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TASMANIA

THE PARLIAMENT OF TASMANIA

REPORT ON GENERAL ELECTION
23rd JANUARY, 1913


WITH STATISTICS OF OTHER ELECTIONS HELD IN
TASMANIA FROM 1903 TO 1913

BY

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Tasmania:

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REPORT ON GENERAL ELECTION. 23RD JANUARY, 1913.

WITH STATISTICS OF OTHER ELECTIONS HELD IN
TASMANIA IN THE YEARS 1903 TO 1913.

Hobart, 8th July, 1913

SIR,

IN accordance with instructions given by you, we have prepared the following report on the General Election for the House of Assembly held on 23rd January, 1913:—

INTRODUCTORY.

1. The General Election was conducted in accordance with "The Electoral Act, 1907," as amended by "The Electoral Act, 1911," and the regulations made thereunder. Introductory.

The rules for counting the votes contained in Schedule 4 of "The Electoral Act, 1907," are not affected by "The Electoral Act, 1911." These rules were used at the General Elections of 30th April, 1909 ⁽¹⁾ and 30th April, 1912, ⁽²⁾ and the recent General Election was thus the third at which they have been used.

We have included in the Tables in the Appendix a summary of the principal Tables contained in the Reports on the Elections of 1909 and 1912; and we have also added some statistics of other elections held in the years 1903 to 1913.

THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 23RD JANUARY, 1913; WITH REMARKS ON THE TABLES IN THE APPENDIX.

2. The number of electors on the rolls on 23rd January, 1913, was 105,292. Electors on rolls.
Table I.
The numbers in the several districts ranged from 18,952 in Wilmot to 22,294 in Denison. The average for the five districts being 21,058, the greatest difference from the average was 2106.

The following table shows the representation in a thirty-member house to which each district is entitled in proportion to the number of electors enrolled in it, and also in proportion to the number who voted, on 23rd January, 1913; with similar information based on the rolls ⁽³⁾ and voting at the Federal elections held on 31st May, 1913.

⁽¹⁾ See *Report on General Election*, 1909, Papers of Parliament, 1909, No. 34.

⁽²⁾ See *Report on General Election*, 1912, Papers of Parliament, 1912, No. 11.

⁽³⁾ The rolls contain the names of persons entitled to vote both at State and Federal elections, and also of those entitled to vote only at Federal elections. On 31st May, 1913, the number of electors entitled to vote only at Federal elections was 315.

Electoral Districts—Representation in Proportion to Enrolment and Voting, 1913.

	Bass.	Darwin.	Denison.	Franklin.	Wilmot.
Representation in proportion to Enrolment, 23rd January, 1913	6.0	5.9	6.4	6.3	5.4
Representation in proportion to Voting, 23rd January, 1913	6.1	5.6	6.3	6.7	5.3
Representation in proportion to Enrolment, 31st May, 1913	6.0	6.0	6.5	6.3	5.3
Representation in proportion to Voting, 31st May, 1913..	5.1	6.1	6.6	6.4	5.8

Redistribution.

From the enrolment at both elections and from the voting on 23rd January, it appears that Wilmot is over-represented, and that Denison and Franklin should return one more member between them. On the basis of the voting on 31st May, however, Wilmot is entitled to retain six members.

Redistribution, if required, would involve arrangements, possibly of some difficulty, with the Commonwealth; and, for other reasons, it should be avoided if possible. We point out below that the method of the uniform quota provides automatically that the representation in each district shall be in proportion as nearly as may be to its electoral population, or rather to the number of electors who record valid votes in it.

Numbers on rolls compared with estimates of adult population.

The numbers of electors on the rolls have increased during the last four years in a much greater ratio than the increase of population, as estimated by the Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics.

The number of electors (102,326) on the rolls on 26th April, 1911 (which were closed on 15th March, 1911), was about 1750 in excess of the adult population (about 100,557) (*) enumerated at the census of 3rd April, 1911; the number of male electors (54,008) was about 2450 in excess of the males enumerated (about 51,552) (*), and the number of female electors (48,318) was about 700 less than the number of females enumerated (about 49,005). (*)

Comparing the rolls on 26th April, 1911, and 31st May, 1913 (the latter closed on 24th April), we find that the number of males enrolled has increased by 843; and the number of females enrolled by 3568. (*) The number of males enrolled on 31st May, 1913 (54,851) was about 1550 in excess of the estimate of adult male population (53,300), and the number of females (51,886) about 2500 in excess of the estimate of adult female population (49,400); a total excess of over 4000. It is estimated that the number of names which occur more than once on the various rolls is over 5000; so that, allowing for the inmates of hospitals for the insane and gaols, and other adults not qualified, the number of persons on the rolls is probably less than the number of persons who are qualified to be enrolled.

Proportion of female electors.**Table V.**

Table V. contains a statement of the "femininity" of the electors from 1909 to 1913. From 1909 to 1911 there was little change in the proportion of females to males; but from 1911 to January, 1913, there was a marked increase in all the districts, and in Denison the ratio has reached the somewhat astonishing figure of 131 women to every 100 men. In all districts the ratios were lower in the rolls used at the Federal Elections of 31st May, 1913.

Number of voters.**Tables II., III., and IV.**

3. Tables II., III., IV. contain statements of the number of voters, and the percentages of electors enrolled who voted, at the elections from 1909 to 1913. In comparing the percentages of voters in the various years, it must be remembered that the duplication of names reduces the apparent percentage of voters, and that this effect of duplication varies from year to year according to the proportion of duplications.

The percentage of voters was about 66 per cent., compared with 73 per cent. at the General Election of 30th April, 1912. The percentage was again highest in Franklin.

(*) In these totals, one-half of the persons whose ages were not specified are assumed to have been over 21.

(*) The Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics estimate that the population of Tasmania on 31st March, 1913, was about 100,975 males and 94,394 females; from which, assuming the same age-distributions as at the Census of 3rd April, 1911, the adult male population on 31st March, 1913, may be estimated to have been about 53,300, and the adult female population about 49,400.

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3. The percentage of male electors who voted was about 72 per cent., and of female electors about 61 per cent.

4. Table VI. contains a statement of the postal votes at the elections held in the years 1909 to 1913. The percentage at the late Election was higher than at any previous election, and, compared with the Election of 30th April, 1912, there was an increase in every district except Denison. The percentage in Denison was again the highest, although, as pointed out in Paragraph 8 of the Report of 1912, there should be less need for voting by post in Denison than in other districts. About 60 per cent. of the applicants for postal vote certificates in Denison stated illness or infirmity as the ground of application, and about 40 per cent. stated as the ground that they would be more than seven miles from their polling-place on the day of the election.

Postal votes.
Table VI.

Table VII. shows the postal votes (first choices) arranged according to parties.

Table VII.

Many applications for postal votes were received too late for the postal vote certificates to be sent to the applicants and returned before the close of the poll.

5. Table VIII. contains a statement of the number of informal ballot-papers in each district, and the percentage of these to all ballot-papers; and Table IX. a comparison with previous elections. The percentage is about the same as at former elections with the single transferable vote (1909, 2'86 %; 1912, 2'85 %; 1913, 2'87%). In 1909 and 1912 the percentages for the districts were lowest in Bass, Denison, and Franklin; but this year Wilmot and Bass were the lowest, and Denison the highest.

Informal Ballot-papers.
Tables VIII. and IX.
Compare 1909, paragraph 15; 1912, paragraph 5.

Comparing the Federal elections in which voting is by making one or more crosses with the State elections in which candidates have to be marked in order of preference, it will be seen that the percentage of informal papers has always been higher at the Senate elections than at the State elections. The only occasion since 1906 on which the percentage has been noticeably smaller than at the elections under the present Electoral Act was at the voting for the Federal Referendums in 1911, at which one cross only was required. It is clear that the method of marking the papers required by the single transferable vote is understood as well as the simpler methods used under the Commonwealth Electoral Act.

Table X. also contains an analysis of the sources of informalities, and it is instructive to compare this table with the similar table (III.) in the Appendix to the Report of 1909. There are differences in the classifications used in these tables, which have been necessitated by the amendments in regard to informalities made in the Electoral Act of 1911; but these do not prevent a useful comparison of the tables. The most numerous cases of informality arise either from an incomplete numbering of three candidates in order of preference (in 1909 these papers are grouped under the heading "Defective Preference Numbering," and in 1913 they form (a) to (d) under the same heading); or from marking three or more names with 1's or crosses, as in the system of block voting used for the Federal Senate (in 1909 these papers are under the heading "no vote indicated on ballot-papers," (a) to (c), and in 1912 they form (e) to (g) under the heading "defective preference numbering").

Table X.

The voters whose numbering of three candidates in order of preference was incomplete were 729, or about 1½ % of all the voters, in 1909; and 809, or just over 1 %, in 1913. In 1913, a new class of informalities was numerous: on 197 papers, two or more candidates were marked 1, and one or more marked 2, &c. This source of informality is probably attributable in the main to the multiple transferable vote system used since August, 1912, by the Tasmanian Workers' Political League in its pre-elections of candidates for the State and Federal Elections, in which the voting is by marking two or more candidates 1 and the others in order of preference. Even with the disturbing effect of this new method of voting, the cases of informality arising from imperfect numbering of preferences have much diminished.

In 1909 the number of voters who marked their papers as in a block-vote election was 496, or about 1 %; in 1913, 967, or about 1½ %. The large increase in this

class of informal paper should not have occurred, for incessant instructions in the method of voting were given by official posters and notices in the newspapers, by leaflets issued by the party organisations, and by candidates and canvassers. It is the large increase under this head that has brought the metropolitan constituency, Denison, to the bottom of the list.

The choices obtained by candidates. Tables XI.-XIV.

6. Tables XI.-XIV. contain analyses and summaries of the choices recorded for each candidate. In addition to information similar to that which was given in the reports for 1909 and 1912, a fuller analysis has been made in Table XII., and this, it may be hoped, will enable answers to be found for many of the questions on the operation of the single transferable vote which are constantly reaching the Electoral Department from other countries.

The elections in which the single transferable vote has been used have usually resulted in the return of the candidates who obtain the greatest number of first choices. In 1913 there were four exceptions, in 1912, three, and in 1909, two.

Values of the choices.

Table XXI.

7. In Table XXI. the average values as fractions of a vote of all choices recorded in 1913, and also the average values of the first choices recorded in 1912, are stated. Comparing this table with Table VIII. of the Report of 1909, it is seen that the first choice has a much greater value than the second or any subsequent choice. The values of the first choices have varied from $\cdot699$ of a vote (Denison, 1912) to $\cdot885$ (Darwin, 1909), and the average values for all the districts at the three elections have been fairly constant— $\cdot739$ in 1909, $\cdot752$ in 1912, and $\cdot800$ in 1913. The variations between the districts are of little significance; the values depend almost entirely on the total number of candidates, and the number who obtain about a quota of votes at the count of the first choices. The second choices (1909 and 1913) have varied in value from $\cdot074$ (Darwin, 1913) to $\cdot199$ (Denison, 1909); and the third choices from $\cdot006$ (Bass, 1913) to $\cdot078$ (Bass, 1913). To summarise, it may be said that a first choice has been worth on the average about three-fourths of a vote; a second choice, about one-eighth of a vote; a third choice, about one-thirtieth; a fourth choice, about one-fiftieth; a fifth, about one one-hundredth; a sixth, about one one-hundred-and-fiftieth.

The candidates nominated by the parties.

8. The election was contested by candidates of two parties, the Liberal Party and the Labour Party, and (in Wilmot) by one Independent candidate. Owing to the shortness of the period from the dissolution of the previous Parliament (27th December, 1912) to polling-day, there was not sufficient time for the party organisations to hold pre-elections: but all the candidates who stood as Liberal and Labour candidates received the support of the organisations of these parties. It is generally considered that it is not advisable for a party to nominate many more candidates than it can return, and doubtless the number of candidates in some of the districts would have been fewer if there had been time for the organisations to hold pre-elections to select the maximum numbers considered advisable.

The candidates in the several districts, and the seats won by the parties, were as follows:—

General Election, 23rd January, 1913.—Candidates and Seats Won.

District.	Candidates.				Seats won.		
	Liberal.	Labour.	Independent.	Total.	Liberal.	Labour.	Independent.
Bass	4	4	—	8	3	3	—
Darwin	5	5	—	10	3	3	—
Denison	7	7	—	14	3	3	—
Franklin	5	4	—	9	3	3	—
Wilmot	5	3	1	9	4	2	—
All	26	23	1	50	16	14	—

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9. Tables XVI.-XVIII. contain information as to party voting, short-voting, and cross-voting. Party-voting, short-voting, and cross-voting.

By "party-voting" we mean the giving of choices to some or all of the candidates of a party, without choices for any candidates of other parties, or the giving of choices to all the candidates of a party, with subsequent choices to candidates of other parties; by "short-voting," the giving of choices to some only, but not all, of the candidates of a party, without choices for any candidates of other parties; and by "cross-voting," the giving of choices to candidates of more than one party (excepting cases in which choices are given to all the candidates of one party and only subsequent choices to other candidates—such cases are cases of "party-voting").

In Table XVI. are tabulated the numbers of papers on which there was party-voting, arranged according to the candidates who received the first choices and according to the numbers of choices recorded. It appears from this table that there was party-voting on 90.3% of the papers on which the first choice was given to a Labour candidate, and on 90.5% of the papers on which the first choice was given to a Liberal candidate. The percentages for the parties range from 87.8% in Wilmot to 92.0% in Bass for the Labour party, and from 86.9% in Wilmot to 93.4% in Bass for the Liberal party. The percentages for the districts range from 87.3% in Wilmot to 92.7% in Bass. Thus it appears that nine out of every ten electors voted only for candidates of one party, and only one in ten for candidates of more than one party. It is noticeable that the percentage of cross-voting is highest in the votes for the candidates who received fewest votes. Table XVI.

In Table XVII. the percentage of voters who voted for all the candidates of either party (the choices, if any, for other candidates being subsequent choices) is shown. Of the voters who gave first choices to Liberal candidates, 80.1% voted for all the Liberal candidates in their district; of the voters who gave first choices to Labour candidates, 82.2% voted for all the Labour candidates in their district. Of all the voters, just 80% voted for all the candidates of one party. Table XVII.

Tables XVI. and XVII. include all papers on which there was short-voting or cross-voting whether or not the transfer of votes was affected; on a large proportion of the papers short-voting and cross-voting did not have any effect, as it was unnecessary to examine the choices at which such voting would be discovered. Table XVIII. shows the effect in loss of votes to the parties of short-voting and cross-voting at the elections of 1912 and 1913; it being assumed that a voter's party allegiance is shown by his No. 1 choice, and that if the vote or a fraction of it goes to the other party through short-voting or cross-voting, the transfer is to be counted as a loss to the party to whom the first choice was given. It will be seen from Table XVIII. that the losses to the parties, estimated in this way, were very small. In 1913 the Liberal party lost one vote in 358 through short-voting, and one in 96 through cross-voting; the Labour party lost one vote in 536 through short-voting, and one in 140 through cross-voting. Table XVIII.

10. Table XIX. contains an estimate of the strengths of the Liberal and Labour parties at the elections of 1909, 1912, and 1913, obtained in three ways: (I.) from the numbers of first choices obtained by the candidates of the parties; (II.) from the aggregate of first, second, and third choices obtained by the candidates; (III.) from the numbers of papers on which there was no cross-voting. The strengths of parties. Table XIX.

In the reports for 1909 (paragraph 16) and 1912 (paragraph 6), the strengths of the parties were estimated by the method (I.). In view of the much higher value of first choices than of subsequent choices (paragraph 7 above), perhaps this method is the best; although both of the other methods give instructive results.

Representation of the parties. Compare 1909, paragraph 16; 1912, paragraph 6.

11. The representation of the parties was for the third time as exactly as possible in proportion to the numbers of first choices obtained by their candidates, as appears from the following table:—

*General Elections, 30th April, 1909, 30th April, 1912, 23rd January, 1913.—
Representation of the Parties.*

District.		Liberal Party. ^(c)			Labour Party.		
		1909.	1912.	1913.	1909.	1912.	1913.
Bass	Proportionate share...	3·83	3·11	2·98	2·17	2·89	3·02
	Seats won	4	3	3	2	3	3
Darwin	Proportionate share...	2·49	2·83	2·93	3·51	3·17	3·07
	Seats won	2	3	3	4	3	3
Denison	Proportionate share...	3·30	3·07	3·12	2·70	2·93	2·88
	Seats won	3	3	3	3	3	3
Franklin	Proportionate share...	3·99	3·44	3·37	2·01	2·56	2·63
	Seats won	4	3	3	2	3	3
Wilmot	Proportionate share...	3·54	3·96	3·35	2·46	2·04	2·17
	Seats won	4	4	4 ^(e)	2	2	2
All	Proportionate share...	18·31	16·35	15·78	11·69	13·65	13·80
	Seats won	18	16	16	12	14	14

The results in Franklin in 1912 and 1913 gave rise to much comment, because in each case the Liberal candidates had in the aggregate nearly a quota (one-seventh) of votes in excess of the Labour candidates, and yet as many Labour candidates were returned as Liberal candidates. Such a result, however, is inevitable with an even number of members for a district; and, whether the number be even or odd, there must always be just under a quota of votes not appropriated for successful candidates, and it will always be possible for these votes to be all for one party. The results in Franklin in each year were as near to exact proportionality as was possible with six members.

