



REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON GENERAL ELECTION, 1909.

Hobart, 18th August, 1909.

SIR,

IN accordance with instructions received from your predecessor (the Hon. J. W. Evans, C.M.G.), we have the honour to present a report on the General Election for the House of Assembly held on the 30th April, 1909.

CONTENTS OF REPORT.

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SCOPE OF THE REPORT.

1. This report is confined to a description of the conduct of the General Election, 1909, and to a consideration of certain alterations which have been suggested for improving the single transferable vote system of proportional representation. Accordingly, we have not dealt with the general political questions connected with proportional representation; nor have we considered how far other systems, such as the list systems in use in most of the countries of Europe, and the mark system, would be suitable for use in Tasmania. At the same time, we have included in the tables of the Appendix much information which, though not necessary for the main purpose of our report, will be of value in the discussion of other systems.

THE RULES OF “THE ELECTORAL ACT, 1907.”

2. The rules in Schedule (4) of “The Electoral Act, 1907,” are adapted from a Bill introduced in the Parliament of South Australia in July, 1906, and from a Bill laid before the Commonwealth Parliament in August, 1906, neither of which became law.

3. Their distinguishing features, as compared with the rules of “The Electoral Act, 1896” (commonly called in Tasmania the “Hare-Clark system”), are the use of the Gregory fractional method of transfer of surpluses, and the use of the Droop quota in place of the higher Hare quota.

4. The Gregory fractional method of transfer is discussed in Para. 20.

5. The use of the Droop quota has been criticised. This quota is now advocated almost universally in place of the Hare quota, but it seems desirable to state shortly the reasons for using it in place of the Hare quota.

The Hare quota and Droop quota defined.

The Hare quota (so called from its use by Thomas Hare, the originator in England of proportional representation by single transferable vote) is the number obtained by dividing the number of valid votes by the number of members to be elected. This quota was used in "The Electoral Act, 1896."

The Droop quota (so called after Mr. H. R. Droop, a Cambridge mathematician, who advocated it in 1868 and 1869) is obtained by dividing the number of valid votes by one more than the number of members to be elected, and adding 1.

Thus, in the case of a constituency of 4200 voters, electing six members, the Hare quota is one-sixth of 4200 (or 700), and the Droop quota is one more than one-seventh of 4200 (or 601).

Comparison of the two quotas in a contest between candidates.

6. Considering an election as a contest between candidates, it is clear that a candidate who obtains, in the instance given in Paragraph 5, the Droop quota (601 votes) has more votes than it is possible for each of six other candidates to obtain; and therefore the first-mentioned candidate has sufficient votes to entitle him to election. Even if the Hare quota is used, any candidate who obtains a number of votes equal to the Droop quota is elected, for the reason stated in the last sentence; and a candidate who obtains the Hare quota receives an excess of votes which are not really required by him, and which are therefore wasted. Hence it is clear that, considering an election as a contest between candidates, the Droop quota is to be preferred to the Hare quota.

Quotation from Baily's "Proportional Representation in Large Constituencies."

We take the following extract from a pamphlet, entitled "Proportional Representation in Large Constituencies," by Walter Baily (London, Ridgway, 1872):—

"We have still to consider what is the sufficient number of votes to be retained for each candidate. The rule in use in Denmark (and adopted by Mr. Hare, for finding this number, which is called the quota) is to divide the number of votes by the number of members to be elected. This is simple, but still it is wrong. For example, if we apply Mr. Hare's plan to an election of two members, in which 100 votes are given—70 for *A* first, and then *B*, and 30 for *C*—we should obtain the quota by dividing 100 by 2; and then retaining this quota of 50 votes for *A*, we should hand over 20 votes to *B*; and the votes would then stand, *A* 50, *C* 30, *B* 20, and therefore we should have *A* and *C* elected. And yet it is clear that, as 70 is more than twice 30, *A* and *B* should have been the candidates elected.

"The number of votes to be retained for a candidate must be enough to make his election certain, whatever combination may be made of the other votes given in the election. The smallest number which will suffice for this is the true quota; all votes retained beyond this number are wasted. There is no difficulty in finding this number. Suppose that two members have to be elected, we must retain for a candidate votes enough to insure his being one of the first two, and this we shall do if we retain for him just over a third of the whole number of votes given. It is impossible for three persons each to have more than one-third of the votes, so that any candidate who has more than one-third by ever so little is certain to be one of the first two, in whatever way the rest of the votes may be distributed. In the same way, we see that if five members have to be elected, a candidate who has more than one-sixth of the votes will certainly be one of the first five, and therefore elected; and so for any other number of members. The rule, then, for finding the true quota is this:—Divide the number of votes by the number just above that of the members to be elected, and take as a quota the number just above the quotient.

"In the example given above, the true quota just exceeds one-third of 100. It is therefore 34. The 70 votes given to *A*, *B*, will then be divided into 34 for *A*, 34 for *B*, and 2 over. *C* has only 30 votes; and the result is that *A* and *B* are elected, and it is clear they should be.

"It will be observed that some votes are wasted. This must needs be, whatever mode of election is adopted. If a constituency has only one member, a candidate who gets a bare majority will be elected, and it will be of no moment whether the remaining votes are for him or against him. All except the bare majority can have no effect upon the election, and may be considered as wasted. But as the number of members is increased, the unavoidable waste is diminished. With five members the effective votes for each will just exceed one-sixth, and therefore the waste votes will just fall short of the remaining sixth; in fact, the unavoidable waste will always just fall short of the true quota."

7. But these arguments do not decide the superiority of one quota over the other if an election is considered, not as a contest between candidates, but as a contest between parties. For here we have to consider the possibility of one or more candidates of a party securing election on less than a quota, and so obtaining for their party an amount of representation in excess of its proportional share. With the Hare quota it is very easy for a party to secure excessive representation by returning several candidates with less than the quota. With the Droop quota this is impossible in a two-party contest (except when papers become exhausted through the neglect of voters to give a preference to each candidate of their party), and in a contest between more than two parties disproportional representation would probably occur much less frequently with the Droop quota than with the Hare quota.

Comparison of the two quotas in a contest between parties.

Take the case of an election of six members by 210 voters, 63 of whom belong to party *A*, and 147 to party *B*, and assume the Hare quota is used. Party *A*, having roughly one-third of the voters, is entitled to two members, and party *B* to 4. When all candidates but seven have been excluded, the state of the poll might be that the five remaining candidates of party *B* had respectively 30, 30, 29, 29, 29 votes each (total 147); and the two remaining candidates of party *A* 35 and 28 each (total 63). The candidate lowest on the poll has now to be excluded; that is, the *A* candidate with 28 votes is excluded, and there are left six candidates—five of party *B*, and one of *A*, who are declared elected. That is, party *A*, instead of getting two members, has got only one; and party *B*, instead of four members, has got five.

Illustration of return of candidates with less than quota if Hare quota used.

Now this has happened solely because the use of the Hare quota (35) has wasted the four votes which the *A* candidate, with 35 votes, had in excess of the Droop quota (31). If the Droop quota had been used, this surplus of four would have been distributed before the exclusion of the lowest candidate. It would naturally have gone to the other candidate of the party, whose votes would thus have been raised from 28 to 32; and the candidate excluded as lowest on the poll would then have been one of the *B* candidates. Thus, the result would have been the correct result—party *A*, two members; party *B*, four members.

It is interesting to note in passing that if, in the election for Franklin, the Hare quota had been used, and if there had been no cross-voting between the candidates of the Labour Party and other candidates by voters who gave their first preferences to Non-labour candidates, and no exhaustion of the papers of such voters, the Labour Party would have secured only one member in place of the two to whom it was entitled in proportion to the number of its supporters.

Illustration from Franklin election of effect of waste of votes with Hare quota.

There are a large number of cases in which the Hare quota produces disproportional representation. On the other hand there are some cases in which the Droop quota, for another reason, does the same. The comparison of the merits of the two quotas, therefore, involves an examination of the range of values in which these cases occur. This has been made by one of the writers (E. L. Piesse) and L. F. Giblin, who, by an argument unsuitable for this report, have shown that in a two-party contest for a six-member electorate, in which votes do not become exhausted through a voter failing to vote for all the candidates of his party, the Hare quota may be in error to the extent of one member for a range about three times as great as that in which the Droop quota can be in error. It therefore follows that in a two-party contest, as in a contest between two members, the Droop quota is superior to the Hare quota.

The superiority of the Droop quota.

A similar comparison in a three-party contest has been made for particular cases only.

THE SCRUTINY AT THE GENERAL ELECTION.

8. As the rules contained in Schedule (4) of "The Electoral Act, 1907," had not been used previously at a Parliamentary Election, several mock elections were held prior to the General Election to gain experience of the working of the rules and of the most efficient arrangements for conducting the scrutiny. It was at first intended to adopt the arrangement of staff and method of recording preferences used at the election of 1897 (see R. M. Johnston, "Observations on the Working Results of the Hare System of Election in Tasmania," Proc. Roy. Soc. Tas. 1897, p. 75, at pp. 82, 83, and pamphlet pp. 18, 19); but these arrangements were, after a test, abandoned in favour of the much more efficient method used at the Pro-

Preliminary experiments.

Arrangement of
furniture.

portional Representation Society's model election, held in December, 1908 (see Journal of the Proportional Representation Society, December, 1908, p. 107).

9. The furniture of the room in which the scrutiny was carried out was arranged as follows:—The Returning Officer's table at the head of the room, a long sorting-table in the centre of the room, and counting-tables (one for each candidate) on either side of the sorting-table.

On the Returning Officer's table was placed a set of pigeon-holes (one for each candidate), with pigeon-holes for informal and exhausted papers, all suitably labelled; and also a similar set of open boxes, with the like labels.

On the sorting-table were placed sets of open sorting-trays (one for each sorter), with the same labels as the pigeon-holes; and each counting-table had a similar set of trays, and was labelled with the name of the candidate whose papers were being counted at it. At each counting-table was one counting-clerk.

Procedure at the
Scrutiny.

10. The parcels of ballot-papers received from the polling-places for each district were opened by the Returning Officer at the head table, and were distributed by messengers among the sorters at the sorting-table. The sorters sorted them according to the first preference, at the same time examining them for informalities and placing in the compartment for informals for reference to the Returning Officer any which seemed to be irregular. The sorters did not count the papers. Messengers collected from all the sorting-trays the papers on which a particular candidate had the first preference, and took them to the table at which his papers were being counted. The counter counted them into bundles of 50 each, at the same time checking the sorting, and also examining the papers for informalities. Each bundle of 50 was checked, and the totals for each candidate added up. Any papers found to have been missorted were sent to the correct tables.

The papers were then done up in bundles (one for each candidate), and were brought up to and placed in the open boxes at the head table, where an assistant returning officer labelled them, and called out the numbers to another assistant returning officer, who recorded them on the scrutiny abstract. The papers were then placed in the appropriate pigeon-holes at the head table.