The appearance of injustice to either party (though no such case has yet occurred) would be avoided if the uniform quota ^(f) were used. The principle of the uniform quota is, in effect, to add together the remainders of the parties in the various districts, and to use the totals for the whole country in ascertaining the shares of representation of the parties throughout the country.

The smallness of the majority. Compare 1912, paragraph 6.

12. The election resulted, as did the election of 30th April, 1912, in the larger party having a majority of only two members over the smaller party. In proportion to the strengths of the parties, two was the correct majority; but it is generally agreed that a majority of two is inconveniently small.

In the report for 1912, paragraph 6, it was pointed out that the smallness of the majority in 1912 was mainly to be attributed to the number of members for a district being even, and not odd, and it was shown that with five-member districts there would probably have been a majority of three in a house of twenty-five members, and, with seven-member districts, a majority of five in a house of thirty-five members.

If the districts had returned seven members each at the late election, making thirty-five members in all, the Liberal members would probably have numbered 18 and the Labour members 17. A twenty-five member house would almost certainly have been made up of thirteen Liberal and twelve Labour members.

No system certain to give a large majority.

It is clear, then, that if the distribution of party-strengths continues as at the last election, a change from an even to an odd number of members in the present districts will not ensure a larger majority, unless the numbers of members is considerably increased. With a house of about thirty members, it is impossible at present to secure a larger majority unless the proportional principle is deliberately violated. A slight change in the distribution of the strengths of the parties, would, however, produce a larger majority in either a thirty-member or a thirty-five member

^(c) See note to Table XIX.

^(d) The votes transferred to Liberal candidates on the exclusion of the Independent candidate enabled the Liberal party to win a fourth seat.

^(e) See Paragraphs 33, 34, and the Appendix.

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house; while on the other hand, an increase in the number of districts, and consequent reduction in the number returned by each district, though promising a larger majority, might, with a change in the party strengths, give in turn as small a majority as the present districts. Even single-member districts, which usually exaggerate the majority obtained by the larger party, may sometimes give a narrow majority in Parliament, and may even give the smaller party a majority. Examples of both these possibilities are given by the Election for the House of Representatives held on 31st May, 1913; of the former, by the results for Australia as a whole, and of the latter by the results for Tasmania and Western Australia.

113.

THE RULES OF THE MUNICIPAL REPRESENTATION BILL,
1908 (GREAT BRITAIN).

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13. In Paragraphs 17-21 of the Report on the General Election of 1909, the rules for conducting the scrutiny contained in Schedule 4 of "The Electoral Act, 1907," were compared with the rules proposed in a Municipal Representation Bill considered by the House of Lords in 1908. (*)

Rules of the
Municipal Repre-
sentation Bill.

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Paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Report are as follows :—

Quotation from
the Report of
1909.

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" 18. We have classified the rules contained in the first schedule to the Municipal Representation Bill, 1908, which differ materially from the Tasmanian rules, for convenience of reference, according as, (a) their adoption in place of or in addition to the corresponding Tasmanian rules could not alter the result of an election; or (b) their adoption might occasionally alter the result.

Classification of
rules of M.R.
Bill which differ
from Tasmanian
rules.

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(a) Rules which could not alter the result of an election :—

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(i) The provision—Rule 4, sub-rule (5)—for the postponement of the transfer of a surplus, if the surplus, together with any other surpluses not transferred, does not exceed the difference between the totals of the two continuing candidates lowest on the poll;

(ii) The provision—Rule 7, sub-rule (2)—for the simultaneous exclusion of two or more candidates if the total of their votes, together with any surpluses not transferred, is less than the votes of the next highest candidate;

(iii) The provision—Rule 9, sub-rule (2)—for the filling of the last vacancy if the votes of one unelected candidate exceed the votes of all other continuing candidates, together with any surpluses not transferred; and

(iv.) The similar provision—Rule 9, sub-rule (3)—for filling two or more vacancies.

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(b) Rules which might occasionally alter the result of an election :—

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(i) The provision, in the transfer of surpluses, for selecting for transfer a number of papers equal to the number of surplus votes in place of transferring all papers containing the votes which produced the surplus;

(ii) The provision for raising the transfer-value in cases where some of the papers containing the votes which produced the surplus have no further available preference marked on them.

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" 19. The rules (a) are ingenious provisions which, by decreasing the number of counts and transfers, would shorten the work of the returning officer. The addition of any one or more of them to the Tasmanian rules could in no wise alter the result of an election, subject only to the unimportant qualification (in respect of which they are superior to the Tasmanian rules) that the number of votes lost by omitting fractional remainders might be less than with the present Tasmanian rules.

The adoption of
rules (a) recom-
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" We recommend that, when opportunity offers, the rules (a) should be added to the Tasmanian rules."

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In Paragraph 20 of the Report of 1909 the rule (b) (i)—which is similar to the rule for the transfer of surpluses contained in the Electoral Act of 1896—was discussed. A re-scrutiny according to the English rules of the papers at the Gen-

(*) Printed in the Appendix to the Report of 1909.

eral Election of 1909 was made, of which "the result was, that in each district the same candidates were excluded in the same order, and the same candidates were returned, as at the General Election."

But it was shown that in a close contest the differences between the two sets of rules might so affect the distribution of votes as to result in the return of different candidates. At the same time, it was pointed out that the Tasmanian rules would be unsuitable for constituencies in which there were many more candidates than members to be elected. With the constituencies and the number of candidates usual in Tasmania, however, it was possible to use the Tasmanian rules; and the writers of the Report concluded that it was unnecessary to abandon the Tasmanian rules in favour of the rules of the Municipal Representation Bill.

14. With the experience of two other elections available, it is now desirable to reconsider this question. Three General Elections have now been held, each in five districts, making fifteen elections in all, in some of which there were very close contests; and the experience of these is of more value than any abstract reasoning as to what is likely to occur.

The rules applied to the elections of 1912 and 1913.

Taking first the election of 23rd January, 1913, it can be seen from the result-sheets that the English rules must necessarily have resulted in the return of the same candidates for four of the districts. In the remaining district it was just possible that different candidates might have been returned. A re-scrutiny according to the English rules was therefore made; and it was found that the same candidates were returned as with the Tasmanian rules.

For the election of 1912 the results must have been the same in two districts. In the other two it was just possible that the results might have been different; but this could only have happened if the distribution of votes throughout had been as favourable as possible to a different result, and it was so improbable that this should occur that a re-scrutiny was not thought necessary.

The results the same.

We are therefore justified in saying that in each district at each of the three elections—15 contests in all—the results would have been the same with the English rules as with the Tasmanian rules.

In Tables X.-XIII.^(*) on the Appendix to the Report of 1909 the two sets of rules were compared in regard to the work of the returning officer, and to the number of votes whose distribution might be affected by the differences between the rules. Table XXII. of the Appendix to the present Report contains an estimate of the number of votes which might have been affected at the last election. It will be seen from this table that, on the average, these amounted to only about 1½ %.

Table XXII.

Recommendation that English rules be followed.

15. We therefore recommend that if the form of the rules for securing proportional representation by the single transferable vote should again be considered by Parliament the English rules (b) (i) should be adopted.⁽¹⁾

Transfer-value of surplus.

16. In Paragraph 21 of the Report of 1909 the rule (b) (ii) was considered, and it was pointed out that if incorporated in the Tasmanian rules it might operate unjustly. If used in conjunction with rule (b) (i), however, there is no objection to it, and in fact it is preferable to the Tasmanian rule, as fewer votes are lost by exhaustion of choices.

Amended rules, which embody the abovementioned provisions of the Municipal Representation Bill, are printed in the Appendix to this Report (pp. 18-19).

^(*) In the last column of Table XIII. the percentages were wrongly stated. The figures should read 0.88, 0.21, &c., instead of as printed.

⁽¹⁾ It is of interest to mention that rules similar in all essentials to the rules of the Municipal Representation Bill of 1908 have been used or proposed in the following:—

The Municipal Elections (Proportional Representation) Act, No. 23, of 1909, of the Transvaal. Regulations for the Election of Senators under the South Africa Act, 1909 (Imperial)—see J. H. Humphreys, *Proportional Representation* (London, 1911), pp. 364-381.

The Legislative Council Elections Bill, 1912, of New Zealand.

The Proportional Representation Bill, 1912 (No. 255), for the election of members of the House of Commons.

Rules similar to the rules of the Electoral Act of 1907 of Tasmania have been proposed in:—

The Proportional Representation Bills, 1902, 1905, 1906, 1907, 1908, 1909, 1910, 1911, and 1912, of South Australia.

The Parliamentary Elections Bill, 1900, of Victoria.

The Commonwealth Electoral Bill (No. 45) introduced in the Senate on 24th January, 1902.

The Proportional Representation Bill, 1912, of Western Australia (but with some rules from the Municipal Representation Bill).

The Legislative Council Bill, 1913, of New Zealand.

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GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE.

17. With the experience of three General Elections it is now possible to state with confidence some general conclusions on the working of the single transferable vote as a means of obtaining proportional representation. We think it will be useful to state these conclusions, both as a record for use in discussions in Tasmania, and for the information of those in other countries who are watching the results of our trial of the single transferable vote.

18. Any questions connected with the desirability of proportional representation, or with its political consequences in the peculiar conditions of Tasmania, are of course beyond our province. The Electoral Act of 1907, so long as it remains law, is evidence that a majority in Parliament desires proportional representation, and it is not our duty to discuss whether this policy should be reconsidered. Accepting proportional representation as the form of representation desired by Parliament, we have only to record such facts and reliable opinions as are available in regard to the working results of the particular system which is used to obtain proportional representation. This we proceed to do; and we shall also give some information about the party-list system, which is advocated by some as a more desirable form of proportional representation.

Scope of the remarks.

19. The use of the single transferable vote in English-speaking countries is due to Hare. It should be remembered, as has been pointed out in the Report of the Royal Commission appointed in the United Kingdom in 1908 to enquire into electoral systems (1) that "in its origin" the transferable vote was not "a system of proportional representation at all." Hare's object was to provide for the return to Parliament of the ablest men in the country, and of representatives of the various interests of the country. Accordingly he proposed that electors in any constituency might vote for a candidate in any other constituency, so that an able man might be returned by the votes of electors throughout the country without having to secure a majority in one constituency, and so that people of like interests in many constituencies, although in a minority in each, might return a member. The quota was a necessary consequence of this enlargement of the constituencies; and the transferable vote was the means Hare devised for avoiding a waste of votes if a candidate received more votes than he required for election. Hare says little of proportional representation of the great parties; and there are few passages which suggest that he was contemplating a contest in which several candidates of similar views would compete in the same locality. Each candidate would nominate for a particular constituency; there would not be several candidates of the same views in the same constituency. In most cases each candidate would receive most of his votes in his own locality; and the transferable vote was to be used to prevent the waste of votes which would occur if a candidate received votes from too many electors in other constituencies.

Hare's proposals.

20. In 1896, when the transferable vote was introduced in Tasmania, the object, again, was not mainly the proportional representation of parties, although it was seen that the system was adapted to this end, but rather to secure some representation to the various sections, most of them small, of political opinion. If a section of opinion was so small (as was frequently the case) as to be entitled to only one member in a constituency, the transferable vote was again appropriate, for the electors forming this section would naturally give their important vote—namely, their first preference—to the candidate of their section, and would be content that their relatively unimportant subsequent preferences should be used for candidates of other sections if their own candidate did not need them.

Use of the single transferable vote in Tasmania in 1896.

21. In single-member districts the use of the single transferable vote (as in the elections for the Legislative Council) is again natural. Whether there are several candidates of the same or of different views, the elector can choose only one, and the natural way for him to express his view is to arrange the candidates in the order of his preference.

The single transferable vote in single-member districts.

(1) United Kingdom, Parliament, Sessional Papers, 1910, Cd. 5163.

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Use of the single transferable vote when several candidates of the same views compete for several seats.

22. But the use of the transferable vote to give representation to large parties in districts returning several members, in which several candidates of the same views must compete, is quite another matter; and it is perhaps somewhat unfortunate that when proportional representation was again introduced in Tasmania six years ago the relative advantages of the transferable vote and of other methods of proportional representation were not more fully debated. For once the parties have become so essential a part of political life that the main concern of electors is to secure representation for their party, it is no longer clear that to compel electors to arrange the candidates of their party in an order of preference, rather than to vote equally for several candidates whose return is equally desired, is a wise or an effective means of achieving the wishes of the constituency. On this point the discussions in the press of the results of the last three elections throw much light.

This use unnatural.

Viewing the transferable vote from the ground of principle, to arrange candidates in an order of preference is an unnatural mode of voting when an elector wishes to assist in electing several candidates. And the necessity for a formal proof that the transferable vote will usually give proportional representation—as also the cases in which it fails to do so—and the elaborate machinery of rules, confirm the view that its use is an unnatural one. Contrasted with the transferable vote, the principles of the apportionment of seats by party-list systems (apart from some arithmetical intricacies for dealing with remainders) are plain to all.

The working results of the single transferable vote in many-member districts.

23. We now proceed to a discussion of the working results of the transferable vote. The criticisms which follow, it is to be understood, are not the official views of the department; they are what are common talk, or have been stated in the public press by responsible writers, and we merely place them on record, with such comments as are afforded by the tables in this report and by other matters of fact available to us.

No administrative difficulty.

24. There is no administrative difficulty in conducting the scrutiny of the votes. We repeat, as representing the experience of three General Elections, the statements made in the report on the first of them, in 1909 (paragraph 14): "The working of the system, from the point of view of returning officers, was an unqualified success. No serious difficulty of any kind was found in conducting the scrutiny." The public has entire confidence in the ability of the electoral officers to carry out the rules; scrutineers, once doubtful papers have been rejected or allowed, rarely take any further part in the scrutiny; and there is little complaint by the public of the work of the electoral officers, except such impatience as naturally occurs owing to the time required for assembling all the papers at one centre.

Lack of understanding of the rules.

25. Complaints, however, are common that electors do not understand the various operations of the scrutiny. The principle of the quota is understood by most; but the rules for the transfer of votes, and particularly of surplus votes, are not generally understood, and electors are not satisfied to be told that they need not concern themselves with the minutiae of the system. It is not easy to gauge whether the public is becoming more familiar with the rules; but there is still much greater dissatisfaction with the intricacies of the system than might have been expected after three elections. That the complications of the system are an accepted subject for joking in all circles is a not unreliable indication of the public attitude. In respect of the details of the rules, we may point out that the difficulties of the system would be increased for the elector, although diminished for the returning officer, if the rules of the Municipal Representation Bill were used.

Electors understand how to vote.

26. It is said that many electors do not understand how to vote; either they spoil their papers, or they vote so that their parties do not get the full benefit from their votes. Table VIII., in the Appendix, relating to informal ballot-papers, has been discussed in paragraph 5, from which it appears that the proportion of informal papers is not large; and in paragraph 9 we have seen that the losses to the parties from cross-voting and short-voting are trifling. It is clear, we think, that the proportion of electors who are able to mark their papers in the way required by the Electoral Act is satisfactory, and that the parties lose very few votes from their strict supporters; but whether a large proportion of electors vote so as to give effect to their real wishes in the choice of candidates is a more difficult question, which is dealt with below.

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27. We now come to the difficulties of the transferable vote which arise from compelling the elector to number the candidates of his own party in an order of preference—difficulties both more serious (if they exist) than those which precede, and more difficult to detect.

Difficulties of numbering in order of preference.

28. Of these, the first is in the struggle among candidates of the same party for first preferences. In paragraph 7 we have shown that the first choice is of much greater value than any subsequent choice; and much of the canvassing is inevitably for first choices, in preference, not to candidates of other parties, but to candidates of the same party. This difficulty was dealt with in paragraph 112 of the report of the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems (12), as follows:—

The struggle among candidates of the same party.