The second and subsequent counts were made in the same way, the assistant returning officer in charge of the scrutiny abstract taking the parcel of papers required for the count from the pigeon-holes, and checking the totals returned by the counters, when the count was completed, with the number given out.

Whenever a candidate became elected or excluded his label was removed from the counting and sorting-trays, so that no further choices should be counted to him.

At the head table, in addition to the Returning Officer and assistant returning officers, were two counting-clerks, who made the calculations required in transferring votes, and assisted in labelling the packets. The calculations were also checked by an arithmometer in the case of the Franklin, Denison, and Wilmot scrutinies.

Number of Staff.

11. The staff employed was as follows:—

Bass	25
Darwin	14
Denison	40
Franklin	27
Wilmot	26

In the Denison and Franklin scrutinies the staff was reduced after the distribution of surpluses obtained at the first count.

As a sorter was able to go through papers more quickly than a counter, two counters were employed for each sorter.

It was not found possible to employ the whole staff continuously, as many of the counts were small. With the experience now gained we think that in future a smaller staff will be sufficient.

Time occupied by
Scrutiny.

12. The scrutiny could not be commenced until the ballot-papers from all the polling-places of the district had reached the Returning Officer. This necessarily involved a delay of some days in four of the districts, but the rough result of the counting of the first preferences, conducted at each polling-place and sent in by telegraph, was announced on the night of the election. The counting of the first

preferences at the polling-places was not relied on for the scrutiny, and all papers were re-examined and counted again at the chief polling-place for the district.

The time occupied in the scrutiny at the chief polling places for the districts was as follows:—

	Hour.
Bass	15
Darwin	11
Denison	11
Franklin	9
Wilmot	10

The poll closed in each district at 6 p.m. on 30th April.

All the ballot-papers for Denison reached the Returning Officer at 9.30 p.m. on the night of the poll. The scrutiny was commenced at 10 p.m., and was continued through the night to 9 a.m. next morning, when it was concluded, and the result announced.

The scrutiny for Bass was concluded on 4th May; for Darwin on 4th May; for Franklin on 5th May; and for Wilmot on 3rd May.

13. An advantage of the scrutiny, not possessed by a scrutiny under the ordinary method of voting, is that the counting of most of the parcels at the first count, and of many of the parcels at other counts, is checked again by the recounting of the parcels at subsequent counts. The number of miscounted or mis-sorted papers discovered at subsequent counts was very small. In Denison, where there were over 19,000 examinations of papers, only three miscounted papers and three mis-sorted papers were found. It was possible to rectify most of these errors immediately they were discovered, and none of them, even if not rectified, could have affected the result of the election. The number of miscounted and mis-sorted papers in the other districts was equally small, and in no district could the result of the election have been affected in any way by these errors.

Checks on the accuracy of the Scrutiny.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE ELECTION.

14. The working of the system, from the point of view of Returning Officers, was an unqualified success. No serious difficulty of any kind was found in conducting the scrutiny. The scrutines for two of the districts were carried out in country towns, where the number of persons available for choice of a staff was small; but here, as elsewhere, no serious difficulty was found.

Successful working of the system.

15. From the point of view of the electors, it is of interest to examine the number of informal ballot-papers. These amounted in each district, except Wilmot, to less than 3 per cent., and in the case of Wilmot, to 3.44 per cent., of all the ballot-papers; and the average for the whole of Tasmania was 2.86 per cent.

Number of informal Ballot-papers.

The percentages of informal ballot-papers in previous elections are shown in Table II. In comparing one election with another, it is to be remembered that changes in the method of voting, whether by striking out the names of the candidates objected to, by placing crosses opposite the names of the candidates voted for, or by numbering in order of preference the candidates voted for, and the varying strictness of Electoral Acts, are responsible for some of the variations in the percentages of informal papers shown by this table.

Comparison with previous elections—see Table.

The percentage of informal ballot-papers was higher than at the General Election for the House of Assembly in 1906, but lower than at the Federal Election of December, 1906.

16. The principal discussions in regard to the Hare system are concerned with the extent to which it will or will not provide representation for what are called "sectional interests," and as to the advantages or disadvantages which attend such representation. This matter we regard as outside the scope of an official report. The facts on which to base an opinion as to how far "sectional interests" did or did not secure representation are difficult to ascertain, and are not known to us officially. It may, however, be permissible to state that there were several "lists" of candidates published for the guidance of electors and supported by various organisations. Some comment has been made because persons supporting these lists did not secure the amount of representation which, as it was supposed, they

Representation of "sectional interests."

might have obtained under the former system of single electorates; but it has not been shown that this is due to any other cause than the insufficient numbers of the supporters of the various lists. An examination of the scrutiny abstracts shows that there was so much cross-voting between the supporters of the various lists that (except in regard to candidates supported by the Labour Party) it is impossible to discuss the amount of representation obtained by each.

The representation secured by the Labor Party proportional to the number of its supporters.

The voters who gave their first preference to candidates of the Labour Party, however, appear to have voted for all the candidates of their party, and rarely for any other candidates; and it is accordingly permissible, for the purposes of the following calculation, to assume the number of voters who supported the Labour Party to be equal to the number who gave their first preferences to candidates of the party. Hence we obtain the following table:

District.	Number of Voters who supported the Labour Party (<i>i.e.</i> , voters who gave first preferences to candidates of the Labour Party).	Total Number of other Voters.	Number of Members to which Labour Party entitled in proportion to number of its supporters.	Number of Members returned by the Labour Party.
Bass	3275	5795	2.17	2
Darwin	5493	3912	3.51	4
Denison	3218	8119	1.70	2
Franklin	3448	6837	2.01	2
Wilmot.....	3633	5230	2.46	2
ALL	19,067	29,893	11.69	12

The Labour Party therefore obtained exactly the number of members in each electorate to which it was entitled; in the case of Darwin and Wilmot the number of members it obtained being the whole number nearest to its proportional share of the representation for each district.

EXAMINATION OF AMENDMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN PROPOSED FOR IMPROVING THE WORKING OF THE RULES OF SCHEDULE (4).

The Municipal Representation Bill, 1908.

17. In the year 1908 a Bill, promoted by the Proportional Representation Society, to allow municipal boroughs in England to adopt for their elections a system of proportional representation, was examined and approved by a Select Committee of the House of Lords, and was passed by that House. It did not, however, pass through the House of Commons.

This Bill contains a system of proportional representation very similar to that of "The Electoral Act, 1907," of Tasmania, but the rules for the scrutiny (which, it is stated in the journal of the Proportional Representation Society, December, 1908, p. 111, are based on the Tasmanian Act of 1896) differ in several details from the Tasmanian rules to the Act of 1907. We proceed first to examine these differences.

Classification of rules of M.R. Bill which differ from Tasmanian rules.

18. We have classified the rules contained in the first schedule to the Municipal Representation Bill, 1908, which differ materially from the Tasmanian rules, for convenience of reference, according as, (a) their adoption in place of or in addition to the corresponding Tasmanian rules could not alter the result of an election; or (b) their adoption might occasionally alter the result.

(A) Rules which could not alter the result of an election.

(a) Rules which could not alter the result of an election:—

(i) The provision—Rule 4, sub-rule (5)—for the postponement of the transfer of a surplus, if the surplus, together with any other surpluses not transferred, does not exceed the difference between the totals of the two continuing candidates lowest on the poll;

- (ii) The provision—Rule 7, sub-rule (2)—for the simultaneous exclusion of two or more candidates if the total of their votes, together with any surpluses not transferred, is less than the votes of the next highest candidate;
 - (iii) The provision—Rule 9, sub-rule (2)—for the filling of the last vacancy if the votes of one unelected candidate exceed the votes of all other continuing candidates, together with any surpluses not transferred; and
 - (iv) The similar provision—Rule 9, sub-rule 3)—for filling two or more vacancies.
- (b) Rules which might occasionally alter the result of an election :—
- (i) The provision, in the transfer of surpluses, for selecting for transfer a number of papers equal to the number of surplus votes in place of transferring all papers containing the votes which produced the surplus;
 - (ii) The provision for raising the transfer-value in cases where some of the papers containing the votes which produced the surplus have no further available preference marked on them.

(B)(i)&(ii) Rules which might alter the result of an election.

19. The rules (a) are ingenious provisions which, by decreasing the number of counts and transfers, would shorten the work of the returning officer. The addition of any one or more of them to the Tasmanian rules could in no wise alter the result of an election, subject only to the unimportant qualification (in respect of which they are superior to the Tasmanian rules) that the number of votes lost by omitting fractional remainders might be less than with the present Tasmanian rules.

The adoption of rules (A) recommended.

We recommend that, when opportunity offers, the rules (a) should be added to the Tasmanian rules.

20. The rule (b) (i) is a return to the Electoral Act of 1896. In the system advocated by Hare, a surplus was distributed by selecting at random from the papers of the elected candidate a number of papers equal to the surplus, and by transferring one vote to each candidate for each of these selected papers on which he had the next choice. The votes obtained by other candidates from the surplus of an elected candidate would thus depend on the particular selection made by the returning officer.

The rule B (i) for the selection of papers on transfer of a surplus considered. Hare's rule.

This result of the selection of papers by the returning officer was pointed out as a defect by critics, and in 1868 Mr. H. R. Droop, in his pamphlet "On Methods of Electing Representatives" (Macmillan), and again in 1881, in a paper "On the Methods of Electing Representatives," published in the Journal of the Statistical Society for June, 1881, showed that it could be avoided by the expedient of distributing a surplus to unelected candidates in proportion to the number of papers in the whole parcel producing the surplus, not in a selection only from the parcel on which each candidate was given the next preference. Mr. Droop did not, however, recommend this plan, as he thought it impracticable and unnecessary.

Droop's suggestion for avoiding chance.

The distinguishing feature of "The Electoral Act, 1896," of Tasmania (now repealed) was the adoption, for the first time in practice, of rules for distributing a surplus in the way proposed by Mr. Droop. And the result of the elections held under that Act showed that there was no difficulty in applying these rules, at least in an election in which only a few thousand papers were to be counted.

The transfer of surpluses according to the rules of the Electoral Act, 1896, and the rules of the M.R. Bill.

According to the rules of "The Electoral Act, 1896," all the papers in the parcel which produces a surplus are re-examined, and the number of next choices for each continuing candidate counted. Each continuing candidate then gets a share of the surplus proportionate to the number of next choices recorded for him on all the papers of the parcel. Thus far the rules are the same as those of "The Electoral Act, 1907," of Tasmania, and of the Municipal Representation Bill; and there is as yet no possibility of chance in the operation of the returning officer affecting the distribution of votes.