“ This brings the argument to the consideration of the difficult relations which would be established between the several candidates who stand together. For it is clear that first preferences are more important than second, and second than third. If each party only ran precisely the number of candidates it could expect to get in, and all electors voted the party ticket in full, there would be no such difference. But in practice, of course, this would not be the case. Some candidates of each party would therefore fail to secure election, and these would, *ex hypothesi*, be those with the fewest high preferences. Consequently each successive contingent vote would be a less and less reliable asset, partly because the election might be decided without, say, third preferences coming into consideration at all, partly because the elector could only be relied on with certainty for one, or at most two, votes. There would thus be a scramble for first preferences. What then would be the relative positions of the candidates to one another, and the party organisations to all? It is said that the party managers would be compelled to admit men of all shades of opinion into their lists so as to allure the maximum amount of support; but where would it place them on its list? To be fifth, sixth, or seventh on the party list in a constituency where the party would probably only secure four seats would be a privilege for which there would be little competition. If the order was varied in different parts of the constituency the division of those parts would be a matter of some delicacy. Both before and after the actual election contest a most undesirable element of rivalry would be introduced between members of the same party in subscriptions, attendance at meetings, and the hundred and one other calls on the time and purse of prospective candidate and member alike. In short, a man would be likely to have to defend himself, not against his enemies only, but his friends.”

It seems to be agreed by candidates of both parties that this difficulty has been found to be a very serious one. In fact, so serious did one of the organisations, the Tasmanian Workers' Political League, find it, that (largely for this reason) it discarded the single vote for pre-elections and adopted the multiple vote, with which, although there may still be competition for first choices, the competition will be between groups of candidates, and not between individual candidates holding the same views.

29. Next, it is alleged that the transferable vote has failed to reflect the wishes of the electors in the choice of candidates. This matter is dealt with by the London "Times" of 19th March in an article on the last election, from which we quote the following paragraphs:—

The wrong candidates said to be chosen.

“ While the electoral system has given exact representation of parties, it has in the choice of individual candidates failed in a serious degree to reflect the wishes of the electors. At the recent election four of the old members were rejected, to the astonishment of both supporters and opponents. They were all contesting electorates which returned three of each party, and were rejected in favour of other candidates of their own party. Two of these cases were particularly glaring. The rejected candidates were trusted members of the party, respected by their opponents, and by general consent superior in character and ability to at least one of

Quotation from the London "Times," 19th March, 1913.

(12) United Kingdom, Parliament, Sessional Papers, 1910, Cd. 5163.

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their successful competitors of the same party. If the party vote in the electorate had been called upon to decide between the two, there is not a shadow of doubt that the rejected candidate would have won triumphantly. Yet in the general election he was beaten easily, in one case by two to one. No other reason outside of the working of the Electoral Act has been suggested for this result. It remains to consider how these mishaps occur.

"The necessary and sufficient condition that the election should reflect the wishes of the electors in the matter of both parties and persons is that each elector should vote 1, 2, 3, 4, strictly in order of his preference, and be swayed by no other consideration. Between every two candidates he must ask himself which he would prefer if only one can be elected, and give that one the preference in his numbering. This injunction is during election times daily proclaimed by public speakers and the Press. But the elector will not obey. Two reasons impel him. One comes from a misunderstanding of the system, and may be overcome. The other comes from understanding it too well, and points to an organic defect.

"Consider a six-member constituency where each party is fairly sure of three members and hopes to get a majority sufficient to give it four. Speakers and Press exhort their supporters to make every effort to elect the fourth man. If A, B, C, D, are generally recognized by the party supporters as their best four candidates in order of merit, a number of electors will be found who think they will help to the desired result of four seats for their party by giving their first choice to D, the weakest of the four. This will not matter much if the four seats are obtained. Generally, of course, they are not obtained by either party, and the result may be to reject A, the safe man, in favour of D, who is the weakest of the first four. This voting for the weakest may be overcome in time, particularly if the schools are used to propagate a right understanding of the voting system, But the misunderstanding helps the weaker candidate. He may expose it on the platform and refrain from encouraging it generally. But it is asking a good deal of political human nature to expect him to bring all his fervency to bear on uprooting the error; and even if he does, his supporters in their private canvassing cannot be controlled. Correction of this misunderstanding will then be slow, but the prospect is not hopeless.

"For the appreciation of the second reason for improper ordering of choice, take the following case. Suppose that if electors voted in strict order of preference the four candidates of a party would receive first choices, thus:—A, 1800; B, 1200; C, 300; D, 200. Suppose also that quota is 1000. Then the total number of first choices makes three-and-a-half quotas; and if the voting is strictly on party lines the party will obtain three seats. A and B will certainly be elected; and the second or third choices of those electors whose first choice was A or B will decide whether C or D gets the third seat. Now those who should vote No. 1 for A or B if they followed their judgment have a preference for either C or D. It may be wholly personal or it may be accentuated by considerations of policy, particularly if C and D represent opposite wings of the party. Some of those who prefer D to C will reason thus:—"A and B are safe: I will use my No. 1 to make sure of D against C. If I vote as I really think, A, B, D, then D will only get a fraction of my vote by transfer. If I vote him No. 1 he will get a whole vote." So he votes No. 1 for D. Then those who prefer C to D will put C before A and B for the same reason and because they know D's supporters are giving him No. 1. The chief interest of the election comes to be whether C or D will get the third seat. The result may very easily be that both C and D are elected and either A or B is rejected, a result which perhaps not 10 per cent. of the electors desired.

"It is to be observed that voting on these lines is based on a true appreciation of the value of the different preferences; and those who do so tend to gain their end, and will do so unless too many others do the same. The only appeal to the electors must be in the terms of Kant's Categorical Imperative—do not vote on lines which, if followed by all, will lead to the wrecking of the system. Obviously this appeal will touch only the more

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responsible and thoughtful elements of a party, and is likely to result in the more unscrupulous sections gaining their ends, without bringing about such obvious absurdities as would effectually discredit the system.

“The confessions of individual electors show that both these causes have contributed to the mishaps of the recent election; in two of the four cases they are almost wholly responsible. Comparing the results of the three last Tasmanian elections, it seems that a few outstanding men—three or four out of a House of 30—can be sure of a solid No. 1 vote from their party; but that all who have not this special pre-eminence, however good their record, are liable to be rejected at any election for no reason at all. The rejection of a few good men in favour of their inferiors, though serious enough, is only a small thing compared to the general insecurity and the evils that must follow. We have already heard a good deal about the disintegrating effects of the system, and the strain it puts on party loyalty. In one electorate, where the loss of one seat to a party was expected at the 1912 election, the strain came near to breaking-point. Hitherto the bad results have not been quite certain or the causes clear. It has remained for the recent election to put both beyond doubt.

“It seemed at first as if the new system was going to do away with many of the unsavoury features of the single-seat contest. It seemed to make it possible for a man to run successfully on purely political lines—on his public record in the past and his general political appeal in the present. That dream is shattered. Candidates are faced with much of the old necessity of fighting and scheming for personal support, under conditions which are worse than the old ones; for they must do so against their friends; and they must do so in constituencies six times larger, where the size adds to the expense of time and money, and to the coarseness of the electioneering methods.”

The analysis of the voting contained in Table XII. of the Appendix will give material for discussing this criticism. Taking one of the cases referred to in the article—that of Mr. Sheridan, in Denison—it will be seen that the total of the first and second choices for him is as great as the total for the highest elected candidate of his party, and that the total of his first, second, and third choices is greater than the total of any of the elected candidates of his party. These figures, it is true, do not conclude the question, but they certainly suggest that the result in this case has not reflected the true wishes of the electors.

30. Finally, there are the difficulties due to the size of the constituencies—the expense of canvassing, the difficulty of becoming acquainted with the wants of each locality—and to the narrowness of the majority. We need not refer to these further, for they are objections, not to the single transferable vote only, but to any form of proportional representation, and so are outside the scope of this report.

Difficulties due to the size of the districts.

31. Against all these difficulties, it must be emphasised that the single transferable vote has fulfilled the main purpose of the Electoral Act, for it has given proportional representation as exact as the size of the House of Assembly allows. This is no small merit, and it must have great weight in estimating the importance of the incidental difficulties of the system.

The single transferable vote does give proportional representation.

32. The single transferable vote, however, is not the only means of obtaining proportional representation. It is little used outside English-speaking countries, and one country at least which has tried it has abandoned it (Transvaal, for municipal elections): Nearly all the countries which have proportional representation use the party-list system in one or other of its many forms. The party-list system is free from many of the defects which Tasmania has found in the transferable vote; but in its turn, it has difficulties which do not occur with the transferable vote. It is not necessary to discuss these difficulties here, or to compare the merits of the systems; but in the Appendix (pp. 20-24) we have printed some particulars of the system proposed in France, and of a further improvement of it—the system of the uniform quota.

Other systems of proportional representation.

33. It would be premature for us to discuss whether a party-list system should be introduced in Tasmania. We may, however, point out that the party-list system

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THE SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE.

REVISED RULES FOR COUNTING VOTES.

Embodying the Principal Rules of the Municipal Representation Bill, 1908 (Great Britain).

Definitions.

In these rules, unless the contrary intention appears—

- “ Returning officer ” means the returning officer for the district:
 “ Quota ” means the number of votes sufficient to elect a candidate:
 “ Surplus ” means the number of votes which a candidate has obtained, at any stage of the scrutiny, over and above the quota:
 “ First choice recorded for a candidate ” means the number 1 placed in the square opposite the name of the candidate:
 “ Second choice recorded for a candidate ” means the number 2 placed in the square opposite the name of the candidate:
 “ Continuing candidate ” means a candidate not already declared elected or excluded from the poll:
 “ Vote capable of transfer ” means a vote given on a voting-paper on which a further preference is recorded for a continuing candidate.

First choices of each candidate to be counted.

To find the quota.

Candidates who have the quota to be declared elected.

If first choices exactly equal to quota voting-papers to be set aside.

If a surplus, surplus to be transferred.

Voting-papers re-examined and second choices counted.

If votes capable of transfer less than surplus, all to be transferred.

If greater than surplus, find transfer value.

Multiply second choices by transfer value.

Add on result.

Transfer as many papers to each candidate as he receives votes.

Set aside other papers.

Postponement of transfer.

Vacancies to be filled under Rule 10, if possible.

If more than one surplus, largest to be first dealt with.

If surpluses equal, last difference to decide.

If transfer raises candidate up to or above quota he to be declared elected.

1. The number of first choices recorded for each candidate shall be counted.
 2. The aggregate number of first choices shall be divided by one more than the number of candidates to be elected, and the quotient increased by one, disregarding any remainder, shall be the quota, and (except as hereinafter provided in Rule 10) no candidate shall be elected until he obtains a number of votes equal to or greater than the quota.

3. Any candidate who has, upon the first choices being counted, a number of such votes equal to or greater than the quota shall be declared elected.

4. If the number of such votes obtained by any candidate is equal to the quota, the whole of the voting-papers on which a first choice is recorded for such elected candidate shall be set aside as finally dealt with.

5. If the number of such votes obtained by any candidate is in excess of the quota, then, subject to paragraphs VIII. and IX. of this rule, the surplus shall be transferred to the other candidates not yet declared elected, next in the order of the voters' respective preferences, in the following manner:—

I. All the voting-papers on which a first choice is recorded for the elected candidate shall be re-examined, and the number of papers on which there are votes capable of transfer shall be ascertained, and the number of second choices, or (in the case provided for in Rule 12) third or next consecutive choices, recorded for each continuing candidate thereon counted:

II. If the total number of votes capable of transfer is not greater than the surplus, all the votes capable of transfer shall be transferred:

III. If the total number of votes capable of transfer is greater than the surplus, the surplus shall be divided by the total number of votes capable of transfer, and the first three figures of the resulting decimal fraction (afterwards called the transfer-value) shall be found:

IV. The number of second or other choices, ascertained in paragraph I. to be recorded for each continuing candidate shall be multiplied by the transfer value:

V. The resulting number, disregarding any fractional remainder, shall be credited to each continuing candidate, and added to the number of votes obtained by him on the counting of the first choices:

VI. From the papers on which second or other choices are recorded for each continuing candidate, there shall be selected at random a number equal to the number of votes found for him in paragraph V., and these shall be placed in a separate parcel and transferred to him:

VII. All papers not transferred under the foregoing provisions shall be set aside as finally dealt with:

VIII. A transfer of votes under this rule shall not be made unless the surplus of the elected candidate, together with any other surpluses not transferred, exceeds the difference between the votes of the two continuing candidates lowest on the poll:

IX. The foregoing provisions of this rule shall take effect subject to the provisions of Rule 10, Clause (b), and if at any time there is one remaining vacancy which can be filled under that rule no further transfer under this rule shall be made.

6.—(a) Where, on the counting of the first choices or on any transfer, more than one candidate has a surplus, the largest surplus shall be first dealt with. If then more than one candidate has a surplus, the then largest surplus shall be dealt with, and so on: Provided that if one candidate has obtained a surplus at a count or transfer previous to that at which another candidate obtains a surplus, the surplus of the former shall be first dealt with.

(b) Where two or more surpluses are equal, the surplus of the candidate who was the highest on the poll at the count or transfer at which they last had an unequal number of votes shall be first dealt with; and if they have had an equal number of votes at all preceding counts or transfers, the Returning Officer shall decide which candidate's surplus shall be first dealt with.

7.—(a) If the number of votes obtained by a candidate is raised up to or above the quota by a transfer as aforesaid, he shall thereupon be declared elected. And in such case, notwithstanding the fact that he may have reached the quota such transfer shall be completed, and all the votes to which he is entitled therefrom shall be transferred to him, but no votes of any other candidate shall be transferred to him.

(b) If the number of votes obtained by a candidate is raised up to, but not above, the quota by a transfer as aforesaid, the whole of the voting-papers on which such votes are recorded shall be set aside as finally dealt with.

If votes exactly equal to quota, voting-papers to be set aside.

(c) If the number of votes obtained by a candidate is raised above the quota by a transfer as aforesaid, then, subject to paragraphs iv. and v. of this rule, his surplus shall be transferred to the candidates next in the order of the voters' respective preferences, in the following manner:—

If surplus created, surplus to be transferred.

i. The voting-papers transferred to the elected candidate in the last transfer shall be re-examined, and the number of papers on which there are votes capable of transfer shall be ascertained, and the number of third, or (in the case provided for in Rule 12) next consecutive choices recorded for each continuing candidate thereon counted:

Voting-papers of last transfer re-examined and third choices counted.

ii. If the total number of votes capable of transfer is not greater than the surplus, all the votes capable of transfer shall be transferred:

If votes capable of transfer less than surplus, all to be transferred.

iii. If the total number of votes capable of transfer is greater than the surplus, then the transfer value shall be found, the surplus transferred, and the papers dealt with in similar manner as is directed in Rule 5, paragraphs iii.-vii., for the transfer of a surplus arising at the first count:

If greater than surplus, surplus to be transferred as in Rule 5.

iv. A transfer of votes under this rule shall not be made unless the surplus votes of the elected candidate, together with any other surplus votes not transferred, exceed the difference between the votes of the two continuing candidates lowest on the poll:

Postponement of transfer.

v. The foregoing provisions of this rule shall take effect subject to the provisions of Rule 10, Clause (b), and if at any time there is one remaining vacancy which can be filled under that rule no further transfer under this rule shall be made.

Vacancies to be filled under Rule 10, if possible.

8. If after the first choices have been counted and all surpluses (other than surpluses of which the transfer has been postponed under the foregoing rules) have been dealt with, no candidate, or less than the number of candidates required to be elected, has or have obtained the quota, then, subject to Rule 10, the candidate lowest on the poll shall be excluded, and all the votes obtained by him as first choices, and all the votes transferred to him from the surpluses of elected candidates, shall be transferred in one transfer to the candidates who on the papers on which such votes are recorded are next in the order of the voters' respective preferences.

When all surpluses dealt with, candidate lowest on poll to be excluded and his votes transferred.

9.—(a) Where the number of votes obtained by a candidate is raised up to or above the quota by any such transfer as aforesaid, he shall thereupon be declared elected. And in such case, notwithstanding the fact that he may have reached the quota, such transfer shall be completed, and all the votes to which he is entitled therefrom shall be transferred to him, but no other votes shall be transferred to him.

If transfer raises candidate up to quota, he to be declared elected.

(b) Where the number of votes obtained by a candidate is raised up to, but not above, the quota by any such transfer as aforesaid, the whole of the voting-papers on which such votes are recorded shall be set aside as finally dealt with.

If votes exactly equal to quota, voting-papers to be set aside.

(c) Where the number of votes obtained by a candidate is raised above the quota by any such transfer as aforesaid, his surplus shall be transferred to the candidates next in the order of the voters' respective preferences in the same manner as is directed by Rule 7, Clause (c).

If surplus created, surplus to be transferred.

10.—(a) The same process of excluding the candidate lowest on the poll and transferring to other candidates his votes shall be repeated until all the candidates, except the number required to be elected have been excluded, and the continuing candidates, who have not already been so declared, shall then be declared elected.

Process of exclusion to be repeated until there remain number of candidates required, except when a vacancy can be filled without further transfer.

(b) But if only one vacancy remains unfilled, and the votes of some one continuing candidate exceed the total of the votes of the other continuing candidates, together with any surplus votes not transferred, the firstmentioned candidate shall be declared elected.

If lowest candidates equal, last difference to decide.

11. Where at any time it becomes necessary to exclude a candidate, and two or more candidates have the same number of votes and are lowest on the poll, then whichever of such candidates was lowest on the poll at the last count or transfer at which they had an unequal number of votes shall be first excluded, and if such candidates have had an equal number of votes at all preceding counts or transfers the returning officer shall decide which candidate shall be first excluded.

If a candidate elected or excluded, his name not considered on voting-paper.

12. In determining what candidate is next in the order of the voter's preference, any candidates who have been declared elected or who have been excluded shall not be considered, and the order of the voter's preference shall be determined as if the names of such candidates had not been on the voting-paper.

Exhausted votes.

13. If at any count it is found that on any voting-paper there is no candidate opposite whose name a number is placed, other than those who have been already either declared elected or excluded, such voting-paper shall be set aside as exhausted.

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PARTY-LIST SYSTEM IN FRANCE.

A BILL PASSED BY THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES ON 10TH JULY, 1912.

No. 365.

(Chamber of Deputies. 10th Parliament: Session of 1912.)

A Bill to Amend the Law for the Election of Deputies.

The Chamber of Deputies has passed the following Bill:—

1. The members of the Chamber of Deputies are elected by the block vote (*scrutin de liste*) with representation of minorities.

2. Each Department forms an electoral district.

3. The number of seats allotted to a district is based upon the number of its population of French nationality.

Each district elects one member for each 70,000 of French population, and one more member if there is a remainder of more than 20,000. The number of members to be elected by each district is stated in the schedule.

4. No one can be a candidate in more than one district.

5. Lists are formed for each district, consisting of groups of candidates who are nominated jointly by 200 electors of the district, and who by a duly attested declaration accept nomination for the district.

A list cannot contain more candidates than the number of members to be elected for the district.

Each isolated candidature is treated as a separate list.

6. Each list must be lodged at the Prefecture after the commencement of the period for receiving nominations and at least 10 clear days before the day of the election.

The Prefecture registers the list and its name and gives it a serial number.

Registration is refused to any list containing more names than there are members to be elected; and to any list containing the name of any candidate appearing in another list already registered in the district.

The names of those candidates only can be registered who have made a declaration that they comply with the provisions of Clauses 4 and 5.

Registration cannot be refused for any other reason.

A provisional acknowledgement of the lodging of the list is given to each candidate named in it. The final receipt is given within 24 hours.

7. If the same candidate makes a declaration in more than one district, only the first in date is valid.

If the declarations have the same date, none are valid.

8. The name of a candidate cannot be struck out of a list unless he notifies to the Prefecture his wish to withdraw 12 clear days before the day of the election.

9. To any list, if there are vacancies, there may be added, not later than 10 clear days before the day of the election, the names of new candidates if they are nominated by all the candidates already in the list and make the declaration required by Clause 5.

The order of the names in a list may be altered by a joint declaration of all the candidates of the list not less than 10 clear days before the day of the election.

10. Two or more lists in the same district may declare that the votes given to them shall be pooled for the purpose of allotting seats for remainders.

Such declarations must be made at the Prefecture within the same periods as are fixed for declarations of candidates.

They are valid only if they are reciprocal and are signed by the first candidate of each list.

If the declarations are made on different papers, each must mention all the lists forming the group.

Such a grouping of lists can be cancelled for any list only by the first candidate of the list, and subject to the same conditions as the withdrawal of a candidate.

11. On the Sunday before the election, all registered lists are to be placarded by the officers of the Prefecture on the doors of the polling-booths, each with its number, its name, and the names of the lists, if any, with which its votes are to be pooled.

12. The ballot-papers for all the lists are printed on one sheet, so that any ballot-paper may be detached easily.

Each list has the number which has been assigned to it, its name, and the names of the lists, if any, with which its votes are to be pooled.

The names of the candidates are printed in the order of nomination. Blank spaces are left at the foot of each ballot-paper; and on each sheet a space is left for another list, with a list number at the head.

Two sheets of ballot-papers, and a copy of the circular issued by each list of candidates, are given by the electoral officers to each elector, at the same time as the elector's card.

A regulation may be made to prescribe the maximum size and weight of the circulars, and the conditions of their issue.

Sheets of ballot-papers may be obtained by electors at any polling-place.

Any ballot-paper not issued by the electoral administration is invalid.

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13. Each elector has as many votes as there are members to be elected in the district.*

14. When there are more votes on a ballot-paper than there are members to be elected, the ballot-paper is valid, but the last names written in excess of the number to be elected are not counted. But if it is not possible to determine the order of the names, the paper is informal.

If the name of a candidate is repeated on a ballot-paper, the ballot-paper is valid, but only one vote is counted for the candidate.

15. The votes given to candidates are counted for the candidates individually, and also for the lists to which they belong.

If an elector votes on a ballot-paper which has a number and the name of a list and does not use all his votes, the remaining votes are counted for the list.

Votes given to a candidate who has died within 12 days before the election are counted for the list to which he belonged.

16. Votes given to citizens whose candidature has not been registered are invalid.

Invalid votes are counted only for checking the scrutiny.

17. At each polling-place the electoral officers count the number of voters, the number of votes given to each candidate, and the number of votes credited to each list under the second paragraph of Clause 15.

The electoral officers sign and make public at once a statement of these results.

18. After the examination of the papers at the polling-places, the ballot-papers and the returns of the electoral officers are placed in parcels and sealed by the presiding officers in the presence of scrutineers for each list; and the parcels are posted to the President of the Civil Tribunal at the chief town of the Department.

19. The scrutiny at the chief town is supervised by a Commission consisting of the President of the Civil Tribunal and three members of the General Council chosen by lot.

The parcels are opened, and the scrutiny is made in the presence of two scrutineers appointed by each list.

Objections to ballot-papers are recorded in a return, and the ballot-papers are attached to it.

20. The Commission ascertains the number of voters and the number of votes given to each candidate.

It ascertains the number of votes for each list by adding together the votes given to the various candidates in the list and the votes which have been credited to the list under the second paragraph of Clause 15.

The Commission divides the number of votes for each list by the number of deputies to be elected by the district, and so ascertains the electoral strength of each list.

21. The Commission finds the quota (*quotient électoral*) by dividing the total number of voters by the number of members to be elected by the district.

Each list receives as many seats as the number of times the quota is contained in the electoral strength of the list.

Next, each group of lists receives as many seats as the number of times the quota is contained in the sum of the remainders of the lists forming the group.

*The Bill does not contain the whole of the electoral law, but is only an amendment of other laws. The provisions for the method of voting and the counting of votes cannot be understood without reference to other electoral laws. These cannot be seen in Tasmania; but the following, compiled from various sources, is believed to be a correct statement of the French law as proposed to be modified by the Bill:—

The ballot-papers, one for each of the lists which have been nominated and one blank ballot-paper, are printed on one sheet, perforated so that any paper can be detached. Two sheets of ballot-papers are left before the election at the elector's residence; and the elector can detach a ballot-paper from either sheet and take it to a polling-booth, or he can obtain a ballot-paper at the booth. (Cl. 12.)

Each elector has as many votes as there are members to be elected (Cl. 13), and all his votes are given on one ballot-paper.

An elector votes either without making any alteration on the ballot-paper he selects; or by striking out one or more names from it; or by adding one or more names; or by striking out one or more and adding one or more; and handing in the paper at the polling-booth. He must be careful in adding names, for if he leaves more names than there are members to be elected, and it is not possible to determine for which names he wishes to vote, his paper will be informal (Cl. 14). No other marks are made on the paper; and only one vote can be given to a candidate (Cl. 14).

The names of candidates from other lists may be added to the ballot-paper used by the voter.

For each name left by the voter on his ballot-paper, one vote is counted to the candidate and one to the list in which he was nominated. (Cl. 15.)

Further, if an elector has used the ballot-paper of any list (but not the blank ballot-paper), and if there are fewer names on it than there are members to be elected, i.e., if the elector has not used all his votes, the remaining votes are counted for the list. (Cl. 15.)

As an example, take the case of a district returning six members. Party A nominates six candidates, Party B five, Party C one.

An elector chooses the ballot-paper for list A, and hands it in without alteration. One vote is counted for each of the six candidates of A, and six votes for the list.

An elector chooses the ballot-paper for list A, and strikes out one or more names, but does not add any. One vote is counted for each candidate not struck out, and six for the list.

An elector chooses the ballot-paper for list A, strikes out one or more names, and adds one name from list B. A vote is counted to each name left on the paper; one vote is counted for list B, and the remaining votes for list A.

An elector chooses the ballot-paper for list B, and hands it in without alteration. One vote is counted for each of the five candidates of B, and six votes for the list.

An elector chooses the ballot-paper for list B, and adds a name from list A. A vote is counted for each candidate of B, and five for the list; and one is counted to the candidate from A, and one to the list.

An elector chooses the ballot-paper for list C, and hands it in without alteration. One vote is counted to the candidate individually, and (for apportioning seats) six to C as a list.

An elector chooses the ballot-paper for list C, and adds one name from list A. One vote is counted to the candidate from A, and one to his list; one vote is counted to the candidate of C, and five to C as a list.

An elector chooses the blank ballot-paper and writes six names on it. One vote is counted to each candidate and one to the list to which he belongs.

An elector chooses the blank ballot-paper and writes fewer than six names on it. One vote is counted to each candidate, and one to the list to which he belongs; the rest of the elector's votes are unused.—(Note by translator.)

Then a seat is given to the list or group of lists, if any, which, having received the absolute majority of the votes, has not yet received the absolute majority of the seats.

Finally, if there are still any vacant seats, they are allotted by the method of averages among the lists and groups of lists.

22. The seats given jointly to a group of lists are allotted among the lists by the method of averages.

23. Allotment by the method of averages is carried out as follows:—

To find the average for a list, its electoral strength is divided by one more than the number of seats already allotted to it.

To find the average for a group of lists, the total of the electoral strengths of the various lists is divided by one more than the total number of seats already allotted to them.

The first of the remaining seats is allotted to the list or group of lists which has the largest average.

If several lists or groups of lists have the same average the seat is allotted to the list or group of lists which has received the greatest number of votes.

Each of the remaining seats is allotted in the same way.

24. In each list the seats are given to the candidates who have received the greatest number of votes.

If two candidates have received the same number of votes, the older of the two is elected.

If several lists are equally entitled to a seat, it is allotted, among the candidates who are equally entitled, to the one who has received the greatest number of votes, and, in case of equality, to the oldest.

No candidate can be declared elected unless the number of votes given to him is at least equal, either to the quota, or to half the number of votes for the list to which he belongs.

25. If the number of voters in a district is not more than half of the number of electors on the rolls, or if the number of valid ballot-papers is not more than one-quarter of the number of electors on the rolls, the Commission does not allot any seat.

In such a case another election is held 15 days later, and the allotment of seats for the district is then made whatever be the number of voters or of valid ballot-papers.

26. The candidates on each list who come next after those who have been elected are summoned, subject to the conditions of Clause 24, to sit in place of any members elected from the list whose seats become vacant by resignation, death, or from any other cause.

The notification to the substitutes is made by the President of the Chamber.

27. If, after the substitutes have been summoned, the representation of a district is reduced by one-third or (in the case of a district returning more than 15 members) by five members, a by-election is held within three months, unless the last vacancy occurs within six months of the expiration of the Chamber.

28. In each commune, special hoardings of the same area shall be allotted to each list. The posting of electoral notices except on these hoardings is forbidden.

29. The election of a member of the Senate to the Chamber of Deputies terminates his membership of the Senate.

30. The provisions of this law apply to Algeria and the colonies.

The number of members for the colonies is six, as shown in the schedule.

31. The present law shall come into force at the next general election for the Chamber of Deputies, and thereafter all inconsistent enactments and the law of 17th July, 1889, shall be repealed.

Deliberated in public session, at Paris, the 4th June and 10th July, 1912.

PAUL DESCHANEL, President.

Schedule.

(The districts and members for each.)

PARTY-LIST SYSTEM.—THE METHOD OF THE UNIFORM QUOTA.

(From "The Theory of the Quota in Proportional Representation—II," by E. L. Piessé, Papers and Proceedings of the Royal Society of Tasmania, 1913, at pp. 22-25.)

62. Finally, it remains to point out that the problem of apportioning seats among parties arises from fixing before the election the number of seats for each constituency. The problem can be avoided, and a partition of seats among parties as exact as the size of the legislature allows can be secured, if the number of seats in the legislature is fixed, but the number of seats for each constituency is determined after the polling by the number of votes polled in it. On this idea is based the system of *le nombre unique*, or the *uniform quota*—a system supported by the late Professor Henri Poincaré and other French mathematicians as the only exact method of proportional representation.

63. Hare proposed to use for the quota the number obtained by dividing the total of the votes throughout the country by the number of members in the House of Commons. He also proposed that the whole country should be one constituency; a proposal which, with other notions contained in his works, is usually thought to have kept back for a generation the progress of proportional representation in England. The same quota is used in the system of *le nombre unique*; but the country

is divided into districts, as in other systems of proportional representation, and these may be equal or unequal, as may be convenient. The system assumes that the same parties will contest the election in many districts or throughout the country; it would break down if there were many isolated candidatures, but these are not to be expected when the party system has become established.

The votes for all the candidates of each party throughout the country are totalled, and then the total number of votes for all parties is obtained. This total is divided by the number of members to be elected, and the result is *le nombre unique*, or the uniform quota.

The total number of votes for each party is then divided by the quota. The quotient so obtained is the share of representation of the party. If the sum of the quotients is not equal to the number of members to be elected, the remaining seats can go to the parties with the largest remainders, or otherwise as may be thought fit; it matters little how the remaining seats are dealt with if the House is at all large. The proportion of seats to voters in each party can thus be made as exact as the number of members will allow.

Next, the number of votes for each party in each district is divided by the quota, and members equal in number to the quotient so obtained are selected from the candidates of the party in that district. The total number of seats allotted to a party in the various districts will be less than the total number of seats to which it is entitled, for in some or all of the districts there will be remainders. The unallotted seats are then given to the districts with the largest remainders. Each party's share of representation in each district has now been ascertained. It only remains to choose the members for the party in each district from the candidates of the party in the district; the candidates to be chosen will be those of the party who are highest on the poll.*

64. As an example, let us apply the system of the uniform quota to the Tasmanian General Election of 23rd January, 1913. The first choices (with the single transferable vote) obtained by the parties were as follow:—

General Election, Tasmania, 23rd January, 1913.—Votes for the Parties.

District.	Liberal.	Labour.	Independent.	Grand Total.
Bass.....	6839	6932	—	13,771
Darwin	6174	6441	—	12,615
Denison	7717	7132	—	14,849
Franklin	8566	6677	—	15,243
Wilmot	6861	4451	977	12,289
All	36,157	31,633	977	68,767

I assume that these numbers represent the relative strengths of the parties. With a party-list system, as each elector would have several votes, the numbers would be multiples of these (subject to a slight disarrangement of the votes in Wilmot); but these numbers will serve for the illustration.

We first divide the total number of votes polled, 68,767, by the number of members to be elected, 30; the result is the quota, 2292.

The total of the votes for each party is then divided by 2292; the results are—Liberal, 15·78; Labour, 13·79; Independent, 0·43. The members to be allotted to the parties are therefore—Liberal, 16; Labour, 14; Independent, 0 (which, it may be noticed, was the result given by the single transferable vote).

Next divide the totals of the votes for the parties in the various districts by the quota. The results are:—

General Election, Tasmania, 23rd January, 1913.—Share of Representation in each District according to the Method of the Uniform Quota.

District.	Liberal.	Labour.	Independent.	Grand Total.
Bass.....	2·98	3·02	—	6·00
Darwin	2·70	2·81	—	5·51
Denison	3·37	3·11	—	6·48
Franklin	3·74	2·91	—	6·65
Wilmot	2·99	1·94	0·43	5·36
All	15·78	13·79	0·43	30

Allotting seats first to whole quotas, the Liberals would get two seats in Bass, Darwin, and Wilmot, and three in Denison and Franklin, total 12; and the remaining four seats would go to the districts in which there are the greatest remainders, namely, Bass, Darwin, Franklin, and Wilmot. Similarly the Labour Party would get, from whole quotas, three seats in Bass and Denison, two in

* On the system of *le nombre unique*, see—

Le Système du Nombre Unique, a pamphlet of 8 pages published by the Comité Républicain de la R.P., 23

Rue Pasquier, Paris.

Lachapelle (see § 61), pp. 89-102, 230-5, 258-9.

Groussier (see § 61), pp. 103-4, 191-3.

Darwin and Franklin, and one in Wilmot, total 11; and the remaining three seats would go to Darwin, Franklin, and Wilmot. The result of the election would therefore be:—

General Election, Tasmania, 23rd January, 1913.—Result according to the Method of the Uniform Quota.