The rules of "The Electoral Act, 1896," and of the Municipal Representation Bill then provide that from the papers on which each continuing candidate has the next choice shall be taken at random a number of papers equal to the number of votes obtained by the candidate from the surplus. These selected papers are thereafter treated as worth one vote each, and if it becomes necessary to examine them again (for instance, if the candidate to whom they are transferred is subsequently

excluded), each of them is worth one vote each to the candidate having the next available choice.

The remaining element of chance in the rules of the Electoral Act and the M.R. Bill.

It is clear that these rules allow of chance influencing the result of the election, not in respect of the votes obtained by the candidates who share in the surplus (since these votes are not determined by a random selection), but in respect of the votes obtained from them by other candidates, if and when it becomes necessary to transfer the votes of the candidates who share in the surplus. One selection of papers may contain a large proportion of papers on which a candidate, *A*, has the next choice after the candidate sharing in the surplus; another selection may contain a small proportion of such papers. Consequently, from the former *A* would get more votes, if the papers were again transferred, than from the latter.

This element of chance eliminated by the Gregory fractional method of transfer in the Electoral Act, 1907.

This remaining element of chance is got rid of by what is called Gregory's fractional method of transfer, and this is embodied in the rules of Schedule (4) to "The Electoral Act, 1907," of Tasmania.

By this method, ascribed by Professor E. J. Nanson in his pamphlet "The Real Value of a Vote and How to Get It" (pp. 16, 22) to Mr. J. B. Gregory, of Melbourne, all papers in the parcel producing the surplus are transferred each to the candidate having the next choice thereon, and each with a fractional value. If, for instance, 80 papers produce a surplus of 19 votes, each paper is transferred to the next candidate thereon as worth nineteen-eightieths of a vote. There is here no random selection of papers, and no possibility of chance affecting the result. Each paper receives its correct value, and this value it retains through the remainder of the election. If the papers are again dealt with, each candidate having the next available choice after the candidate sharing in the surplus obtains nineteen-eightieths of a vote from each paper when the papers are again examined. No operation of the returning officer affects the number of votes any candidate gets, and each paper has a total value of one vote, and none a value of more than one vote, in determining who shall be elected.

The rules of "The Electoral Act, 1907," therefore get rid completely of any possibility that a chance selection of papers by the returning officer may affect the result.

Additional labor due to Gregory fractional method of transfer.

But the additional rules necessary to do this increase the work of the returning officer. It is therefore a matter of some interest to determine whether the additional rules are really required.

Calculations of the amount of chance remaining with the rules of the M.R. Bill examined.

Calculations of eminent mathematicians have been published in the Journal of the Proportional Representation Society and elsewhere which show that the element of chance in Hare's system, which was removed by the rules of the Tasmanian Act of 1896, would not (with constituencies of 25,000) affect an election more than about once in 10,000 years. These calculations are doubtless based on some simple assumptions as to the shuffling of ballot-papers, and as to the frequency of close contests; but our experience in the recounts which we have made, as mentioned below, leads us to doubt whether any simple assumptions as to shuffling can be made. The ballot-papers as they come in from the polling-places are found to be in sets—in one set there will be a large number of consecutive papers on which *A* is 1 and *B* is 2; in another set a large number of consecutive papers on which *A* is 1 and *C* is 2; and so for subsequent preferences—and no amount of sorting, mixing, and shuffling which is practicable with a large number of pieces of paper can be relied on to produce the same average distribution in all parts of a large packet. If a random selection is made of a part only of the packet, the proportion of papers on which *B* has the next choice may be much greater, or much less, than in the whole packet. We think, then, that there can be no question that the improvements contained in "The Electoral Act, 1896" are indispensable. The further question, whether the removal of the much less important element of chance got rid of under "The Electoral Act, 1907," by Gregory's fractional method of transfer is worth the additional labour it entails, is also, we think, incapable of satisfactory treatment by calculations based on probabilities; and we accordingly report in full detail the results of the recounts we have made.

The number of votes in the late Election subject to this element of chance—see Table.

We refer to Table XII. (suggested to us by an interesting calculation made by Mr. R. M. Johnston in "Observations on the Working Results of the Hare System of Election in Tasmania," Proc. Roy. Soc. Tas., 1897, p. 75), which shows the number of votes of which the distribution might have been altered if Rule (b) (i) of the Municipal Representation Bill, 1908, for the transfer of surpluses had been used at the late election in place of the corresponding rules of "The Electoral

Act, 1907." From this table it appears that the percentage of votes of which the distribution might have been altered varied from 4.14 per cent. in Franklin to 0.51 per cent. in Denison, and that the average for all the districts was a little more than 2 per cent. These figures show that the percentage of votes which might be affected is small; yet the number of votes which might be affected in a large constituency would be important in a close contest.

It can also be shown from the scrutiny abstracts for Darwin and Wilmot that no possible alteration in the distribution of votes which could be produced by using the Rule (b) (i) could affect the result of the elections for these districts, the reason being that the contests in these districts were not close. Similar results could not be predicted from the abstracts for the other districts.

Having obtained this information, we proceeded to perform the scrutiny for each district in accordance with the rules of the Municipal Representation Bill. At the beginning of each re-scrutiny the papers were put back into the packets they were in at the end of the first count at the General Election; that is, the papers were in the packets into which they had been sorted according to number 1 choices; and some packets contained sub-packets sorted according to the number 2 choices. This was done so that the labour of the recount might be shortened as much as possible, by using the sorting done at the General Election. But great care was taken to shuffle thoroughly any packets whose previous sorting might vitiate the comparison to be made between the results according to the two sets of rules; and we believe that the papers were shuffled as thoroughly as they could ever be at an election.

The re-scrutiny for each district was then carried out according to the rules of the Municipal Representation Bill. The result was, that in each district the same candidates were excluded in the same order, and the same candidates were returned, as at the General Election.

The same results would therefore have been obtained, and much labour saved, if the rules of the Municipal Representation Bill had been used.

But a comparison of the scrutiny abstracts will show that there are serious alterations in the distributions of the votes. These alterations would affect close contests; and if close contests were frequent we should think it undesirable that such alterations should be possible. We have no information from which we can judge how frequent close contests are.

Tables X., XI., and XIII. contain further comparisons between the results of using the two sets of rules.

The principal disadvantage of the Gregory fractional method of transfer is that it involves a large number of small transfers. Whilst these transfers are being carried out the greater part of the staff must remain idle. The examinations of the papers for these transfers do not take a long time, but the arranging and labelling of the papers is tedious, and requires great care. With the rules of the Municipal Representation Bill the number of transfers is much decreased, small transfers are rare, the whole staff is kept employed more continuously, and the results can be obtained in a shorter time. Thus we estimate that the Denison scrutiny, which occupied 11 hours with the Tasmanian rules, could have been completed under the rules of the Municipal Representation Bill in five or six hours; the Franklin scrutiny, in place of nine hours, could probably have been finished in about five hours.

This saving of a few hours is not of great importance, but the difference in the times occupied would become much greater if there were more candidates and a larger number of papers. The larger the number of papers the greater is the number of transfers required with the Gregory fractional method of transfer, and consequently the greater the amount of time spent in arranging in packets and labelling. We consider that if the number of candidates exceeded by more than 12 the number of members to be elected, the labour required by the Gregory fractional method of transfer would become intolerable; and we should hesitate to recommend it for constituencies of over 20,000 voters returning more than, say, eight members. But we think there would be no great difficulty in working the system for constituencies returning not more than six members if the number of candidates was not more than double the number of members to be elected, however large the number of voters. The additional labour required by the Gregory method increases much more with an increase in the number of candidates than with an increase in the number of voters.

No chance operation of the returning officers could have affected the results in Darwin and Wilmot.

Rescrutiny according to rules of M.R. Bill.

Results the same as with Tasmanian rules.

But results might not be same if contests close.

Further comparisons in tables.

Saving of time occupied by Scrutiny if rules of M.R. Bill used.

This saving of time not important in small elections.

Recommendation that Gregory fractional method of transfer be retained in Tasmania.

The case, however, is different for the small constituencies which we have in Tasmania, and we are of opinion that, for these constituencies, it is unnecessary to abandon the Gregory fractional method of transfer in favour of Rule (b) (i) of the Municipal Representation Bill.

The rule B (ii) condemned.

21. The Rule (b) (ii) seems to us to be unnecessary, and we think it operates unjustly. A striking instance of the way in which it may alter the distribution of a surplus appears from the scrutiny abstracts for Bass, according to the rules of the Municipal Representation Bill. At the last count (transfer of Mr. Sadler's surplus) Mr. Mackenzie obtained, with the use of this rule, 145 votes, in place of 75 which he would have obtained if the Tasmanian transfer-value had been used. It happened that this did not affect the result, but cases would often occur when such a large alteration in the distribution of a surplus would result in the return of another candidate. The effect of the rule is magnified, too, by the larger surpluses which occur with the rules of the Municipal Representation Bill.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDMENT OF "THE ELECTORAL ACT, 1907."

Rules (A)—Par. 19.

22. The adoption of rules (a) has been recommended in par. 19.

Decimal form of transfer value.

We think that the rules fixing the transfer-value should be amended so as to compel the use of the decimal form of the fraction in place of the vulgar fraction. The amendment should provide that the first four figures following the decimal point obtained by dividing the number of surplus votes by the number of papers producing it shall be taken as the transfer-value, no approximation being made for the value of the fourth figure.

Informalities—same number opposite two or more names.

Section 127 (iv) of the Act should be amended so that a paper which has the same number (not being the number 1, 2, or 3) opposite the names of more than one candidate shall not be informal, but shall be treated as if there were no preference marked on it subsequent to the number next below the number which is repeated.

Informalities—Gap in numbering of preferences.

Provision should also be made for the case in which there is a gap in the sequence of numbers (*e.g.*, a paper which has the preferences 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, but not the preference 4).

CONCLUSION.

23. In conclusion, we have great pleasure in recording our thanks to the officers of the Commonwealth and Tasmanian Public Services, who gave their services voluntarily for many nights to assist us in preparing the tables contained in the appendix. We wish to mention especially the Commonwealth Audit Inspector for Tasmania (Mr. F. A. MacDonald) and his staff, Messrs. J. W. Brocklehurst, T. L. Westbrook, and C. G. Lake, Mr. J. W. Clinch (General Post Office), Mr. J. P. Laughton (Statistician's Office), and Mr. A. E. Walker (Registry of Deeds).

P. C. DOUGLAS.
E. L. PIESSE.
W. A. BIRCHALL.

The Honourable the Chief Secretary.

APPENDIX.

RULES OF "THE ELECTORAL ACT, 1907."

RULES OF THE MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION BILL (ENGLISH), 1908.