District.	Liberal.	Labour.	Independent.	Grand Total.
Bass.....	3	3	—	6
Darwin.....	3	3	—	6
Denison.....	3	3	—	6
Franklin.....	4	3	—	7
Wilmot.....	3	2	0	5
All.....	16	14	0	30

As between the parties the result would be the same as with the single transferable vote; but in Franklin (in which 15,243 votes were polled) there would have been seven members instead of six, of whom the Liberals would have had four, and in Wilmot (in which only 12,289 votes were polled) there would have been only five members instead of six, and there would thus have been a greater approach to electoral equality between electors in these two districts than with the same number of members for each district.

It would remain only to choose the members from the candidates of each party in each district. For each party the candidates highest on the poll would be chosen; these, of course, would not necessarily be the same if each elector had several votes as when he had only one vote.

65. From this illustration two of the principal advantages of the method of the uniform quota can be seen; first, districts in which political interest is more active may get more members than districts in which, although the number of electors enrolled is the same, fewer voters go to the poll; second, it is no longer necessary to alter boundaries as the distribution of population changes, for the method (so far as the size of the House allows) will give proportional representation to the districts in spite of differences in their electoral populations. The method, then, gives proportional representation as between parties throughout the country; proportional representation as between parties in each district; and proportional representation as between districts of varying sizes.

TABLE VI.—General Elections, 30th April, 1909, 30th April, 1912, 23rd January, 1913.—Postal Voting.

District.	Number of Postal Ballot-papers.						Percentage of Postal Ballot-papers to All Ballot-papers.							
	1909.		1912.		1913.		1909.		1912.		1913.			
	All.	Males.	Fe-males.	All.	Males.	Fe-males.	All.	Males.	Fe-males.	All.	Males.	Fe-males.	All.	
Bass	124†	115	163	278	145	219	364	1.33	1.46	2.24	1.84	1.95	3.22	2.51
Darwin	35	58	50	108	100	93	193	0.36	0.68	0.88	0.76	1.27	1.80	1.48
Denison	414	325	642	967	221	481	702	3.55	4.24	7.18	5.83	3.12	6.36	4.80
Franklin	105	106	178	284	140	216	356	1.00	1.13	2.44	1.70	1.55	3.26	2.28
Wilmot	80*	56	120	176	89	133	222	0.87	0.77	1.95	1.38	1.31	1.95	1.78
All	758	660	1153	1813	695	1142	1837	1.50	1.62	3.26	2.38	1.82	3.61	2.63

* Approximate. † Excluding papers collected from Straits Islands by a special officer.

At the elections for the Federal Senate and House of Representatives held on 13th April, 1910, the percentage of postal votes throughout Tasmania was 2.14%; at the Federal Referendum of 26th April, 1911, the percentage was 2.55%.

TABLE VII.—General Elections, 30th April, 1912, and 23rd January, 1913.—Postal Votes (First Choices) arranged according to Parties.

District.	1912.		1913.	
	Liberal.	Labour.	Liberal.	Labour.
Bass	221	57	263	101
Darwin	51	53	98	85
Denison	562	266	437	222
Franklin	214	64	270	77
Wilmot	139	37	161	58
All	1187	477	1229	543

TABLE VIII.—General Elections, 30th April, 1909, 30th April, 1912, 23rd January, 1913.—Number and Percentage of Informal Ballot-papers.

District.	Number of Informal Ballot-papers.			Percentage of Informal Ballot-papers to all Ballot-papers.		
	1909.	1912.	1913.	1909.	1912.	1913.
Bass	238	398	351	2.56	2.63	2.48
Darwin	283	421	400	2.92	2.97	3.07
Denison	326	444	491	2.79	2.67	3.20
Franklin	279	464	496	2.64	2.78	3.15
Wilmot	316	439	297	3.44	3.26	2.36
All	1442	2166	2035	2.86	2.85	2.87

Para. 5. TABLE IX.—*Elections held in Tasmania, 1903 to 1913—Informal Ballot-papers.*

Election.	Total Number of Ballot-papers.	Number of Informal Papers.	Percentage of Informal Papers.	Method of Marking Papers.
General Election for House of Assembly, 2nd April, 1903 (31 contested electorates)	23,261	345	1·48	Striking out all names but one
Federal Senate, 16th Dec., 1903	35,580	1441	4·05	Cross in square opposite three names
Federal House of Representatives, 16th Dec., 1903	35,849	1164	3·25	Cross in square opposite one name
General Election for House of Assembly, 16th March, 1906 (2 contested electorates)	40,322	487	1·21	Striking out all names but one
Federal Senate, 12th Dec., 1906	48,879	2192	4·48	Cross in square opposite three names
Federal House of Representatives, 12th December, 1906 (four contested divisions)	40,194	1583	3·94	Cross in square opposite one name
General Election for House of Assembly, 30th April, 1909	50,402	1442	2·86	At least three candidates to be numbered in order of preference
Federal Senate, 13th April, 1910	57,669	1893	3·29	Cross in square opposite three names
Federal House of Representatives, 13th April, 1910	57,609	1447	2·51	Cross in square opposite one name
Federal Referendum (Legislative Powers), 26th April, 1911	58,620	673	1·16	Cross in square
General Election for House of Assembly, 30th April, 1912	76,052	2166	2·85	At least three candidates to be numbered in order of preference
General Election for House of Assembly, 23rd January, 1913	70,812	2035	2·87	Ditto
Federal Senate, 31st May, 1913	80,084	4575*	5·71	Cross in square opposite three names
Federal House of Representatives, 31st May, 1913	80,084	2118*	2·64	Cross in square opposite one name

* Not including papers (352) of absent voters rejected because the voters were not enrolled for the division to which they directed that their papers be sent.

TABLE X.—General Election, 23rd January, 1913. Informal Ballot-papers—Sources of Informalities.

Sources of Informalities.	Bass.	Darwin.	Denison.	Franklin.	Wilmot.	Total of each Description.
<i>Post. 1 Ballot-papers disallowed for following reasons:—</i>						
(a) Counterfoil not signed by voter...	...	3	5	5	2	15
(b) Signature of voter on counterfoil not witnessed.....	...	4	6	10
(c) Signature of voter on counterfoil not the same as signature to application	9	2	...	11
(d) Witness not authorised, or his title not stated	3	17	1	...	21
<i>Defective preference numbering:—</i>						
(a) No candidate marked No. 1.....	9	19	25	20	23	96
(b) No candidate marked No. 2, or no candidate marked No. 3	52	72	71	85	44	224
(c) Two or more candidates marked No. 1, and one or more marked No. 2, &c.	32	33	47	44	41	197
(d) Two candidates marked No. 2, or two candidates marked No. 3...	31	34	54	46	27	192
(e) Three or more names marked thus <input type="checkbox"/> 1	32	57	63	54	47	253
(f) Ditto <input type="checkbox"/> X	140	136	159	182	83	700
(g) Ditto <input type="checkbox"/> —	1	3	1	4	5	14
Figures not recognisable	26	14	9	19	11	79
<i>No vote indicated on Ballot-papers:—</i>						
(a) Names merely struck out	19	10	6	4	6	45
(b) Blank papers	4	6	16	7	1	34
Ballot-papers not initialed	2	1	1	14	2	20
Voter identifiable by writing	1	1	2	6	1	11
Papers mutilated or otherwise defective.....	2	4	...	3	4	13
TOTALS	351	400	491	496	297	2085

TABLE XI.—General Election, 23rd January, 1913.—First Choices obtained by each Candidate, arranged according to Subdistricts.

This table is compiled principally from the summaries of the first rough count telegraphed on the night of the election by presiding officers to returning officers. The totals of the votes for individual candidates do not agree in all cases with the result of the first count afterwards made at the chief polling-places by the returning officers. The totals at the foot of the columns are those obtained at the latter count.

The Electoral Act permits electors to vote in any subdistrict of their district. The votes are arranged below according to the subdistricts in which they were recorded, not according to the subdistrict in which the voters were enrolled; and postal votes are stated separately.

DISTRICT OF BASS. (Quota 1968.)

Subdistrict.	Electors on Roll.			Liberal Candidates.					Labour Candidates.					Informal.	Total Number of Votes Recorded.
	Male.	Female.	Total.	Hayes.	McKenzie.	Sadler.	Solomon.	Total.	Anderson.	Becker.	Guy.	Howroyd.	Total.		
Fingal	773	745	1518	148	79	29	112	368	115	374	50	122	661	24	1053
Flinders	180	110	290	4	17	5	14	40	29	8	61	9	107	1	148
George Town	252	270	522	17	97	23	115	252	30	23	18	41	112	9	373
Launceston, Central	1109	1471	2580	52	61	240	534	887	253	85	108	225	671	36	1594
Launceston, East	1325	1861	3186	90	104	276	678	1148	266	93	169	267	795	64	2007
Launceston, North	1551	1690	3241	41	110	200	369	720	380	167	352	510	1409	33	2162
Launceston, West	1356	1638	2994	61	37	154	489	741	497	115	180	272	1064	34	1839
Lilydale	772	664	1436	112	355	21	75	563	83	108	43	76	310	27	900
Portland	562	384	946	165	28	20	58	271	27	339	12	16	394	25	690
Ringarooma	1360	1033	2393	330	56	60	162	608	163	586	56	124	929	56	1593
Scottsdale	665	632	1297	549	23	4	81	657	85	89	16	46	236	15	908
St. Leonards	386	381	767	47	161	62	64	334	37	34	46	52	169	5	508
Postal Votes	32	34	45	152	263	19	27	22	33	101	...	364
Total	10,291	10,879	21,170	1643*	1157	1130*	2909*	6839	1974*	2039*	1131	1788*	6922	351	14,122

* Elected.

DISTRICT OF DARWIN. (Quota, 1083)

Subdistrict.	Electors on Rolls.			Liberal Candidates.						Labour Candidates.					Informal.	Total Number of Votes Recorded.	
	Male.	Female.	Total.	Lamerton.	Laughton.	Payne.	Pullen.	Whitsitt.	Total.	Belton.	Hurst.	Jones.	Ogden.	Watkins.			Total.
Circular Head	1270	878	2148	23	661	54	16	40	794	453	24	4	12	1	494	38	1326
Emu Bay	1434	1171	2605	42	81	320	171	285	899	67	665	17	9	20	778	53	1730
Gormanston	657	310	967	40	10	14	23	11	98	15	36	7	92	219	369	21	488
King Island	290	170	460	31	6	117	15	31	200	49	13	1	6	2	71	10	281
Leven	1633	1482	3115	111	132	502	318	297	1360	196	183	2	12	8	401	43	1804
Penguin	688	573	1261	22	34	60	476	90	682	54	135	1	10	4	204	23	909
Queenstown	1012	681	1693	86	30	19	21	40	196	12	23	4	23	812	874	46	1116
Strahan	251	208	459	11	2	6	16	11	46	9	7	0	55	149	220	13	279
Table Cape	1506	1162	2668	59	77	239	182	642	1199	397	89	78	10	7	581	41	1821
Waratah	1035	502	1537	51	15	59	65	31	221	410	95	29	72	75	681	22	924
Zeehan	2252	1617	3869	256	21	58	18	29	382	63	94	13	123	89	1682	30	2144
Postal Votes	—	—	—	10	10	36	20	21	98	11	8	0	26	40	85	10	193
Total	12,028	8754	20,782	742	1079	1484*	1341*	1528*	6174	1736*	1372	156	1751*	1426*	6441	400	13,015

* Elected.

TABLE XI. (continued)—General Election, 23rd January, 1913.—First Choices obtained by each Candidate, arranged according to Subdistricts.

DISTRICT OF DENISON. (Quota, 2122.)

Subdistrict.	Electors on Rolls			Liberal Candidates.							Labour Candidates.							Informal.	Total Number of Votes Recorded.		
	Male.	Female.	Total.	Bottrill.	Davies.	Fullerton.	Lewis.	Paterson.	Rattle.	Valentine.	Total.	Barker.	Edmonds.	Giblin.	O'Brien.	Sheridan.	Waterworth.			Woods.	Total.
Hobart, Central	1273	1689	2962	51	194	132	216	13	53	78	737	138	98	214	52	133	57	184	906	33	1676
Hobart, East	1174	1300	2474	82	356	237	352	36	69	122	1254	221	249	382	111	225	148	256	1592	96	2942
Hobart, North	1859	2368	4227	86	228	213	304	35	198	134	1108	202	100	325	41	135	93	370	1266	71	2505
Hobart, South	1538	2180	3718	52	309	216	498	25	44	124	1268	198	140	252	70	105	41	188	994	53	2315
Hobart, West	1380	1657	3037	37	134	140	199	9	32	91	642	143	115	207	43	82	68	162	820	69	1527
New Town	1418	2008	3421	19	298	209	229	61	224	307	1399	247	17	129	27	253	31	71	778	71	2178
Queenborough	1006	1449	2455	30	223	149	304	19	70	87	882	113	29	185	42	69	29	87	551	59	1495
Postal Votes	12	100	34	199	4	20	68	473	32	16	36	6	25	35	72	222	43	702
Totals	9643	12,651	22,294	369	1902	1321	3292	202	620	1011	7717	1294	764	1760	392	1027	502	1393	7132	491	15,340

* Elected.

DISTRICT OF FRANKLIN. (Quota 2178.)

Subdistrict.	Electors on Rolls.			Liberal Candidates.						Labour Candidates.					Informal.	Total Number of Votes Recorded.
	Male.	Female.	Total.	Cotton.	Evans.	Ewing.	Hoan.	McDermott.	Total.	Banks.	Dicker.	Earle.	Martin.	Total.		
Bothwell	671	355	1026	117	40	61	16	2	236	72	17	137	47	273	15	524
Brighton	966	915	1881	366	95	194	85	27	767	42	33	340	59	474	28	1269
Campbell Town	705	614	1319	203	43	70	39	11	365	28	34	396	56	514	33	912
Clarence	707	805	1512	259	170	102	141	205	877	52	103	228	66	449	50	1376
Esperance	1082	871	1953	168	109	73	52	3	405	191	233	245	114	783	35	1223
Glamorgan	226	218	444	112	8	56	12	4	192	35	12	98	5	150	14	356
Glenorchy	365	373	728	110	147	58	45	6	366	33	43	105	26	207	12	585
Hamilton	553	395	948	124	24	83	24	10	263	32	19	208	94	351	17	631
Huon	962	850	1812	174	483	181	45	38	921	37	58	133	38	266	53	1240
Kingborough	485	440	925	115	124	124	49	15	423	31	26	99	25	181	24	628
New Norfolk	1411	1265	2676	308	88	180	118	29	722	66	57	199	674	996	53	1772
Oatlands	862	764	1626	256	66	187	74	15	598	73	36	355	58	522	30	1150
Port Cygnet	1185	977	2162	135	480	152	38	18	823	157	131	209	165	662	61	1546
Richmond	544	490	1034	111	31	121	38	64	365	29	28	187	24	268	24	657
Sorell	584	502	1086	97	18	22	434	37	608	27	17	134	27	205	23	836
Spring Bay	214	187	401	74	8	16	36	7	141	22	27	62	33	144	7	292
Tasman	327	234	561	56	13	9	154	2	234	21	33	54	32	140	12	386
Postal Votes	112	62	55	35	6	270	4	11	39	23	77	9	356
Total	11,849	10,245	22,094	2897*	2007*	1747*	1422	493	8566	950	92*	3234*	157	6677	496	15,739

DISTRICT OF WILMOT. (Quota 1756.)

Subdistrict.	Electors on Rolls.			Liberal Candidates.						Labour Candidates.				Independent Candidate.	Informal.	Total Number of Votes Recorded.
	Male.	Female.	Total.	Best.	Hays.	Lee.	Mulcahy.	Walduck.	Total.	Lyons.	O'Keefe.	Shoobridge.	Total.			
Beaconsfield	1174	1118	2292	39	24	78	137	412	690	50	528	113	691	19	31	1431
Deloraine	1614	1442	3056	425	138	90	208	36	897	282	122	181	585	348	49	1879
Devonport	1277	1490	2767	97	582	48	252	64	1043	459	45	136	640	157	70	1910
Evandale	964	1010	1974	84	87	263	225	57	716	350	85	109	544	81	28	1369
Kentish	1352	1151	2503	137	292	28	573	48	1078	236	50	65	351	141	26	1596
Latrobe	962	930	1892	144	258	22	219	48	691	225	35	86	346	114	24	1175
Longford	1080	1154	2234	25	31	591	92	14	753	310	60	399	769	37	34	1593
Westbury	1138	1096	2234	190	98	335	191	84	898	261	88	136	483	80	22	1485
Postal Votes	22	10	53	63	13	161	30	9	19	58	3	...	222
Total	9561	9391	18,952	1163*	1506*	146*	1961*	775	6861	2198*	1008*	1245	4451	977	284	12,660

53
48
73
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126
790
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381
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144
193
015

TABLE XII.—General Election, 23rd January, 1913.—Analysis of the Choices, arranged according to the First Choices for each Candidate.