GENERAL ELECTION, 1909 —

- Table I.—Number of Electors on Rolls and Number who Voted.
 Table II.—Number and Percentage of Informal Ballot-papers.
 Table III.—Sources of Informalities of Ballot-papers.
 Table IV.—Exhausted Ballot-papers.
 Table V.—Number of Choices recorded for all Candidates.
 Table VI.—Number of Choices recorded for each Candidate.
 Table VII.—Analysis of the Votes at the end of the Scrutiny.
 Table VIII.—Average Value as a Fraction of a Vote of each Choice recorded.
 Table IX.—Number of Examinations of Papers.
 Table X.—Comparison with Number of Examinations required by Rules of the Municipal Representation Bill.
 Table XI.—Comparison of Number of Packets into which Papers were sorted according to Rules of "The Electoral Act, 1907," and according to the Rules of the Municipal Representation Bill.
 Table XII.—Table showing the Number of Votes of which the Distribution might have been altered if the Rule (b) (i) of the Municipal Representation Bill, 1908, for the transfer of surpluses had been used in place of the Rules of "The Electoral Act, 1907."
 Table XIII.—Re-scrutiny according to the Rules of the Municipal Representation Bill. Table showing the approximate Number of Votes at all Counts of which the Distribution was altered by the use of Rule (b) (i).
 Scrutiny Abstract for—Bass.
 Darwin.
 Denison.
 Franklin.
 Wilmot.
 Re-scrutiny according to Rules of Municipal Representation Bill :—Scrutiny Abstract for—
 Bass.
 Darwin.
 Denison.
 Franklin.
 Wilmot.

RULES OF "THE ELECTORAL ACT, 1907."

(SCHEDULE 4.)

Sect. 130.

In this Schedule, unless the contrary intention appears—

"Returning Officer" means the Returning Officer for the District:

"Quota" means the number of votes sufficient to elect a candidate:

"Surplus" means the number of votes which a candidate has obtained, at any stage of the scrutiny, over and above the quota:

"First choice recorded for a candidate" means a voting-paper on which the number 1 is placed in the square opposite the name:

"Second choice recorded for a candidate" means a voting-paper on which the number 2 is placed in the square opposite his name:

"Transfer value" means that portion of a vote which is unused by—

(a) an elected candidate who has obtained a surplus,

(b) a candidate excluded on account of his being lowest on the Poll, and which is therefore transferred to the candidate next in the order of the voter's preference. The transfer value of all votes is either 1 or some fraction of 1.

Method of Counting Votes where One Member only has to be returned for a District.

First choice for each candidate to be counted.

Candidate obtaining absolute majority to be elected.

Exhausted ballot-papers.

Casting-vote.

First choice of each candidate to be counted.

To find the quota.

Candidates who have the quota to be declared elected.

If first choices exactly equal to quota voting-papers to be set aside.

If a surplus, surplus to be transferred.

Voting papers re-examined and second choices counted.

Find the transfer value.

Multiply second choices by transfer value.

Add result on.

If more than one surplus, largest to be first dealt with.

If surpluses equal, last difference to decide.

1. The number of first choices recorded for each candidate shall be counted, and all informal ballot-papers shall be rejected.

2. The candidate obtaining an absolute majority of votes shall be elected.

An absolute majority of votes means a number greater than One-half of the whole number of ballot-papers other than exhausted and informal ballot-papers. The casting vote of the Returning Officer shall be included in reckoning an absolute majority of votes.

3. If no candidate has an absolute majority of votes, the candidate who has the fewest votes shall be excluded, and each ballot-paper counted to him shall (unless exhausted) be counted to the unexcluded candidate next in the order of the voter's preference.

4. If no candidate then has an absolute majority of votes, the process of excluding the candidate who has the fewest votes and counting each of his ballot-papers (unless exhausted) to the unexcluded candidate next in order of the voter's preference, shall be repeated until one candidate has an absolute majority of votes.

5. Every ballot-paper, not rejected as informal, shall be counted in every count until it becomes exhausted, when it shall be rejected in all further counts. When a candidate is excluded, any ballot-paper counted to him shall be deemed to be exhausted if there is not indicated upon it a consecutive preference for one unexcluded candidate.

6. If on any count two or more candidates have an equal number of votes and one of them has to be excluded, the Returning Officer shall decide which is to be excluded, and if in the final count two candidates have an equal number of votes, the Returning Officer shall decide by his casting vote which shall be elected, but otherwise no Returning Officer shall vote at any election.

Method of Counting Votes where more than One Member has to be returned for a District.

1. The number of first choices recorded for each candidate shall be counted, and all informal voting-papers shall be rejected.

2. The aggregate number of such first choices shall be divided by one more than the number of candidates required to be elected, and the quotient increased by one, disregarding any remainder shall be the quota, and (except as hereinafter provided in Rule 10) no candidate shall be elected until he obtains a number of votes equal to or greater than the quota.

3. Any candidate who has, upon the first choices being counted, a number of such votes equal to or greater than the quota shall be declared elected.

4. Where the number of such votes obtained by any candidate is equal to the quota, the whole of the voting-papers on which a first choice is recorded for such elected candidate shall be set aside as finally dealt with.

5. Where the number of such votes obtained by any candidate is in excess of the quota, the proportion of votes in excess of the quota shall be transferred to the other candidates not yet declared elected, next in the order of the voter's respective preferences, in the following manner:—

i. All the voting papers on which a first choice is recorded for the elected candidate shall be re-examined, and the number of second choices, or (in the case provided for in Rule 12) third or next consecutive choices, recorded for each unelected candidate thereon shall be counted:

i. The surplus of the elected candidate shall be divided by the total number of votes obtained by him on the counting of the first choices, and the resulting fraction shall be the transfer value:

iii. The number of second or other choices, ascertained in paragraph i. to be recorded for each unelected candidate shall be multiplied by the transfer value.

iv. The resulting number, disregarding any fractional remainder, shall be credited to each unelected candidate, and added to the number of votes obtained by him on the counting of the first choices.

6.—(a) Where, on the counting of the first choices or on any transfer, more than one candidate has a surplus, the largest surplus shall be first dealt with. If then more than one candidate has a surplus, the then largest surplus shall be dealt with, and so on: Provided that, if one candidate has obtained a surplus at a count or transfer previous to that at which another candidate obtains a surplus, the surplus of the former shall be first dealt with.

(b) Where two or more surpluses are equal, the surplus of the candidate who was the highest on the poll at the count or transfer at which they last had an unequal number of votes shall be first dealt with; and if they have had an equal number of votes at all preceding counts or transfers, the Returning Officer shall decide which candidate's surplus shall be first dealt with.

- 7.—(a) Where the number of votes obtained by a candidate is raised up to or above the quota by a transfer as aforesaid, he shall thereupon be declared elected. And in such case, notwithstanding the fact that he may have reached the quota, such transfer shall be completed, and all the votes to which he is entitled therefrom shall be transferred to him, but no votes of any other candidate shall be transferred to him. If transfer raises candidate up to or above quota he to be declared elected.
- (b) Where the number of votes obtained by a candidate is raised up to, but not above, the quota by a transfer as aforesaid, the whole of the voting-papers on which such votes are recorded shall be set aside as finally dealt with. If votes exactly equal to quota voting-papers to be set aside.
- (c) Where the number of votes obtained by a candidate is raised above the quota by a transfer as aforesaid, his surplus shall be transferred to the candidates next in the order of the voter's respective preferences, in the following manner:— If surplus created, surplus to be transferred.
1. The voting-papers on which are recorded the votes obtained by the elected candidate in the last transfer shall be re-examined, and the number of third, or (in the case provided for in Rule 12) next consecutive choices recorded for each unelected candidate thereon counted. Voting-paper of last transfer re-examined and third choices counted.
 - ii. The surplus of the elected candidate shall be divided by the total number of voting-papers mentioned in paragraph i., and the resulting fraction shall be the transfer value. Find the transfer value.
 - iii. The number of third (or other) choices, ascertained in paragraph i. to be recorded for each unelected candidate, shall be multiplied by the last-mentioned transfer value: Multiply third choices by transfer value.
 - iv. The resulting number, disregarding any fractional remainder, shall be credited to each unelected candidate, and added to the number of votes previously obtained by him. Add result on.
- 8.—(a) Where, after the first choices had been counted and all surpluses (if any) have been transferred as hereinbefore directed, no candidate, or less than the number of candidates required to be elected, has or have obtained the quota, the candidate who is lowest on the poll shall be excluded, and all the votes obtained by him shall be transferred to the candidates next in the order of the voter's respective preferences, in the same manner as is directed in Rule 5. When all surpluses dealt with candidate lowest on poll to be excluded and his votes transferred.
- (b) The votes obtained by such excluded candidate as first choices shall first be transferred, the transfer value of each vote in this case being 1. First choices to be transferred first.
- (c) The other votes of such excluded candidate shall then be dealt with in the order of the transfers in which, and at the transfer value at which, he obtained them. The other votes in order.
- (d) Each of the transfers which takes places under the two previous clauses of this rule shall be deemed for all purposes to be a separate transfer. Each transfer deemed a separate transfer.
- 9.—(a) Where the number of votes obtained by a candidate is raised up to or above the quota by any such transfer as aforesaid, he shall thereupon be declared elected. And in such case, notwithstanding the fact that he may have reached the quota, such transfer shall be completed, and all the votes to which he is entitled therefrom shall be transferred to him, but no other votes shall be transferred to him. If transfer raises candidate up to quota, he to be declared elected.
- (b) Where the number of votes obtained by a candidate is raised up to, but not above, the quota by any such transfer as aforesaid, the whole of the voting-papers on which such votes are recorded shall be set aside as finally dealt with. If votes exactly equal to quota, voting-papers to be set aside.
- (c) Where the number of votes obtained by a candidate is raised above the quota by any such transfer as aforesaid, his surplus shall be transferred to the candidates next in the order of the voters' respective preferences in the same manner as is directed by Rule 7, Clause (c): Provided that such surplus shall not be dealt with until all the votes of the excluded candidate have been transferred. If surplus created, surplus to be transferred.
- (d) Where any surplus exists it shall be dealt with before any other candidate is excluded. Surpluses to be dealt with before further exclusion.
10. The same process of excluding the candidate lowest on the poll and transferring to other candidates his votes shall be repeated until all the candidates, except the number required to be elected have been excluded, and the unexcluded candidates, who have not already been so declared, shall then be declared elected. Process of exclusion to be repeated until there remain number of candidates required.
11. Where at any time it becomes necessary to exclude a candidate, and two or more candidates have the same number of votes and are lowest on the poll, then whichever of such candidates was lowest on the poll at the last count or transfer at which they had an unequal number of votes shall be first excluded, and if such candidates have had an equal number of votes at all preceding counts or transfers the Returning Officer shall decide which candidate shall be first excluded. If lowest candidates equal last difference to decide.
12. In determining what candidate is next in the order of the voter's preference, any candidates who have been declared elected or who have been excluded shall not be considered, and the order of the voter's preference shall be determined as if the names of such candidates had not been on the voting-paper. If a candidate elected or excluded his name not considered on voting-paper.
13. Where on any transfer it is found that on any voting-paper there is no candidate opposite whose name a number is placed, other than those who have been already either declared elected or excluded, such voting-paper shall be set aside as exhausted. Exhausted votes.

RULES OF THE MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION BILL (ENGLISH) 1908.

RULES FOR THE TRANSFER OF VOTES AND FOR ASCERTAINING THE RESULT OF THE POLL.

Arrangement of Ballot-papers.

1. After the ballot-papers have been mixed, in accordance with the rules contained in the First Schedule to "The Ballot Act, 1872," the returning officer shall draw out all ballot-papers which he does not reject as invalid and file in a separate parcel those on which the figure 1 is set opposite the name of the same candidate. The returning officer shall then count the number of papers in each parcel.

Ascertainment of Quota.

2. The returning officer shall then add together the numbers of the papers in all the parcels and divide the total by a number exceeding by one the number of vacancies to be filled, and the result increased by one, disregarding any fractional remainder, shall be the number of votes sufficient to secure the return of a candidate, herein called the "quota."

Candidates with Quota elected.

3. Any candidate whose parcel contains a number of papers equal to or greater than the quota shall be declared elected.

Transfer of Surplus Votes.

4.—(1) If the number of candidates elected under the last rule shall not equal the number of vacancies the returning officer shall as far as possible transfer from each elected candidate the votes (if any) in excess of the quota (herein called surplus votes) to the candidates indicated on the ballot-papers as next in order of the voters' preference, excluding candidates already declared elected. The votes of the candidate having the largest number of votes shall first be dealt with, and the particular votes to be transferred shall be determined in accordance with the following regulations:—

- (a) The returning officer shall arrange all the ballot-papers in the parcel of the elected candidate on which votes capable of transfer are given by filing in a separate sub-parcel those on which a next preference is indicated for some one continuing candidate.
- (b) The returning officer shall also make a separate sub-parcel of the ballot-papers in the parcel on which the votes given are not capable of transfer.
- (c) The returning officer shall count the ballot-papers in each sub-parcel, and also the total of all the ballot-papers containing votes capable of transfer.
- (d) If the total number of votes capable of transfer is equal to or less than the surplus votes the returning officer shall transfer all the votes capable of transfer.
- (e) If the total number of votes capable of transfer is greater than the surplus votes, the returning officer shall transfer from each sub-parcel of votes capable of transfer the number of votes which bears the same proportion to the total of the sub-parcel as the number of surplus votes bears to the total of all the votes capable of transfer.
- (f) The number of votes to be transferred from each sub-parcel under the preceding regulation shall be ascertained by multiplying the total of the sub-parcel by the number of surplus votes and dividing the result by the total number of votes capable of transfer. Fractional remainders shall be disregarded.
- (g) The particular votes transferred from each sub-parcel shall be those last filed in the sub-parcel.

(2) The transfer of surplus votes shall be effected by making new sub-parcels of the ballot-papers on which those votes are given, and adding those sub-parcels to the parcels (if any) of the candidates to whom the transfers are made, or, where any such candidate has as yet no parcel, a new parcel shall be formed for him from the papers transferred.

(3) All ballot-papers in a parcel of an elected candidate not transferred under this rule shall be set aside as finally dealt with, and the votes given thereon shall henceforth not be taken into account.

(4) If two or more parcels of elected candidates are equal in size, the returning officer shall decide which parcel he will first deal with under this rule.

(5) A transfer of votes under this rule shall not be made unless the surplus votes of the elected candidate, together with any other surplus votes not transferred exceed the difference between the totals of the votes of the two continuing candidates lowest on the poll.

(6) This rule shall take effect subject to the provisions for filling the last vacancy hereinafter contained, and if at any time it shall be possible to fill the last vacancy under those provisions no further transfer under this rule shall be made.

Result of Transfer.

5. After the transfer of the surplus votes of an elected candidate any candidate who shall as a result of the transfer obtain the quota of votes shall be declared elected.

Further Transfer of Surplus Votes.

6.—(1) Unless and until the last vacancy shall have been filled under the provisions hereinafter contained, if, after the transfers directed by Rule 4, there shall still remain a vacancy, and the votes of any elected candidate to whom a transfer has been made are in excess of the quota, the returning officer shall, as far as possible, take from the sub-parcel last transferred to that candidate a number of votes equal to the surplus.

(2) The particular votes to be taken shall be determined in accordance with the regulations given in Rule 4 hereof, in the same manner as if the votes included in the sub-parcel last transferred had been the only votes given to the candidate; the ballot-papers so taken shall be added in separate sub-parcels to the parcels of the continuing candidates (if any) indicated thereon as next in order of the voters' preference, and the votes given thereon shall be transferred to those candidates accord-

ingly. Where any such candidate has as yet no parcel, a new parcel shall be formed for him from the papers transferred.

(3) The remaining ballot-papers in the parcel of the elected candidate (including the ballot-papers taken from the parcel under Sub-Rule (1), on which the votes given are not capable of transfer) shall be set aside as finally dealt with, and the votes given thereon shall henceforth not be taken into account.

(4) After any transfer of votes under this rule any candidate who shall as a result of the transfer obtain the quota of votes shall be declared elected.

(5) The process directed by this rule shall be repeated until the last vacancy is filled or until no candidate has any surplus votes, whichever shall first happen.

(6) If two or more parcels shall be equal in size, regard shall be had to the number of votes counted to each candidate under Rule 1, and the parcel of the candidate highest on that count shall first be dealt with, but if the numbers of votes on that count were equal the returning officer shall decide which parcel he will first deal with under this rule.

(7) A transfer of votes under this rule shall not be made unless the surplus votes of the elected candidate, together with any other surplus votes not transferred, exceed the difference between the totals of the votes of the two continuing candidates lowest on the poll.

Distribution of Votes of Lowest Candidate.

7.—(1) Unless and until the last vacancy shall have been filled under the provisions hereinafter contained, if after the transfers under the preceding rules there shall still remain one or more vacancies, or if no candidate shall have been declared elected under Rule 3, the returning officer shall exclude from the poll the candidate having the lowest number of votes, and shall distribute the votes capable of transfer on the ballot-papers in his parcel among the continuing candidates next in order of the voters' preference. Any ballot-papers in the parcel on which votes not capable of transfer are given shall be set aside as finally dealt with, and the votes given thereon shall henceforth not be taken into account.

(2) If in any case the total of the votes of the two or more candidates lowest on the poll, together with any surplus votes not transferred, is less than the votes of the next highest candidate, the returning officer may in one operation exclude those candidates from the poll and distribute their votes in accordance with the foregoing provisions.

(3) After the distribution under this rule of votes capable of transfer any candidate who has received the quota shall be declared elected.

(4) The surplus votes of any candidate elected under this rule who has received more than the quota shall be distributed in the manner directed by, and subject to the conditions of, the last preceding rule.

Further Distributions.

8. The process directed by the last rule shall be repeated on the successive exclusions one after another of the candidates with the lowest number of votes until the last vacancy is filled, either by the election of a candidate with the quota, or under the next following rule.

Filling the Last Vacancy.

9.—(1) When the number of continuing candidates is reduced to the number of vacancies remaining unfilled, the continuing candidates shall be declared elected.

(2) When only one vacancy remains unfilled and the votes of some one continuing candidate exceed the total of all the votes of the other continuing candidates, together with any surplus votes not transferred, that candidate shall be declared elected.

(3) When more than one vacancy remains unfilled and the votes of the candidate, who, if all the vacancies were filled by the successive elections of the continuing candidates with the largest numbers of votes, would be the last to be elected, exceed the total of all the votes of the continuing candidates with fewer votes than himself, together with any surplus votes not transferred, that candidate and all the other continuing candidates who have not less votes than himself shall be declared elected.

(4) When only one vacancy remains unfilled and there are only two continuing candidates, and those two candidates have each the same number of votes, and no surplus votes remain capable of transfer, one candidate shall be declared excluded under the next following rule and the other declared elected.

Provisions for Exclusion of Candidates in Special Cases.

10. If at any time when a candidate has to be excluded under these rules two or more candidates have each the same number of votes regard shall be had to the number of votes counted to each candidate under Rule 1, and the candidate lowest on that count shall be excluded; but if the numbers of votes on that count were equal the returning officer shall decide which candidate shall be excluded.

Public Notice of Transfers.

11. The returning officer shall record and give public notice of any transfer of votes made under these rules, and of the total number of votes counted to each candidate after any such transfer, in addition to the particulars described by Rule 45 to the First Schedule to "The Ballot Act, 1872." Such public notice may be in accordance with the form given in the appendix to these rules.

Recounts.

12.—(1) Any candidate or his agent may at any time during the counting of the votes, either before the commencement or after the completion of the transfer of the votes (whether surplus or otherwise) of any candidate, request the returning officer to recount the papers then comprised in the parcels of all or any candidates not being papers set aside as finally dealt with, and the returning officer shall forthwith recount the same accordingly. The returning officer may also, at his discretion, recount votes either once or more often in any case in which he is not satisfied as to the accuracy of any previous count. Provided that nothing herein shall make it obligatory on the returning officer to re-count the same votes more than once.

- (2) If upon an election petition—
- (i) any ballot-papers counted by the returning officer are rejected as invalid, or
 - (ii) any ballot-papers rejected by the returning officer are declared valid,
- the court may direct the whole or any part of the ballot-papers to be recounted, and the result of the election ascertained, in accordance with these rules.
- (3) Except as in this rule expressly provided, no recount shall be had whether on an election petition or otherwise.

Determination of Questions as to Transfers.

- 13.—(1) If any question shall arise in relation to any transfer the decision of the returning officer, whether expressed or implied by his acts, shall be final, unless an objection is made by any candidate or his agent before the declaration of the poll, and in that event the decision of the returning officer may be reversed upon an election petition.
- (2) If any decision of the returning officer is so reversed, the transfer in question, and all operations subsequent thereto, shall be void, and the court shall direct what transfer is to be made in place thereof, and shall cause the subsequent operations to be carried out, and the result of the election to be ascertained in accordance with these rules.

Definitions.

14. In these rules—
- (1) The expression "votes capable of transfer" means votes given on ballot-papers on which a further preference is indicated for a continuing candidate.
- Provided that a vote shall be deemed not capable of transfer in any case in which—
- (a) The names of two or more candidates (whether already excluded from the poll or declared elected or not) are marked with the same figure and are next in order of preference, or
 - (b) The name of the candidate to whom the transfer is to be made or of some candidate (whether continuing or not) higher in the order of the voters' preference is marked—
 - (i) by a figure not following consecutively after some other figure on the ballot-paper, or
 - (ii) by two or more figures.
- (2) The expression "continuing candidates" means candidates not already declared elected or excluded from the poll.

GENERAL ELECTION, 1909.

TABLE I.—General Election, 1909. Number of Electors on Rolls and Number who Voted, with certain Percentages.