DISTRICT OF BASS.

Choices.	ANDERSON (La.)—1974.								
	Becker (La.)	Guy (La.)	Hayes (Li.)	Howroyd (La.)	McKenzie (Li.)	Sadler (Li.)	Solomon (Li.)	Total	Total Choices for Liberal Candidates
1									
2	1274	326	11	358	2	3	...	1974	16
3	285	1310	17	352	2	4	4	1974	27
4	357	313	73	1140	10	11	7	1911	101
5	16	13	6	14	10	61	46
6	3	1	20	10	5	39	38
7	2	..	1	14	3	20	20
8	1	..	2	..	15	18	18

Choices.	BECKER (La.)—2039.								
	Anderson (La.)	Guy (La.)	Hayes (Li.)	Howroyd (La.)	McKenzie (Li.)	Sadler (Li.)	Solomon (Li.)	Total	Total Choices for Liberal Candidates
1									
2	756	783	14	463	10	6	7	2039	37
3	298	940	45	722	14	13	7	2039	79
4	836	270	44	731	20	20	11	1932	95
5	2	2	11	9	15	13	6	58	45
6	3	1	9	1	9	9	7	39	34
7	2	..	5	6	2	15	15
8	2	..	3	8	13	11

Choices.	GUY (La.)—1131.								
	Anderson (La.)	Becker (La.)	Hayes (Li.)	Howroyd (La.)	McKenzie (Li.)	Sadler (Li.)	Solomon (Li.)	Total	Total Choices for Liberal Candidates
1									
2	181	330	31	568	6	9	6	1131	52
3	280	500	11	301	9	22	8	1131	50
4	575	235	17	195	14	14	25	1075	76
5	3	3	11	2	10	4	21	54	46
6	3	1	5	..	10	7	6	32	28
7	1	..	2	1	6	2	..	12	10
8	4	2	3	9	9

TABLE XII. (continued).—General Election, 23rd January, 1913.—Analysis of the Choices, &c.

DISTRICT OF BASS (continued).

Choices.	HAYES (Li.)—1643.								
1	Anderson (La.)	Becker (La.)	Guy (La.)	Howroyd (La.)	McKenzie (Li.)	Sadler (Li.)	Solomon (Li.)	Total	Total Choices for Labour Candidates
2	4	16	8	15	814	173	613	1643	43
3	5	12	6	16	512	805	287	1643	39
4	11	6	11	18	266	593	681	1586	46
5	4	6	6	8	1	1	...	26	4
6	1	2	5	5	1	3	1	18	13
7	4	1	...	1	1	7	5
8	2	2	...	1	2	7	4

Choices.	HOWROYD (La.)—1788.								
1	Anderson (La.)	Becker (La.)	Guy (La.)	Hayes (Li.)	McKenzie (Li.)	Sadler (Li.)	Solomon (Li.)	Total	Total Choices for Liberal Candidates
2	285	417	1042	11	27	11	15	1788	64
3	361	967	398	7	7	37	11	1788	62
4	1041	316	285	11	23	25	29	1730	88
5	4	7	5	12	8	22	13	71	55
6	2	5	3	7	13	10	12	52	42
7	...	2	...	3	7	4	1	17	15
8	3	5	2	1	1	12	9

Choices.	MCKENZIE (Li.)—1157.								
1	Anderson (La.)	Becker (La.)	Guy (La.)	Hayes (Li.)	Howroyd (La.)	Sadler (Li.)	Solomon (Li.)	Total	Total Choices for Labour Candidates
2	3	12	6	409	15	381	331	1157	36
3	6	12	17	252	14	412	444	1157	49
4	13	12	13	378	24	372	285	1097	62
5	6	4	9	2	10	3	3	37	29
6	4	7	6	1	7	2	...	27	24
7	2	2	6	1	2	13	12
8	5	2	2	1	2	12	11

TABLE XII. (continued).—General Election, 23rd January, 1913.—Analysis of the Choices, &c.

DISTRICT OF BASS (continued).

Choices.	SADLER (Li.)—1130.								Total Choices for Labour Candidates
1	Anderson (La.)	Becker (La.)	Guy (La.)	Hayes (Li.)	Howroyd (Li.)	McKenzie (Li.)	Solomon (Li.)	Total	
2	9	8	18	106	16	312	661	1130	51
3	4	22	23	264	37	587	193	1130	86
4	5	17	26	623	32	165	192	1060	80
5	8	4	12	9	11	3	4	51	35
6	5	9	8	7	5	3	2	39	27
7	3	4	2	2	3	14	12
8	4	4	1	..	3	..	1	13	12

Choices.	SOLOMON (Li.)—2909.								Total Choices for Labour Candidates
1	Anderson (La.)	Becker (La.)	Guy (La.)	Hayes (Li.)	Howroyd (La.)	McKenzie (Li.)	Sadler (Li.)	Total.	
2	1	3	7	657	18	742	1481	2909	29
3	6	6	10	547	34	1660	606	2909	56
4	7	14	17	1539	67	410	767	2821	105
5	6	16	19	5	22	4	4	76	63
6	8	10	19	3	8	1	1	50	45
7	4	11	..	1	2	1	1	20	17
8	12	..	4	1	1	18	17

DISTRICT OF DARWIN.

Choices.	BELTON (La.)—1736.									Total Choices for Liberal Candidates	
1	Hurst (La.)	Jones (La.)	Lamerton (Li.)	Laughton (Li.)	Ogden (La.)	Payne (Li.)	Pullen (Li.)	Watkins (La.)	Whitsitt (Li.)	Total	
2	1356	93	12	22	174	5	8	62	4	1736	51
3	152	762	20	20	467	16	16	271	12	1736	84
4	95	140	52	27	647	20	10	555	19	1565	128
5	45	462	20	40	241	18	16	591	27	1400	121
6	..	3	3	69	7	4	9	8	6	109	91
7	6	3	..	2	13	13
8	1	..	2	6	9	9
9	1	1	3	1	6	3
10	1	3	4	4

TABLE XII. (continued).—General Election, 23rd January, 1913.—Analysis of the Choices, &c.

DISTRICT OF DARWIN (continued).

Choices.	HURST (La.)—1372.										Total Choices for Liberal Candidates
1	Belton (La.)	Jones (La.)	Lamerton (Li.)	Laughton (Li.)	Ogden (La.)	Payne (Li.)	Pullen (Li.)	Watkins (La.)	Whitsitt (Li.)	Total	
2	1058	68	7	10	128	7	5	82	7	1372	36
3	111	358	23	8	376	7	14	464	11	1372	63
4	91	141	20	11	698	8	14	356	12	1291	65
5	48	636	14	25	123	7	7	317	13	1190	66
6	1	3	3	11	1	2	2	4	8	35	26
7	...	1	...	3	1	...	2	7	6
8	2	1	3	3
9	2	2	2
10	1	1	2	2

Choices.	JONES (La.)—156.										Total Choices for Liberal Candidates
1	Belton (La.)	Hurst (La.)	Lamerton (Li.)	Laughton (Li.)	Ogden (La.)	Payne (Li.)	Pullen (Li.)	Watkins (La.)	Whitsitt (Li.)	Total	
2	79	48	8	3	8	5	5	156	16
3	44	59	...	6	17	10	1	18	1	156	18
4	7	10	5	3	67	5	2	36	3	138	18
5	8	16	2	1	32	6	4	58	1	128	14
6	1	2	...	1	1	2	2	9	6
7	1	...	1	...	1	3	1
8	...	1	1	2	1
9	1	1	...	2	...
10	1	1	2	2

Choices.	LAMERTON (Li.)—742.										Total Choices for Labour Candidates
1	Belton (La.)	Hurst (La.)	Jones (La.)	Laughton (Li.)	Ogden (La.)	Payne (Li.)	Pullen (Li.)	Watkins (La.)	Whitsitt (Li.)	Total	
2	5	4	2	318	25	199	119	5	05	742	41
3	7	5	4	65	24	325	162	14	136	742	54
4	13	10	...	75	9	112	307	20	150	696	52
5	8	9	...	161	7	53	75	22	289	636	58
6	6	...	6	1	15	1	4	4	4	41	31
7	1	1	3	1	...	1	1	8	6
8	...	2	3	1	...	6	6
9	2	1	...	1	1	1	...	6	5
10	1	2	2	1	6	5

TABLE XII. (continued).—General Election, 23rd January, 1913.—Analysis of the Choices, &c.

DISTRICT OF DARWIN (continued).

Choices.	PULLEN (Li.)—1341.										
	Belton (La.)	Hurst (La.)	Jones (La.)	Lamerton (Li.)	Laughton (Li.)	Ogden (La.)	Payne (Li.)	Watkins (La.)	Whitsitt (Li.)	Total	Total Choices for Labour Candidates
1											
2	7	15	..	130	77	7	773	9	323	1341	38
3	14	8	8	219	151	9	334	19	579	1311	58
4	8	3	3	424	454	19	113	19	227	1270	52
5	14	5	9	428	488	11	65	24	135	1179	63
6	11	3	13	5	3	6	..	7	5	53	40
7	2	2	1	..	2	7	5
8	..	1	1	1	..	2	..	5	5
9	1	3	..	1	..	5	5
10	2	1	3	2

Choices.	WATKINS (La.)—1426.										
	Belton (La.)	Hurst (La.)	Jones (La.)	Lamerton (Li.)	Laughton (Li.)	Ogden (La.)	Payne (Li.)	Pullen (Li.)	Whitsitt (Li.)	Total	Total Choices for Liberal Candidates
1											
2	71	195	19	1	2	1109	13	11	5	1426	32
3	320	346	102	10	8	133	9	13	5	1426	45
4	352	789	119	9	5	77	6	9	..	1372	35
5	105	51	1044	23	15	58	6	6	5	1313	55
6	1	1	1	6	2	..	4	3	2	..	17
7	3	..	1	1	1	6	6
8	3	2	1	6	6
9	3	2	1	6	6
10	1	..	1	1	3	6	6

Choices.	WHITSITT (Li.)—1528.										
	Belton (La.)	Hurst (La.)	Jones (La.)	Lamerton (Li.)	Laughton (Li.)	Ogden (La.)	Payne (Li.)	Pullen (Li.)	Watkins (La.)	Total	Total Choices for Labour Candidates
1											
2	6	6	2	354	37	13	632	404	14	1528	41
3	15	11	5	139	237	8	547	360	6	1528	45
4	15	14	3	339	579	18	174	284	9	1435	59
5	8	7	19	800	232	13	98	131	10	1318	57
6	12	2	6	2	..	9	..	3	8	42	37
7	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	8	5
8	2	2	2	1	7	7
9	1	2	2	5	5
10	2	1	1	4	4

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TABLE XII. (continued).—General Election, 23rd January, 1913.—Analysis of the Choices, &c.
DISTRICT OF DENISON.

Choices.		BARKER (La.)—1294.													Total	Total Choices for Liberal Candidates
1	2	Bottrill (Li.)	Davies (Li.)	Edmonds (La.)	Fullerton (Li.)	Giblin (La.)	Lewis (Li.)	O'Brien (La.)	Paterson (Li.)	Rattle (Li.)	Sheridan (La.)	Valentine (Li.)	Waterworth (La.)	Woods (La.)		
2	42	17	548	4	235	1	36	3	225	3	39	141	1294	70
3	1	33	81	9	482	4	93	2	251	7	91	240	1294	56
4	2	2	114	9	148	6	397	5	5	5	244	4	152	176	1264	33
5	1	2	120	22	107	9	134	5	10	10	394	10	281	144	1239	59
6	2	4	158	4	123	3	185	7	12	12	59	18	474	169	1218	50
7	8	3	174	11	82	15	268	10	5	5	30	13	125	338	1082	65
8	...	1	1	1	1	1	1	...	8	3
9	1	...	2	1	4	3
10	1	1	2	...
11	1	...	1	...	1	2	1
12	1	1	...	2	1
13	1	...	1	2	1
14	1	...	1	...

Choices.		BOTTRILL (Li.)—369.													Total	Total Choices for Labour Candidates
1	2	Barker (La.)	Davies (Li.)	Edmonds (La.)	Fullerton (Li.)	Giblin (La.)	Lewis (Li.)	O'Brien (La.)	Paterson (La.)	Rattle (Li.)	Sheridan (La.)	Valentine (Li.)	Waterworth (La.)	Woods (La.)		
2	6	156	8	94	8	40	2	10	24	...	19	1	1	369	26	
3	1	57	6	114	7	100	2	26	20	...	25	2	1	369	27	
4	3	51	2	36	3	118	2	34	32	4	52	2	3	351	28	
5	1	33	...	32	4	33	2	98	44	2	78	2	2	334	16	
6	...	24	3	27	6	21	3	60	99	5	64	5	5	319	24	
7	4	17	...	21	1	20	3	63	72	3	63	9	6	282	26	
8	1	1	2	2	
9	1	...	1	2	1	
10	2	...	2	2	
11	1	...	1	2	2	
12	1	1	
13	1	1	1	
14	1	1	1	

Choices.		DAVIES (Li.)—1902.													Total	Total Choices for Labour Candidates
1	2	Barker (La.)	Bottrill (Li.)	Edmond (La.)	Fullerton (Li.)	Giblin (La.)	Lewis (Li.)	O'Brien (La.)	Paterson (Li.)	Rattle (Li.)	Sheridan (La.)	Valentine (Li.)	Waterworth (La.)	Woods (La.)		
2	4	83	5	303	27	1258	3	16	33	5	164	1	...	1902	45	
3	...	113	3	465	21	361	3	84	166	9	657	15	5	1902	56	
4	4	192	5	434	13	141	5	205	275	12	536	9	11	1842	59	
5	7	426	4	214	10	51	9	335	434	6	270	7	15	1790	60	
6	5	335	9	152	6	24	9	625	361	19	158	8	14	1725	70	
7	7	413	8	55	16	24	4	420	381	7	91	15	10	1451	67	
8	4	1	2	...	5	1	2	2	18	14	
9	1	1	1	...	1	7	1	1	...	1	1	16	7	
10	1	...	3	1	...	1	2	2	1	2	2	15	10	
11	1	1	...	3	3	1	3	2	14	12	
12	1	...	3	...	2	...	1	2	2	2	1	14	12	
13	...	2	2	1	1	5	1	14	11	
14	3	1	3	...	1	1	4	13	11	

TABLE XII. (continued)—General Election, 23rd January, 1913.—Analysis of the Choices, &c.
DISTRICT OF DENISON (continued).