District.	Number of Electors on Rolls.			Number of Electors who Voted.			Percentage of Voters to Number on Roll.			Percentages of Male and Female Voters to Total Number of Voters.	
	Male.	Female.	Total.	Male.	Female.	Total.	Male	Female.	Male and Female.	Male.	Female.
Bass	10,353	10,315	20,668	5682	3626	9308	54·88	35·15	45·04	61·04	38·96
Darwin ..	11,786	7679	19,465	6621	3067	9688	56·18	38·15	49·77	68·34	31·66
Denison ..	8603	10,312	18,915	5959	5704	11,663	69·26	55·32	61·65	51·10	48·90
Franklin ..	10,315	8832	19,147	6646	3918	10,564	64·42	44·36	55·17	62·91	37·09
Wilmot ..	9164	8425	17,589	5601	3578	9179	61·11	42·47	52·19	61·02	38·98
All ...	50,221	45,563	95,784	30,509	19,893	50,402	60·74	43·67	52·62	60·53	39·47

Percentage of Voters at Previous Elections.

Election.	Electorate.	Percentage of Voters to Number on Rolls.			Percentage of Male and Female Voters to Total Number of Voters.	
		Male.	Female.	Male and Female.	Male.	Female.
Federal Senate Election, 12th December, 1906.....	Tasmania	61·65	45·95	54·18	59·66	40·34
Federal House of Representatives Election, 12th December, 1903.....	Bass, Darwin, Denison, Wilmot	62·87	47·19	55·35	59·10	40·90
General Election, House of Assembly, 16th March, 1906...	27 contested electorates	62·10	51·50	57·10	57·36	42·64

TABLE II.—General Election, 1909. Number and Percentage of Informal Ballot-papers.

District.	Total Number of Ballot-papers.	Number of Informal Papers.	Percentage of Informal Papers.
Bass	9308	238	2·56
Darwin	9688	283	2·92
Denison	11,663	326	2·79
Franklin	10,564	279	2·64
Wilmot	9179	316	3·44
All	50,402	1442	2·86

Comparison with previous Elections at which Ordinary Method of Voting was Used.

Federal Senate Election, 12th December, 1906	48,879	2192	4·48
Federal House of Representatives Election, 12th December, 1906 (four contested divisions) ..	40,194	1583	3·94
General Election, House of Assembly, 16th March, 1906 (27 contested electorates)	40,322	487	1·21

NOTE.—In comparing the percentages of informal ballot-papers at the elections mentioned, it must be remembered that changes in the method of marking ballot-papers (whether by cross opposite the candidates voted for, by striking out the names of candidates not voted for, or by numbering the candidates in order of preference) are responsible for many of the informalities.

TABLE III.—General Election, 1909. Informal Ballot-papers.

Sources of Informalities.	Bass.	Darwin.	Denison.	Franklin.	Wilmot.	Total of each Description.
<i>Postal Ballot-papers disallowed for following reasons:—</i>						
(a) Counterfoil not signed by voter	1	13	14
(b) Signature of voter on counterfoil not witnessed	4	4
(c) Signature of voter on counterfoil not witnessed by authorised witness	10	10
<i>Defective preference numbering:—</i>						
(a) No candidate marked No. 1	13	9	19	12	11	64
(b) Less than three marked in order of preference	51	72	89	62	59	333
(c) Same number opposite more than one candidate	38	15	57	23	97	230
<i>Figures not recognisable</i>	35	19	4	30	37	125
<i>No vote indicated on Ballot-papers:—</i>						
(a) Each choice marked thus <input type="checkbox"/>	35	51	78	54	33	251
(b) " " " " <input type="checkbox"/>	31	66	25	67	42	231
(c) " " " " <input type="checkbox"/>	1	5	4	3	1	14
(d) Names merely struck out	13	14	6	5	9	47
(e) Blank papers	9	17	14	11	7	58
<i>Ballot-papers not initialed</i>	1	..	11	15	27
<i>Voter identifiable by writing</i>	4	12	1	1	5	23
<i>Papers mutilated or otherwise defective</i>	8	1	2	11
TOTALS	238	283	326	279	316	1442

TABLE IV.—General Election, 1909. Exhausted Ballot-papers.

District.	No. of valid ballot-papers.	No. of Papers which became exhausted.	Percentage of Papers which became exhausted.	No. of Papers of value 1 vote each when exhausted.	No. of other exhausted papers.	No. of Votes lost by exhaustion of Papers.	Average unused value in Votes of each exhausted Paper.	No. of Choices marked on Exhausted Papers.										Total.
								3 Ch. only.	4 Ch. only.	5 Ch. only.	6 Ch. only.	7 Ch. only.	8 Ch. only.	9 Ch. only.	10 or more Ch.			
Bass	9070	576	6.35	193	383	251	.44	282	124	48	109	9	2	2	576	
Darwin ...	9405	174	1.85	27	147	87	.50	45	10	7	112	174	
Denison... 11,337	1312	11.57	469	843	708	.54	397	746	53	114	2	1312	
Franklin . 10,285	2176	21.16	404	1772	696	.32	1913	147	74	42	2176	
Wilmot ... 8863	281	3.18	127	154	159	.57	201	48	7	25	281	
All	48,960	4519	9.23	1220	3298	1901	.42	2838	1075	189	402	11	2	2	4519	

TABLE V.—General Election, 1909. (a.) Number of Choices recorded for all Candidates.

District.	No. 1 Chs.	No. 2 Chs.	No. 3 Chs.	No. 4 Chs.	No. 5 Chs.	No. 6 Chs.	No. 7 Chs.	No. 8 Chs.	No. 9 Chs.	No. 10 Chs.	No. 11 Chs.	No. 12 Chs.	No. 13 Chs.	No. 14 Chs.	No. 15 Chs.	No. 16 Chs.
Bass	9070	9070	9070	7394	4608	3937	1298	1013	740	172	163	156	149
Darwin ..	9405	9405	9405	5669	5211	4933	117	99	95
Denison ..	11,337	11,337	11,337	8736	5402	4699	271	188	130	116	95	89	75	75	74	67
Franklin ..	10,285	10,285	10,285	4519	3631	2930	206	108	83	40	38	32
Wilmot ..	8863	8863	8863	4810	3740	3254	308	128	113	94
All ..	48,960	48,960	48,960	31,128	22,592	19,753	2200	1536	1161	422	296	277	224	75	74	67

(b.) Number of Choices marked on all valid Ballot-papers.

District.	No. of Papers having—															
	3 Chs. only.	4 Chs. only.	5 Chs. only.	6 Chs. only.	7 Chs. only.	8 Chs. only.	9 Chs. only.	10 Chs. only.	11 Chs. only.	12 Chs. only.	13 Chs. only.	14 Chs. only.	15 Chs. only.	16 Chs. only.		
Bass	1676	2786	671	2639	285	273	568	9	7	7	149	
Darwin ..	3736	458	278	4816	18	4	95	
Denison ..	2601	3334	703	4428	83	58	14	21	6	14	..	1	7	67	..	
Franklin ..	5766	888	701	2724	98	25	43	2	6	32	
Wilmot ..	4053	1070	486	2946	180	15	19	94	
All ..	17,832	8536	2839	17,553	664	375	739	126	19	53	149	1	7	67	..	

TABLE VI.—General Election, 1909. Numbers of the Several Choices recorded for each Candidate.

District of Bass.

Name	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Bakhap	1193	820	646	418	352	277	83	74	68	3	6	4	6
Batchelor	556	660	659	565	514	418	130	67	42	6	6	8	3
Cullenan	654	573	746	1147	129	98	25	10	13	18	19	32	29
Evans	386	735	1211	753	176	131	20	19	23	25	36	22	9
Grubb	225	692	470	390	370	375	209	169	79	14	7	12	3
Guy	1523	1260	1153	387	140	135	30	22	18	28	17	16	7
Howroyd	712	1170	777	887	168	127	25	21	20	22	17	21	28
Metz	566	376	396	305	365	274	134	176	224	11	10	9	9
McKenzie	590	525	673	508	473	416	134	91	44	14	9	5	8
Sadler	665	885	925	799	612	484	114	65	39	10	5	3	1
Shields	194	278	383	432	494	462	226	188	95	9	16	10	10
Solomon	1459	647	517	425	383	291	63	39	28	2	2	10	11
Stewart	347	449	514	378	432	449	105	72	47	10	13	4	25
	9070	9070	9070	7394	4608	3937	1298	1013	740	172	163	156	149

District of Darwin.

Name.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Belton	893	671	748	1815	814	587	6	4	5
Hurst	382	942	610	813	1779	510	16	18	5
Long	1270	2045	1002	626	320	360	7	4	12
Ogden	1514	865	1325	768	643	312	10	6	5
Payne	1653	1335	810	126	126	113	11	14	11
Riley	219	265	640	563	822	2040	13	15	20
Urquhart	1090	1221	1456	135	89	111	15	12	12
Watkins	1215	942	1425	678	527	761	20	10	8
Whitsitt	1169	1119	1389	145	91	139	19	16	17
	9405	9405	9405	5669	5211	4933	117	99	96

District of Denison.

Name.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
Amott	534	365	409	373	389	394	27	20	7	11	5	7	5	3	4	4
Crowther	873	1109	1302	649	404	322	25	14	10	4	5	3	0	4	1	0
Davies	850	1461	1109	462	288	213	17	13	8	9	6	2	0	1	5	4
Gilmore	439	533	583	636	476	377	22	24	5	10	10	5	2	3	1	1
Jarvis	483	581	525	466	398	346	21	14	21	9	2	1	1	1	5	0
Kerr	491	589	583	670	528	471	21	7	16	5	1	4	0	7	1	3
Leary	212	297	672	1526	154	94	5	6	8	4	7	5	10	9	13	13
Lewis	1921	1118	897	388	310	211	22	4	7	8	3	2	4	3	3	5
Macmaster	219	256	378	386	492	487	25	18	8	8	4	5	2	3	1	1
Meagher	823	451	407	388	375	325	19	16	5	5	10	11	10	2	1	2
Rattle	821	572	538	496	397	375	13	14	6	5	4	7	3	1	1	4
Rowntree	366	282	415	343	361	324	8	9	4	15	6	11	3	0	1	0
Sheridan	877	1382	819	360	140	122	10	3	8	5	10	11	12	8	6	2
Smyth	299	482	1004	466	428	405	23	14	5	12	10	5	4	4	2	0
Smythe	891	878	910	570	124	72	7	2	9	2	7	4	11	15	16	11
Woods	1238	981	786	557	138	161	6	10	3	4	4	7	8	11	13	17
	11337	11337	11337	8736	5402	4699	271	188	130	116	95	89	75	75	74	67

District of Franklin.

Name.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Bennett	646	403	645	458	645	430	18	3	6	7	1	1
Dicker	1061	1800	718	112	73	47	1	4	2	8	5	7
Earle	2258	1320	626	142	75	70	3	4	6	3	6	2
Evans	1347	1026	764	448	342	221	19	11	3	8	3	3
Ewing	1244	872	773	396	296	260	29	7	11	1	2	2
Giblin	588	596	673	518	272	230	16	19	7	0	5	2
Hean	882	1359	1096	533	375	353	19	5	4	1	0	1
Hilton	129	523	2183	131	72	55	3	5	2	4	7	7
Hodgman	829	1311	1142	734	448	311	14	11	9	2	0	0
Leatham	740	233	392	270	255	290	33	17	10	4	3	1
Lipscombe	130	329	436	252	285	276	32	13	16	1	2	0
Wood	431	513	837	525	493	387	19	9	7	1	4	6
	10285	10285	10285	4519	3631	2930	206	108	83	40	38	32

District of Wilmot.

Name.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Best	935	690	595	609	615	550	23	2	7	5
Dumbleton	518	537	603	632	819	650	24	4	3	5
Field	930	699	692	619	555	585	21	9	4	5
Hope	1232	1302	1077	551	229	159	13	6	2	5
Jensen	1955	894	1087	132	58	58	13	19	7	36
Kean	599	1521	1370	118	53	50	11	28	38	15
Lee	822	750	902	618	512	488	27	4	7	1
Lyons	1079	1444	1329	93	76	65	21	29	32	12
Murray	572	885	972	848	625	395	14	6	7	1
Waterworth	221	141	236	590	198	254	141	21	6	9
	8863	8863	8863	4810	3740	3254	308	128	113	94

TABLE VII.—General Election, 1909.—Analysis of the Votes at the End of the Scrutiny (that is, the Votes of the Six Successful Candidates and of the Seventh Candidate at the end of the Scrutiny).

District.	Of these Votes the following Numbers were given to these Seven Candidates as—										Total Effective at End of Scrutiny	Votes exhausted or lost as fractions.	Total Votes recorded.
	No. 1 Choices.	No. 2 Choices.	No. 3 Choices.	No. 4 Choices.	No. 5 Choices.	No. 6 Choices.	No. 7 Choices.	No. 8 Choices.	No. 9 Choices.	No. 10 and Subsequent Choices.			
Bass	6406	1224	709	233	111	56	16	12	3	..	8770	300	9070
Darwin	8325	739	159	50	21	5	9299	106	9405
Denison	7102	2251	814	273	97	57	3	10,597	740	11,337
Franklin	7479	1589	339	80	37	26	2	9552	733	10,285
Wilmot	6864	1040	458	262	52	7	8683	180	8863
All	36,176	6843	2479	898	318	151	21	12	3	..	46,901	2059	48,960

District.	Of these Votes the following Percentages were given to the Six Successful Candidates and the Seventh Candidate as—						
	No. 1 Choices.	No. 2 Choices.	No. 3 Choices.	No. 4 Choices.	No. 5 Choices.	No. 6 Choices.	No. 7 and Higher Choices.
Bass	73·04	13·96	8·08	2·66	1·27	0·64	0·35
Darwin	89·53	7·94	1·71	0·54	0·23	0·05	..
Denison	67·02	21·24	7·68	2·58	0·91	0·54	0·03
Franklin	78·30	16·64	3·55	0·83	0·39	0·27	0·02
Wilmot	79·05	11·98	5·27	3·02	0·60	0·08	..
All	77·13	14·59	5·28	1·92	0·67	0·33	0·08

TABLE VIII.—General Election, 1909. Average Value as a Fraction of a Vote of each Choice recorded.

(Obtained by dividing the Numbers of Votes in Table VII. by the Numbers of corresponding Choices in Table V. (a).)

District.	No. 1 Choices. Value in Votes.	No. 2 Choices. Value in Votes.	No. 3 Choices. Value in Votes.	No. 4 Choices. Value in Votes.	No. 5 Choices. Value in Votes.	No. 6 Choices. Value in Votes.	No. 7 Choices. Value in Votes.	No. 8 Choices. Value in Votes.	No. 9 Choices. Value in Votes.
Bass	·706	·135	·078	·032	·024	·014	·102	·012	·004
Darwin	·885	·079	·017	·009	·004	·001
Denison	·626	·199	·072	·031	·018	·012	·011
Franklin	·727	·155	·033	·018	·010	·009	·009
Wilmot	·775	·117	·052	·055	·014	·002
All	·739	·140	·051	·029	·014	·008	·009	·008	·003

NOTE.—This Table gives the average values of all Choices recorded, not merely of the Choices which produced the Votes effective at the end of the Scrutiny. Consequently, if a mark system were used in which every choice recorded received the value shown by the Table the result of the Election would not necessarily be the same.

TABLE IX.—General Election, 1909. Number of Examinations of Papers.

District.	Number of Candidates.	Number of Valid Ballot-papers.	Total Number of Examinations of Papers.	Average Number of Examinations per Paper.
Bass	13	9070	16,640	1·8
Darwin	9	9405	14,683	1·6
Denison	16	11,337	19,429	1·7
Franklin	12	10,285	18,547	1·8
Wilmot	10	8863	13,706	1·5
All	48,960	83,005	1·7

TABLE IX.—General Elections, 1909. Number of Examinations of Papers —*continued.*

District.	Number of Papers examined—								Percentage of Papers examined—							
	Once only.	Twice only.	Three times only.	Four times only.	Five times only.	Six times only.	Seven times.	Total.	Once only.	Twice only.	Three times only.	Four times only.	Five times only.	Six times only.	Seven times.	Total.
Bass	3814	3322	1569	349	16	9070	42·05	36·62	17·30	3·85	·18	100
Darwin ...	5637	2516	994	258	9405	59·94	26·75	10·57	2·74	100
Denison ...	5482	3756	1925	164	8	2	...	11,337	48·36	33·13	16·98	1·44	·07	·62	...	100
Franklin ...	6009	1935	829	1379	133	10,285	58·42	18·82	8·06	13·41	1·29	100
Wilmot ...	5597	1817	1321	128	8863	63·15	20·51	14·90	1·44	100
All	26,539	13,346	6638	2278	157	2	...	48,960	54·20	27·25	13·54	4·65	·32	·04	...	100

TABLE X.—Comparison of the Number of Examinations of Papers required according to the Rules of "The Electoral Act, 1907," and according to the Rules of the M.R. Bill.

District.	Number of Candidates.	Number of Valid Ballot-papers.	General Election, 1909 (Rules of "Electoral Act, 1907").		Scrutiny according to Rules of M.R. Bill.	
			Number of Examinations.	Average per Paper.	Number of Examinations.	Average per Paper.
Bass	13	9070	16,640	1·8	15,197	1·7
Darwin	9	9405	14,683	1·6	13,298	1·4
Denison	16	11,337	19,429	1·7	18,654	1·6
Franklin	12	10,285	18,547	1·8	15,675	1·5
Wilmot	10	8863	13,706	1·5	13,073	1·5
All.....	..	48,960	83,005	1·7	75,897	1·5

TABLE XI.—Comparison of the Number of Packets (each requiring separate sorting and labelling) into which the papers were sorted, according to the Rules of "The Electoral Act, 1907," and according to the Rules of the M.R. Bill.

District.	Number of Candidates.	General Election, 1909 (Rules of "Electoral Act, 1907").		Scrutiny according to Rules of M.R. Bill.	
		Number of Packets.	Average per Candidate.	Number of Packets.	Average per Candidate.
Bass	13	265	20·4	86	6·6
Darwin	9	78	8·7	31	3·4
Denison	16	450	28·1	131	8·2
Franklin	12	178	14·8	75	6·2
Wilmot	10	99	9·9	55	5·5
All	60	1070	17·8	378	6·3

TABLE XII.—Table showing the Number of Votes of which the Distribution might have been altered if the Rule (b) (i), (see Para. 18 of the Report), of the Municipal Representation Bill, 1908, for the Transfer of Surpluses had been used in place of the Rules of "The Electoral Act, 1907."

(NOTE.—The number of Votes obtained by each Candidate on a transfer of a Surplus is the same according to both sets of Rules; the difference between the two sets shows itself only when the papers on which these transferred Votes are recorded have to be counted again.)

District.	Some of the Papers distributed in transferring Surpluses had to be counted again; the Value in Votes of the Papers which were counted again was as follows:—					
	(a) Papers which were distributed in transferring Surpluses obtained at First Count, and which were counted again.		(b) Papers which were distributed in transferring Surpluses obtained by Transfer, and which were counted again.		Total of (a) and (b).	
	Value in Votes.	Percentage to Total Votes.	Value in Votes.	Percentage to Total Votes.	Value.	Percentage to Total Votes.
Bass.....	159	1.75%	71 (b)	0.78%	230	2.53%
Darwin.....	54 (a)	0.57	62 (b)	0.66	116	1.23
Denison.....	58	0.51	0 (b)	0.00	58	0.51
Franklin.....	308	2.99	118	1.15	426	4.14
Wilmot.....	123 (a)	1.39	111 (b)	1.25	234	3.64
All.....	702	1.43	362	0.74	1064	2.17

(a) No alteration in the distribution of these votes could have affected the result of the election.

(b) Ditto.

TABLE XIII.—Re-scrutiny according to Rules of M.R. Bill. Table showing the Approximate Number of Votes at all Counts, of which the Distribution was altered by the use of Rule (b) (i), (see Para. 18 of the Report), of the M.R. Bill for the Transfer of Surpluses.

(Compare Table XII.)

District.	Total Number of Votes.	Approximate Number of Votes of which the Distribution was altered in Re-scrutiny.	Approximate Percentage of Votes of which the Distribution was altered in Re-scrutiny.
Bass.....	9070	80	0.0088%
Darwin.....	9405	20	0.0021
Denison.....	11,337	40	0.0035
Franklin.....	10,285	54	0.0053
Wilmot.....	8863	55	0.0062
All.....	48,960	249	0.0051

NOTE.—An exact comparison cannot be made, as in the re-scrutiny according to the rules of the M.R. Bill some surpluses, which were distributed according to the Tasmanian rules, were not further dealt with. The figures given show, however, with sufficient accuracy the amount of chance remaining with the rules of the M.R. Bill.

GENERAL ELECTION, 1909.

SCRUTINY-ABSTRACT FOR DISTRICT OF WILMOT.

(SCRUTINY ACCORDING TO RULES IN SCHEDULE (4) TO ELECTORAL ACT, 1907.)

Number of Members to be elected, 6.

Number of Ballot-papers 9179

Number of Ballot-papers rejected as informal 316

Number of valid Ballot-papers 8863

Quota = $\frac{8863}{7} + 1 = 1267$ (neglecting remainder).

Table I.—Counting of the Choices.