Choices.	LEWIS (Li.)—2292.													Total	Total Choices for Labour Candidates
1	Barker (La.)	Bottrill (Li.)	Davies (Li.)	Edmonds (La.)	Fullerton (Li.)	Giblin (La.)	O'Brien (La.)	Paterson (Li.)	Rattle (Li.)	Sheridan (La.)	Valentine (Li.)	Waterworth (La.)	Woods (La.)	Total	Total Choices for Labour Candidates
2	9	60	1540	1	351	10	7	35	69	3	209	1	3	2292	28
3	3	161	398	4	617	13	3	73	151	4	852	7	6	2292	40
4	5	312	172	1	658	17	2	202	288	13	529	6	4	2284	48
5	5	511	66	3	237	10	7	447	562	11	276	10	6	2201	52
6	11	541	43	3	145	14	4	654	481	8	205	6	14	2129	60
7	14	474	16	8	80	13	7	609	524	5	104	9	6	1869	62
8	4	...	1	1	...	1	1	2	2	1	...	18	8
9	2	1	...	2	...	1	...	2	1	1	...	1	1	11	7
10	2	2	...	1	1	2	1	10	10
11	...	2	...	1	...	2	1	1	...	2	1	1	...	10	7
12	1	2	...	2	...	3	...	9	7
13	1	1	2	1	...	2	2	9	9
14	2	...	2	2	1	2	9	9

Choices.	O'BRIEN (La.)—392.													Total	Total Choices for Liberal Candidates
1	Barker (La.)	Bottrill (Li.)	Davies (Li.)	Edmonds (La.)	Fullerton (Li.)	Giblin (La.)	Lewis (Li.)	Paterson (Li.)	Rattle (Li.)	Sheridan (La.)	Valentine (Li.)	Waterworth (La.)	Woods (La.)	Total	Total Choices for Liberal Candidates
2	46	...	5	25	2	95	13	3	1	119	2	21	60	392	26
3	38	2	9	58	5	44	5	1	2	81	2	65	70	392	23
4	58	3	3	41	4	64	1	2	2	60	6	52	76	372	21
5	54	...	5	63	1	65	3	3	1	64	6	55	46	366	19
6	79	6	...	83	2	30	2	3	4	25	5	71	48	358	22
7	63	3	2	49	4	41	3	3	2	9	5	69	49	302	22
8	1	2	2
9	...	1	1	1	1
10	1	1	1
11	1	1	1
12	1	1	1
13	1	1	1
14	1	1	1

Choices.	PATERSON (Li.)—202.													Total	Total Choices for Labour Candidates
1	Barker (La.)	Bottrill (Li.)	Davies (Li.)	Edmonds (La.)	Fullerton (Li.)	Giblin (La.)	Lewis (Li.)	O'Brien (La.)	Rattle (Li.)	Sheridan (La.)	Valentine (Li.)	Waterworth (La.)	Woods (La.)	Total	Total Choices for Labour Candidates
2	1	13	34	...	34	5	40	2	23	3	40	3	4	202	18
3	3	13	41	...	26	5	48	...	19	4	35	3	5	202	20
4	2	26	35	3	28	2	30	2	22	1	31	5	4	191	19
5	3	27	34	2	25	3	28	2	14	...	33	1	6	178	17
6	4	31	24	4	22	5	13	1	38	2	23	3	2	172	21
7	4	38	9	2	17	6	7	2	38	2	10	4	...	186	22
8	1	1	...	1	...	1	1	1	...	6	5
9	1	2	1	...	5	5
10	...	1	1	1	...	1	1	5	2
11	1	1	1	...	5	3
12	...	2	...	1	1	1	5	3
13	1	1	1	1	...	5	3
14	1	1	2	1	5	4

Choices

1

Choices
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Barker (La.)
Bottrill (Li.)
Davies (Li.)
Edmonds (La.)
Fullerton (Li.)
Giblin (La.)
Lewis (Li.)
Paterson (Li.)
Rattle (Li.)
Sheridan (La.)
Valentine (Li.)
Waterworth (La.)
Woods (La.)
Total
Total Choices for Liberal Candidates

Choices

1

Choices
1
Barker (La.)
Bottrill (Li.)
Davies (Li.)
Edmonds (La.)
Fullerton (Li.)
Giblin (La.)
Lewis (Li.)
O'Brien (La.)
Rattle (Li.)
Sheridan (La.)
Valentine (Li.)
Waterworth (La.)
Woods (La.)
Total
Total Choices for Labour Candidates

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TABLE XII. (continued).—General Election, 23rd January, 1913.—Analysis of the Choices, &c.
DISTRICT OF DENISON (continued).

Choices.		RATTLE (Li.)—620.													Total Choices for Labour Candidates
1		Barker (La.)	Bottrill (Li.)	Davies (Li.)	Edmonds (La.)	Fullerton (Li.)	Giblin (La.)	Lewis (Li.)	O'Brien (La.)	Paterson (Li.)	Sheridan (La.)	Valentine (Li.)	Waterworth (La.)	Woods (La.)	
2	6	50	92	3	175	15	107	1	43	12	107	3	6	620	46
3	3	62	134	3	119	12	154	3	42	6	63	3	11	620	46
4	7	78	180	3	91	4	126	1	37	13	89	2	8	595	44
5	5	81	96	6	83	17	76	2	64	10	110	4	7	571	51
6	5	190	62	8	55	7	47	5	121	4	95	6	3	550	40
7	5	111	24	4	11	8	32	2	178	2	74	4	4	459	29
8	2	9	8
9	...	1	1	1	...	1	3	4
10	1	2	6	4
11	2	...	2	5	3
12	1	5	4
13	2	1	2	5	2
14	2	1	2	5	3

Choices.		SHERIDAN (La.)—1027.													Total Choices for Liberal Candidates
1		Barker (La.)	Bottrill (Li.)	Davies (Li.)	Edmonds (La.)	Fullerton (Li.)	Giblin (La.)	Lewis (Li.)	O'Brien (La.)	Paterson (Li.)	Rattle (Li.)	Valentine (Li.)	Waterworth (La.)	Woods (La.)	
2	108	1	2	39	2	150	4	57	...	7	5	94	558	1027	21
3	239	3	5	122	3	225	2	64	...	1	5	166	187	1027	24
4	235	3	...	164	5	213	2	121	1	2	6	144	100	996	19
5	170	2	2	226	5	173	5	138	2	3	5	184	59	974	24
6	124	5	1	228	5	103	1	200	5	3	6	224	50	955	26
7	96	11	1	154	...	59	4	324	3	4	10	187	42	845	33
8	1	1	...	1	1	...	1	...	1	...	1	7	4
9	1	3	2
10	1	...	1	...	1	3	3
11	...	1	1	...	1	3	3
12	1	1	3	2
13	1	1	3	3
14	...	1	1	1	...	3	2

Choices.		VALENTINE (Li.)—1011.													Total Choices for Labour Candidates
1		Barker (La.)	Bottrill (Li.)	Davies (Li.)	Edmonds (La.)	Fullerton (Li.)	Giblin (La.)	Lewis (Li.)	O'Brien (La.)	Paterson (Li.)	Rattle (Li.)	Sheridan (La.)	Waterworth (La.)	Woods (La.)	
2	1	42	277	...	250	4	291	1	41	87	6	4	7	1011	23
3	7	59	303	1	135	11	389	1	30	53	16	1	5	1011	42
4	6	94	223	2	254	12	165	5	116	99	2	3	9	990	39
5	3	229	90	4	148	6	81	5	188	199	4	2	3	962	27
6	9	215	52	4	89	11	35	8	266	229	2	2	3	925	39
7	6	240	23	4	58	4	12	3	235	217	5	4	2	818	28
8	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1	10	7
9	1	1	1	1	5	3
10	1	...	1	1	4	3
11	...	1	4	3
12	1	2	2	...	4	4
13	1	...	1	2	4	3
14	1	1	1	1	4	3

TABLE XII. (continued).—General Election, 23rd January, 1913. — Analysis of the Choices, &c.

DISTRICT OF DENISON (continued).

Choices.	WATERWORTH (La.)—502.													Total Choices for Liberal Candidates	
	Barker (La.)	Bottrill (Li.)	Davies (Li.)	Edmonds (La.)	Fullerton (Li.)	Giblin (La.)	Lewis (Li.)	O'Brien (La.)	Paterson (Li.)	Rattle (Li.)	Sheridan (La.)	Valentine (Li.)	Woods (La.)		Total
1															
2	36	2	1	25	1	206	..	26	..	1	78	2	124	502	7
3	68	2	3	49	1	73	3	47	1	3	155	4	93	502	17
4	92	2	1	70	..	73	3	61	1	5	94	4	84	490	16
5	119	1	2	79	2	65	1	63	1	6	75	2	66	482	15
6	87	3	1	125	2	39	3	86	3	5	47	2	60	463	19
7	58	4	4	101	5	17	1	145	..	4	18	1	52	410	19
8	..	1	1	1	3	3
9	1	2	3	2
10	1	..	1	1	3	2
11	..	1	3	3
12	3	3
13	1	3	1	3	3
14	2	2	2

Choices.	WOODS (La.)—1393.													Total Choices for Liberal Candidates	
	Barker (La.)	Bottrill (Li.)	Davies (Li.)	Edmonds (La.)	Fullerton (Li.)	Giblin (La.)	Lewis (Li.)	O'Brien (La.)	Paterson (Li.)	Rattle (Li.)	Sheridan (La.)	Valentine (Li.)	Waterworth (La.)		Total
1															
2	137	1	3	49	..	136	4	31	1	2	814	4	211	1393	15
3	391	5	2	131	1	312	6	90	3	5	316	10	121	1393	32
4	261	3	6	259	5	299	1	204	9	3	79	7	218	1354	34
5	237	..	9	291	8	295	5	161	5	8	60	6	238	1323	41
6	172	3	6	323	14	139	5	270	4	3	49	7	279	1274	42
7	102	3	5	207	9	90	2	452	4	2	33	15	206	1130	40
8	1	1	1	..	3	2
9	..	1	..	1	1	3	2
10	1	2	3	3
11	..	1	..	1	1	3	2
12	..	1	1	1	..	3	3
13	..	1	1	1	3	3
14	1	1	..	2	1

DISTRICT OF FRANKLIN.

Choices.	BANKS (La.)—950.									Total Choices for Liberal Candidates
	Cotton (Li.)	Dicker (La.)	Earle (La.)	Evans (Li.)	Ewing (Li.)	Hean (Li.)	McDermott (Li.)	Martin (Li.)	Total	
1										
2	65	438	227	4	1	3	8	204	950	81
3	7	230	474	21	10	3	5	195	950	51
4	4	217	193	17	14	13	12	398	868	60
5	1	1	2	17	7	3	10	3	49	43
6	2	6	6	5	..	19	19
7	2	1	..	1	..	6	3	..	13	12
8	1	1	1	1	6	2	12	10
9	2	1	9	3

TABLE XII. (continued).—General Election, 23rd January, 1913.—Analysis of the Choices, &c.

DISTRICT OF FRANKLIN (continued.)

Choices.	COTTON (Li.)—2897.									
	Banks (La.)	Dicker (La.)	Earle (La.)	Evans (Li.)	Ewing (Li.)	Hean (Li.)	McDermott (Li.)	Martin (La.)	Total	Total Choices for Labour Candidates
1										
2	3	33	90	1292	626	597	250	6	2897	132
3	7	10	28	780	1205	607	245	15	2897	60
4	9	9	19	499	556	1258	384	26	2894	63
5	12	10	11	168	335	250	1692	56	2534	89
6	6	4	5	3	3	1	7	12	41	27
7	2	1	5	...	2	4	...	3	17	11
8	1	3	2	...	1	...	4	3	14	9
9	3	5	1	1	1	3	14	12

Choices.	DICKER (La.)—920.									
	Banks (La.)	Cotton (Li.)	Earle (La.)	Evans (Li.)	Ewing (Li.)	Hean (Li.)	McDermott (Li.)	Martin (La.)	Total	Total Choices for Liberal Candidates
1										
2	124	5	594	20	3	8	1	165	920	37
3	174	9	190	28	15	13	12	479	920	77
4	444	12	93	7	11	13	13	187	780	56
5	4	4	...	7	3	6	4	1	29	24
6	...	2	1	1	4	4	3	2	17	14
7	1	1	1	2	5	4
8	1	1	1	...	3	2
9	...	1	1	1

Choices.	EARLE (La.)—3234.									
	Banks (La.)	Cotton (Li.)	Dicker (La.)	Evans (Li.)	Ewing (Li.)	Hean (Li.)	McDermott (Li.)	Martin (La.)	Total	Total Choices for Liberal Candidates
1										
2	313	25	1575	43	18	20	18	1222	3234	124
3	639	39	1130	30	37	34	24	1301	3234	164
4	1851	33	401	25	25	38	28	476	2877	149
5	12	14	5	17	7	13	24	6	98	75
6	4	7	2	7	7	7	9	...	43	37
7	...	3	...	1	2	4	2	...	13	12
8	4	...	2	2	2	10	8
9	1	3	...	1	2	7	4

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TABLE XII. (continued).—General Election, 23rd January, 1913.—Analysis of the Choices, &c.

DISTRICT OF FRANKLIN (continued).

Choices.	EVANS (Li.)—2007.									
	Banks (La.)	Cotton (Li.)	Dicker (La.)	Earle (La.)	Ewing (Li.)	Hean (Li.)	McDermott (Li.)	Martin (La.)	Total	Total Choices for Labour Candidates
1										
2	3	439	7	25	1070	401	48	14	2007	49
3	8	395	13	13	521	943	101	13	2007	47
4	13	763	11	10	220	490	370	27	1904	61
5	17	245	14	8	106	82	1248	40	1760	89
6	10	4	4	3	...	2	4	8	35	25
7	3	...	2	1	...	1	...	2	9	8
8	2	...	2	1	...	1	...	2	8	7
9	1	...	3	1	1	1	7	6

Choices.	EWING (Li.)—1747.									
	Banks (La.)	Cotton (Li.)	Dicker (La.)	Earle (La.)	Evans (Li.)	Hean (Li.)	McDermott (Li.)	Martin (La.)	Total	Total Choices for Labour Candidates
1										
2	1	419	5	13	884	378	44	3	1747	22
3	1	419	15	15	438	712	138	9	1747	40
4	11	644	7	15	234	435	274	20	1640	53
5	8	148	5	8	94	128	1083	20	1494	41
6	2	2	5	4	...	1	3	7	24	18
7	2	1	2	1	2	1	9	6
8	1	...	1	2	2	2	6	6
9	2	1	...	1	...	1	5	4

Choices.	HEAN (Li.)—1422.									
	Banks (La.)	Cotton (Li.)	Dicker (La.)	Earle (La.)	Evans (Li.)	Ewing (Li.)	McDermott (Li.)	Martin (La.)	Total	Total Choices for Labour Candidates
1										
2	2	596	8	26	286	288	195	21	1422	57
3	10	285	11	27	526	341	207	15	1422	63
4	11	315	14	21	320	389	206	13	1289	59
5	12	122	6	12	132	222	616	24	1146	54
6	2	1	6	2	7	7	25	17
7	2	1	...	1	1	5	3
8	1	...	1	1	...	1	1	...	5	3
9	1	...	2	1	1	...	5	4

TABLE XII. (continued).—General Election, 23rd January, 1913.—Analysis of the Choices, &c.

DISTRICT OF FRANKLIN (continued):

Choices.	MARTIN (La.)—1573.									
1	Banks (La.)	Cotton (Li.)	Dicker (La.)	Earle (La.)	Evans (Li.)	Ewing (Li.)	Hean (Li.)	McDermott (Li.)	Total	Total Choices for Liberal Candidates
2	243	10	309	978	9	3	12	9	1573	43
3	315	8	893	312	15	12	10	8	1573	53
4	878	24	302	215	12	12	14	8	1465	70
5	2	12	3	3	11	7	13	7	58	50
6	..	1	3	1	10	10	6	6	37	33
7	1	1	..	1	1	3	6	..	13	11
8	2	1	1	..	1	..	4	3	12	9
9	..	6	5	11	11

Choices.	McDERMOTT (Li.)—493.									
1	Banks (La.)	Cotton (Li.)	Dicker (La.)	Earle (La.)	Evans (Li.)	Ewing (Li.)	Hean (Li.)	Martin (La.)	Total	Total Choices for Labour Candidates
2	1	152	6	19	69	71	155	20	493	46
3	6	87	16	25	133	127	95	4	493	51
4	17	62	13	12	168	89	97	7	460	54
5	7	114	2	10	47	126	87	5	398	24
6	2	1	1	2	..	3	9	5
7	1	1	2	2
8	1	1	1
9

DISTRICT OF WILMOT.

Choices.	BEST (Li.)—1163.									
1	Cameron (Ind.)	Hayes (Li.)	Lee (Li.)	Lyons (La.)	Mulcahy (Li.)	O'Keefe (La.)	Shoobridge (La.)	Walduck (Li.)	Total	Total Choices for Labour and Independent Candidates
2	93	527	205	13	186	4	11	124	1163	121
3	7	287	492	30	206	20	14	107	1163	71
4	16	161	266	27	377	13	25	180	1065	81
5	14	84	77	17	215	12	13	533	965	56
6	28	4	..	7	15	7	12	16	89	54
7	1	3	2	6	3	1	16	12
8	1	1	..	3	..	2	5	..	12	11
9	5	3	1	2	11	9

TABLE XII. (continued).—General Election, 23rd January, 1913.—Analysis of the Choices, &c.

DISTRICT OF WILMOT (continued).

Choices.	CAMERON (Ind.)—977.								Total
	Best (Li.)	Hayes (Li.)	Lee (Li.)	Lyons (La.)	Mulcahy (Li.)	O'Keefe (La.)	Shoobridge (La.)	Walduck (Li.)	
1									977
2	108	312	91	244	89	48	44	41	977
3	81	181	186	118	131	151	73	56	977
4	76	65	115	54	127	89	122	80	728
5	90	30	69	19	80	16	38	114	451
6	64	11	20	11	33	3	6	61	214
7	1	4	..	2	3	2	12
8	1	1	4	1	1	8
9	2	2	..	4

Choices.	HAYS (Li.)—1506.									Total Choices for Labour and Independent Candidates
	Best (Li.)	Cameron (Ind.)	Lee (Li.)	Lyons (La.)	Mulcahy (Li.)	O'Keefe (La.)	Shoobridge (La.)	Walduck (Li.)	Total	
1										
2	196	31	529	25	599	6	6	114	1506	68
3	226	29	546	23	491	16	7	168	1506	75
4	375	27	260	15	216	11	18	493	1415	71
5	539	35	78	7	114	6	19	518	1311	67
6	16	48	3	8	7	6	10	14	112	72
7	3	..	1	4	1	1	1	3	14	6
8	..	1	2	1	2	2	1	2	11	5
9	1	3	1	..	2	1	8	5

Choices.	LEE (Li.)—1456.									Total Choices for Labour and Independent Candidates
	Best (Li.)	Cameron (Ind.)	Hays (Li.)	Lyons (La.)	Mulcahy (Li.)	O'Keefe (La.)	Shoobridge (La.)	Walduck (Li.)	Total	
1										
2	164	20	496	22	626	8	10	110	1456	60
3	216	11	577	12	411	14	10	205	1456	47
4	373	18	238	9	245	10	10	516	1419	47
5	619	22	56	4	108	7	15	494	1325	48
6	6	37	..	8	1	3	10	6	71	58
7	..	1	..	1	1	1	4	1	9	7
8	..	1	1	3	1	2	8	5
9	1	2	1	4	3

TABLE XII. (continued).—General Elections, 23rd January, 1913.—Analysis of the Choices, &c.