No. of Count.	Description of Choices Counted. ["N.a.c." means "Next available choice."]	Number of choices obtained by each Candidate at Count, or number of Papers placed in each candidate's favor, as stated at source. [A number in a circle—e.g. (7)—is the number of the count at which the Papers above it are counted equal. "N.V." is an abbreviation for "no value," and indicates that the Papers above it have a value of less than one vote.]											Paper exhausted at Count.	Total of Papers counted.	Transfer Value.	Votes transferred to Table II.
		BEST	DUMBLETON	FIELD	HOPE	JENSEN	KEAN	LEE	LYONS	MURRAY	WATERWORTH					
1	First Choices on all Papers	935	518 (7)	330	1232	1955 (2)	599	822	1079	512 (2)	221 (4)		8863	—	8863	
2	N.a.c. after Jensen on his papers at Count 1	16	8 (8)	29	32	—	344	44	849 (3)	10 (12)	23 (5)		1955	$\frac{688}{1955}$	688	
3	N.a.c. after Lyons' on his papers at Count 2	4	1 N.V.	10	4	—	763	13	—	10 (13)	44 (6)		849	$\frac{110}{849}$	110	
4	N.a.c. after Waterworth on his papers at Count 1	24	30 (9)	15	19	—	50	50	—	20 (14)	—	13	221	1	221	
5	N.a.c. after Waterworth on his papers at Count 2	5	1 N.V.	3	1	—	5	6	—	2 N.V.	—	23	$\frac{688}{1955}$		8	
6	N.a.c. after Waterworth on his papers at Count 3	2	3 N.V.	1	1	—	5	3	—	1 N.V.	—	28	44	$\frac{110}{849}$	5	
7	N.a.c. after Dumbleton on his papers at Count 1	53	—	78	133 (10)	—	16	65	—	—	165 (15)	8	518	1	518	
8	N.a.c. after Dumbleton on his papers at Count 2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	6	8	$\frac{688}{1955}$	2	
9	N.a.c. after Dumbleton on his papers at Count 4	7	—	1	—	—	1	7	—	9 (16)	—	5	30	1	30	
10	N.a.c. after Hope on his papers at Count 7	14	—	22	—	—	2	28	—	65 (17)	—	2	133	$\frac{128}{133}$	128	
11	N.a.c. after Murray on his papers at Count 1	125	—	211 (18)	—	—	16	167	—	—	—	53	512	1	512	
12	N.a.c. after Murray on his papers at Count 2	2	—	—	—	—	2	1	—	—	—	5	10	$\frac{688}{1955}$	3	
13	N.a.c. after Murray on his papers at Count 3	1	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	8	10	$\frac{110}{849}$	1	
14	N.a.c. after Murray on his papers at Count 4	4	—	—	—	—	—	7	—	—	—	3	20	1	20	
15	N.a.c. after Murray on his papers at Count 7	48	—	—	—	—	1	79	—	—	—	37	165	1	165	
16	N.a.c. after Murray on his papers at Count 9	—	—	—	—	—	2	5	—	—	—	2	9	1	9	
17	N.a.c. after Murray on his papers at Count 10	17	—	—	—	—	—	22	—	—	—	26	65	$\frac{128}{133}$	62	
18	N.a.c. after Field on his papers at Count 11	131	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	78	211	$\frac{1}{211}$	1	

Table II.—Distribution of the Effective Votes.

No. of Count.	Effective Votes credited to each Candidate at Count (entered above horizontal line) and Total Votes standing to the Credit of each Candidate at end of Count (entered below horizontal line).											Exhausted Votes.	Votes lost by writing Smudges or Erasures.	Total of Votes of all Candidates at end of Count.	Remarks.	No. of Count.
	BEST	DUMBLETON	FIELD	HOPE	JENSEN	KEAN	LEE	LYONS	MURRAY	WATERWORTH						
1	$\frac{935}{935}$	$\frac{518}{518}$	$\frac{330}{330}$	$\frac{1232}{1232}$	$\frac{1955}{1955}$	$\frac{599}{599}$	$\frac{822}{822}$	$\frac{1079}{1079}$	$\frac{512}{512}$	$\frac{221}{221}$			8863	8863	Jensen elected	1
2	$\frac{5}{940}$	$\frac{2}{520}$	$\frac{10}{940}$	$\frac{11}{1243}$	$\frac{-688}{1267}$	$\frac{332}{931}$	$\frac{15}{837}$	$\frac{298}{1377}$	$\frac{3}{575}$	$\frac{8}{229}$		4	4	8863	Jensen's surplus distributed; Lyons elected.	2
3	$\frac{0}{940}$	$\frac{0}{520}$	$\frac{1}{941}$	$\frac{1}{1243}$	$\frac{98}{1267}$	$\frac{1}{1029}$	$\frac{-110}{838}$	$\frac{1}{1267}$	$\frac{1}{576}$	$\frac{5}{234}$		4	8	8863	Lyons's surplus distributed.	3
4	$\frac{24}{964}$	$\frac{30}{550}$	$\frac{15}{956}$	$\frac{19}{1262}$	$\frac{19}{1267}$	$\frac{50}{1079}$	$\frac{50}{888}$	$\frac{20}{1267}$	$\frac{-221}{596}$	$\frac{-221}{73}$	13	13	8	8863	Waterworth excluded & his papers distributed.	4
5	$\frac{1}{965}$	$\frac{0}{550}$	$\frac{1}{957}$	$\frac{1}{1262}$	$\frac{1}{1267}$	$\frac{1}{1080}$	$\frac{2}{890}$	$\frac{0}{1267}$	$\frac{-8}{596}$	$\frac{-8}{5}$	13	3	17	8863		5
6	$\frac{0}{965}$	$\frac{0}{550}$	$\frac{1}{957}$	$\frac{1}{1262}$	$\frac{1}{1267}$	$\frac{1}{1080}$	$\frac{2}{890}$	$\frac{0}{1267}$	$\frac{-5}{596}$	$\frac{-5}{3}$	16	3	2	8863		6
7	$\frac{53}{1018}$	$\frac{-518}{32}$	$\frac{78}{1035}$	$\frac{133}{1395}$	$\frac{16}{1267}$	$\frac{65}{1036}$	$\frac{65}{955}$	$\frac{165}{1267}$	$\frac{165}{761}$		8	24	13	8863	Dumbleton excluded & his papers distributed; Hope elected.	7
8	$\frac{-2}{1018}$	$\frac{30}{1035}$	$\frac{78}{1395}$	$\frac{133}{1267}$	$\frac{16}{1096}$	$\frac{65}{955}$	$\frac{165}{1267}$	$\frac{165}{761}$		2	26	13	8863		8	
9	$\frac{7}{1025}$	$\frac{-30}{1036}$	$\frac{1}{1395}$	$\frac{1}{1267}$	$\frac{1}{1097}$	$\frac{7}{962}$	$\frac{9}{1267}$	$\frac{9}{770}$		5	31	13	8863		9	
10	$\frac{13}{1038}$	$\frac{21}{1057}$	$\frac{-128}{1267}$	$\frac{1}{1267}$	$\frac{26}{1098}$	$\frac{62}{988}$	$\frac{62}{1267}$	$\frac{62}{632}$		1	32	17	8863	Hope's surplus distributed.	10	
11	$\frac{125}{1163}$	$\frac{211}{1268}$	$\frac{16}{1267}$	$\frac{167}{1267}$	$\frac{16}{1114}$	$\frac{167}{1155}$	$\frac{-572}{1267}$	$\frac{260}{260}$		53	85	17	8863	Murray excluded & his papers distributed; Field elected.	11	
12	$\frac{2}{1163}$	$\frac{2}{1268}$	$\frac{1}{1267}$	$\frac{1}{1267}$	$\frac{1}{1114}$	$\frac{1}{1155}$	$\frac{-3}{1267}$	$\frac{257}{257}$		1	86	19	8863		12	
13	$\frac{1}{1163}$	$\frac{1}{1268}$	$\frac{1}{1267}$	$\frac{1}{1267}$	$\frac{1}{1114}$	$\frac{1}{1155}$	$\frac{-1}{1267}$	$\frac{256}{256}$		1	87	19	8863		13	
14	$\frac{4}{1167}$	$\frac{4}{1268}$	$\frac{4}{1267}$	$\frac{4}{1267}$	$\frac{4}{1114}$	$\frac{4}{1162}$	$\frac{-20}{1267}$	$\frac{236}{236}$		9	96	19	8863		14	
15	$\frac{48}{1215}$	$\frac{48}{1268}$	$\frac{48}{1267}$	$\frac{48}{1267}$	$\frac{48}{1115}$	$\frac{48}{1241}$	$\frac{765}{1267}$	$\frac{71}{71}$		37	133	19	8863		15	
16	$\frac{2}{1215}$	$\frac{2}{1268}$	$\frac{2}{1267}$	$\frac{2}{1267}$	$\frac{2}{1117}$	$\frac{2}{1246}$	$\frac{-9}{1267}$	$\frac{62}{62}$		2	135	19	8863		16	
17	$\frac{16}{1231}$	$\frac{16}{1268}$	$\frac{16}{1267}$	$\frac{16}{1267}$	$\frac{16}{1117}$	$\frac{16}{1267}$	$\frac{-62}{1267}$			24	159	20	8863	Lee elected	17	
18	$\frac{1}{1231}$	$\frac{-1}{1267}$	$\frac{1}{1267}$	$\frac{1}{1267}$	$\frac{1}{1117}$	$\frac{1}{1267}$	$\frac{1}{1267}$			—	159	21	8863	Field surplus distributed; Best declared elected.	18	

GENERAL ELECTION, 1909.

SCRUTINY-ABSTRACT FOR DISTRICT OF BASS.

(SCRUTINY ACCORDING TO RULES IN SCHEDULE (4) TO ELECTORAL ACT, 1907.)

Number of Members to be elected, 6.

Number of Ballot-papers 9308

Number of Ballot-papers rejected as informal 238

Number of valid Ballot-papers 9070

Quota = 9070 / 7 = 1296 (neglecting remainder).

Table I.—Counting of the Choices.

Table II.—Distribution of the Effective Votes.

Table I: Counting of the Choices. Columns include Candidate Name, Count, and various ballot categories (BARBAD, METZ, etc.). Rows list candidates like Guy & Solomon, Grubb, Metz, and Batchelor across multiple counts.

Table II: Distribution of the Effective Votes. Columns include Candidate Name, Count, and various ballot categories. Rows show the distribution of votes for each candidate, including notes on excluded papers and surplus distributions.

NOTE.—* = ELECTED.

Main data table with columns for name (e.g., Arnott, Jarvis, Smythe, Rattle, Woods, Sheridan), various counts, and a final column for a summary value (e.g., 51, 52, 53, etc.). The table is organized in two vertical sections across the page.

Jarvis excluded his papers distributed.

Rattle elected.

Rattle surplus distr.

Smythe excluded his papers distributed; Sheridan & Woods elected.

Woods surplus distr.

Sheridan surplus distr. Hoagler cancelled and Crowther & James elected.