DISTRICT OF WILMOT (continued).

Choices. 1	LYONS (La.)—2198.									Total Choices for Liberal and Independent Candidates
	Best (Li.)	Cameron (Ind.)	Hays (Li.)	Lee (Li.)	Mulcahy (Li.)	O'Keefe (La.)	Shoobridge (La.)	Walduck (Li.)	Total	
2	7	37	25	16	77	1518	511	7	2198	169
3	7	31	29	14	41	570	1485	21	2198	143
4	21	845	29	24	44	24	54	32	1079	1001
5	20	17	33	22	25	5	7	19	148	136
6	17	5	10	11	10	5	4	9	71	62
7	8	5	2	2	4	2	1	3	27	24
8	1	..	4	2	2	3	4	3	19	12
9	3	4	..	2	1	..	1	2	13	12

Choices. 1	MULCAHY (Li.)—1961.									Total Choices for Labour and Independent Candidates
	Best (Li.)	Cameron (Ind.)	Hays (Li.)	Lee (Li.)	Lyons (La.)	O'Keefe (La.)	Shoobridge (La.)	Walduck (Li.)	Total	
2	195	26	888	639	40	22	7	144	1961	95
3	234	22	670	784	19	28	23	181	1961	92
4	515	34	236	313	23	13	23	713	1870	93
5	825	37	62	99	10	11	20	684	1748	78
6	22	52	6	4	16	6	13	15	194	87
7	..	1	1	2	10	7	3	2	26	21
8	2	1	4	5	2	4	24	18
9	3	6	2	4	4	1	20	16

Choices. 1	O'KEEFE (La.)—1008.									Total Choices for Liberal and Independent Candidates
	Best (Li.)	Cameron (Ind.)	Hays (Li.)	Lee (Li.)	Lyons (La.)	Mulcahy (Li.)	Shoobridge (La.)	Walduck (Li.)	Total	
2	..	11	1	6	492	21	466	11	1008	50
3	2	14	6	13	453	17	481	22	1008	74
4	5	222	11	12	7	13	7	19	296	282
5	9	6	13	4	3	4	3	..	42	36
6	3	2	4	2	1	2	..	3	17	16
7	1	2	..	1	..	1	5	5
8	1	1	1	1	4	3
9	..	1	..	1	..	1	..	1	4	4

TABLE XII. (continued).—General Election, 23rd January, 1913.—Analysis of the Choices, &c.

DISTRICT OF WILMOT (continued).

Choices.	SHOOBRIDGE (La.)—1245.									Total Choices for Liberal and Independent Candidates
	Best (Li.)	Cameron (Ind.)	Hays (Li.)	Lee (Li.)	Lyons (La.)	Mulcahy (Li.)	O'Keefe (La.)	Walduck (Li.)	Total	
1										
2	7	11	5	5	592	12	605	8	1245	48
3	6	21	11	10	589	20	574	14	1245	82
4	17	602	15	13	13	9	7	13	689	669
5	7	4	19	7	3	7	4	11	62	55
6	8	1	5	7	...	8	1	8	38	37
7	1	1	1	1	1	2	...	1	8	7
8	1	...	1	1	...	4	1	...	8	7
9

Choices.	WALDUCK (Li.)—775.								Total Choices for Labour and Independent Candidates	
	Best (Li.)	Cameron (Ind.)	Hays (Li.)	Lee (Li.)	Lyons (La.)	Mulcahy (Li.)	O'Keefe (La.)	Shoobridge (La.)		Total
1										
2	130	7	148	267	6	175	19	23	775	55
3	83	11	245	246	19	147	13	11	775	54
4	137	24	219	154	13	157	6	18	728	61
5	331	7	70	41	11	183	8	19	670	45
6	9	23	6	2	...	14	4	5	63	32
7	1	1	...	2	1	5	4
8	...	1	1	2	2
9	...	1	1	1	1

TABLE XIII.—General Election, 23rd January, 1913.—Numbers of the Several Choices recorded for each Candidate.

DISTRICT OF BASS.

Candidates: Liberal, 4; Labour, 4; Total, 8.

Candidate.	Choices.							
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Anderson (La.)	1974	1219	960	2488	33	26	10	28
Becker (La.)	2039	2060	1804	957	42	34	19	6
Guy (La.)	1131	2190	2704	935	53	42	12	7
Hayes (Li.)	1643	1239	1183	2685	66	35	13	15
Howroyd (La.)	1788	1453	1476	2207	75	27	9	8
McKenzie (Li.)	1157	1913	2791	908	47	57	20	4
Sadler (Li.)	1130	2064	1899	1802	61	42	28	4
Solomon (Li.)	2909	1633	954	1230	57	33	7	30
Total	13,771	13,771	13,771	13,212	434	296	118	102

DISTRICT OF DARWIN.

Candidates: Liberal, 5; Labour, 5; Total, 10.

Candidate.	Choices.									
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
Belton (La.)	1736	1455	2118	819	291	56	8	3	5	7
Hurst (La.)	1372	1837	949	1955	219	21	7	9	6	5
Jones (La.)	156	214	1324	547	3459	43	12	13	5	1
Lamerton (Li.)	742	715	646	1443	2456	38	9	4	4	3
Lughton (Li.)	1079	568	694	1702	1441	101	13	1	5	2
Ogden (La.)	1751	1485	1045	1497	510	55	7	8	6	...
Payne (Li.)	1484	2098	1693	579	319	16	8	5	4	4
Pullen (Li.)	1341	1441	453	1311	469	28	6	9	7	3
Watkins (La.)	1426	1472	995	1198	1070	48	4	4	7	10
Whitsitt (Li.)	1528	1390	1698	762	684	38	7	4	3	11
Total	12,615	12,615	12,615	11,813	10,918	444	81	60	52	46

DISTRICT OF DENISON.

Candidates: Liberal, 7; Labour, 7; Total, 14.

Candidate.	Choices.													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Barker (La.)	1294	790	1026	1066	1107	930	667	14	5	4	1	5	3	6
Bottrill (Li.)	369	423	537	910	1560	1540	1572	6	5	1	7	4	7	1
Davies (Li.)	1902	2408	1464	884	488	335	140	7	2	2	3	2	4	5
Edmonds (La.)	764	875	640	838	1116	1401	997	4	9	8	3	8	5	2
Fullerton (Li.)	1321	1226	1509	1560	845	525	277	1	5	6	2	5	3	1
Giblin (La.)	1760	1135	1357	942	863	587	396	10	7	7	3	2	2	2
Lewis (Li.)	2292	2296	1439	845	336	207	151	4	3	6	6	1	2	2
O'Brien (La.)	392	339	471	1059	861	1187	2082	11	2	4	10	4	7	12
Paterson (Li.)	202	176	332	716	1379	2138	1915	12	13	4	3	7	2	...
Rattle (Li.)	620	372	521	886	1564	1544	1535	5	6	4	1	2	5	6
Sheridan (La.)	1027	1859	1556	1091	999	386	191	9	2	7	10	6	2	2
Valentine (Li.)	1011	792	1872	1623	1051	753	502	6	3	4	6	4	2	4
Waterworth (La.)	502	808	823	1073	1211	1549	863	4	6	6	6	8	11	3
Woods (La.)	1393	1350	1302	956	697	646	747	5	7	4	3	4	6	11
Total	14,849	14,849	14,849	14,449	14,127	13,708	12,035	98	75	67	64	62	61	57

TABLE XIII. (continued).—General Election, 23rd January, 1913.—Numbers of the Several Choices, &c.

DISTRICT OF FRANKLIN.
Candidates : Liberal, 5 ; Labor, 4 ; Total, 9.

Candidate.	Choices.								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Banks (La.).....	950	690	1160	3234	74	26	12	8	8
Coiton (Li.).....	2897	1711	1249	1991	660	18	8	2	7
Dicker (La.).....	920	2381	2318	979	46	24	6	8	10
Earle (La.).....	3234	1972	1084	578	54	16	8	7	4
Evans (Li.).....	2007	2607	1971	1272	493	24	4	7	1
Ewing (Li.).....	1747	2080	2268	1316	813	32	8	3	6
Hean (Li.).....	1422	1574	2422	2358	587	27	23	8	2
McDermott (Li.).....	493	573	740	1295	4684	44	8	17	8
Martin (La.).....	1573	1655	2031	1154	155	39	9	11	13
Total.....	15,243	15,243	15,243	14,177	7566	250	86	71	59

DISTRICT OF WILMOT.
Candidates : Liberal, 5 ; Labour, 3 ; Independent, 1 ; Total, 9.

Candidate.	Choices.								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Best (Li.).....	1163	807	855	1519	2440	145	14	4	9
Cameron (Ind.).....	977	236	146	1788	142	196	8	5	20
Hays (Li.).....	1506	2402	2006	974	367	46	4	8	...
Lee (Li.).....	1456	1758	2291	1157	392	49	10	5	3
Lyons (La.).....	2198	1434	1263	161	74	51	24	10	3
Mulcahy (Li.).....	1961	1785	1464	1188	736	90	11	10	3
O'Keefe (La.).....	1008	2230	1386	173	69	40	21	20	7
Shoobridge (La.).....	1245	1078	2104	277	129	60	16	21	12
Walduck (Li.).....	775	559	774	2052	2373	132	14	13	8
Total.....	12,289	12,289	12,289	9289	6722	809	122	96	65

TABLE XIV.—General Election, 23rd January, 1913.—Number of Choices recorded for all Candidates.

District.	Candidates.				Choices.													
	Liberal.	Labour.	Independent.	Total.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
Bass.....	4	4	...	8	13,771	13,771	13,771	13,212	434	296	118	102
Darwin.....	5	5	...	10	12,615	12,615	12,615	11,813	10,918	444	81	60	52	46
Denison.....	7	7	...	14	14,849	14,849	14,849	14,449	14,127	13,708	12,035	98	75	67	64	62	61	57
Franklin.....	5	4	...	9	15,243	15,243	15,243	14,177	7566	250	86	71	59
Wilmot.....	5	3	1	9	12,289	12,289	12,289	9289	6722	809	122	96	65
All.....	68,767	68,767	68,767	62,940	39,767	15,507	12,442	427	251	113	64	62	61	57

TABLE XV.—General Election, 23rd January, 1913.—Number of Choices marked on all Valid Ballot-papers.

District.	Candidates.				Numbers of Papers having the following Choices, and no more.—													
	Liberal.	Labour.	Independent.	Total.	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14		
Bass.....	4	4	...	8	559	12,778	138	178	16	102		
Darwin.....	5	5	...	10	802	895	10,474	363	21	8	6	46		
Denison.....	7	7	...	14	400	322	419	1673	11,937	23	8	3	2	1	4	57		
Franklin.....	5	4	...	9	1063	6611	7316	164	15	12	59		
Wilmot.....	5	3	1	9	3000	2567	5913	687	26	31	65		
All.....	5827	23,173	24,260	3065	12,015	178	138	49	2	1	4	57		

Para. 9. TABLE XVII.—General Election, 23rd January, 1913. —Party Voting. Percentage of Voters who voted for all the Candidates of a Party.

District.	Liberal Party.		Labour Party.		All Voters.
	No. of Candidates.	Percentage of (Voters who voted for all Liberal Candidates) to (Voters who gave First Choice to a Liberal Candidate).	No. of Candidates.	Percentage of (Voters who voted for all Labour Candidates) to (Voters who gave First Choice to a Labour Candidate).	Percentage who Voted for all the Candidates of either Party.
Bass.....	4	90·0	4	88·7	89·3
Darwin ...	5	78·7	5	78·9	78·8
Denison ...	7	73·8	7	76·2	74·9
Franklin ...	5	80·3	4	81·5	80·8
Wilmot ...	5	78·5	3	87·8	75·6
All	80·1	...	82·2	80·0

The voters tabulated in this table are only those on whose papers there was party-voting (Para. 9).

Para. 9. TABLE XVIII.—General Elections, 30th April, 1912, and 23rd January, 1913. —Votes lost by the Parties through Short-Voting and Cross-Voting.

VOTES LOST BY THE PARTIES THROUGH SHORT-VOTING.

District.	Liberal.		Labor.	
	1912.	1913.	1912.	1913.
Bass.....	83	0	109	14
Darwin	1	20	23	0
Denison	103	67	25	10
Franklin.....	160	7	101	35
Wilmot	35	7	79	0
All	382	101	337	59

VOTES LOST BY THE PARTIES THROUGH CROSS-VOTING.

Bass.....	117	6	73	126
Darwin	73	101	24	15
Denison	124	140	38	26
Franklin.....	97	58	78	46
Wilmot	46	71	159	12
All	457	376	372	225

LOSSES EXPRESSED AS FRACTIONS OF ALL VOTES POLLED BY PARTIES.

SHORT-VOTING.

	Liberal.		Labor.	
	1912.	1913.	1912.	1913.
All Tasmania	1 in 105	1 in 358	1 in 100	1 in 536

CROSS-VOTING.

All Tasmania	1 in 88	1 in 96	1 in 90	1 in 140
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In preparing these tables it has been assumed that a voter's party allegiance is indicated by the first choice on his ballot-paper.

By "Short-Voting" is meant the giving of choices to some, but not all, of the candidates of a party without choices for any candidates of other parties.

By "Cross-Voting" is meant the giving of choices to candidates of more than one party (excepting cases in which choices are given to all the candidates of one party and only subsequent choices to other candidate-).

A full explanation of the compilation of these tables is given in the Report on the General Election of 30th April, 1912, Appendix, Table IV.

TABLE XX.—General Election, 23rd January, 1913.—Analysis of the Votes of the Six successful Candidates and of the Seventh Candidate, at the end of the Scrutiny.

District.	Of these Votes the following Numbers were given to these Seven Candidates as—									Total Effective at end of Scrutiny.	Votes Exhausted or lost as Fractions.	Total Votes recorded.
	No. 1 Choices.	No. 2 Choices.	No. 3 Choices.	No. 4 Choices.	No. 5 Choices.	No. 6 Choices.	No. 7 Choices.	No. 8 Choices.	No. 9 and subsequent Choices.			
Bass.....	11,622	1075	84	58	18	4	12,861	910	13,771
Darwin.....	10,638	929	165	179	44	2	11,957	658	12,615
Denison.....	10,819	1838	579	251	98	19	13	5	..	13,622	1227	14,849
Franklin.....	12,025	2219	662	234	41	1	15,182	61	15,243
Wilmot.....	9890	1192	382	167	191	47	3	1	...	11,873	416	12,289
All.....	54,994	7253	1872	889	392	73	16	6	...	65,495	3272	68,767

Of the Votes effective at the end of the scrutiny the following percentages were given to the Six successful Candidates and the Seventh Candidate as—

District.	No. 1 Choices.	No. 2 Choices.	No. 3 Choices.	No. 4 Choices.	No. 5 Choices.	No. 6 Choices.	No. 7 and Subsequent Choices.
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Bass.....	90·37	8·36	0·65	0·45	0·14	0·03	...
Darwin.....	88·98	7·77	1·38	1·50	0·37
Denison.....	79·42	13·49	4·25	1·84	0·72	0·14	0·14
Franklin.....	79·20	14·61	4·36	1·55	0·27	0·01	...
Wilmot.....	83·30	10·03	3·22	1·41	1·62	0·40	0·02
All.....	83·97	11·07	2·86	1·36	0·60	0·11	0·03

Para. 7. TABLE XXI.—General Election, 23rd January, 1913.—Average Values as Fractions of a Vote of all Choices recorded.

(Obtained by dividing the Numbers of Votes in Table XX. by the Number of corresponding Choices in Table XIV.)

District.	No. 1 Choices.	No. 2 Choices.	No. 3 Choices.	No. 4 Choices.	No. 5 Choices.	No. 6 Choices.	No. 7 Choices.	No. 8 Choices.	No. 9 and Subsequent Choices.
Bass.....	·844	·078	·006	·004	·041	·014
Darwin.....	·843	·074	·013	·015	·091	·025
Denison.....	·729	·124	·039	·017	·007	·001	·001	·050	...
Franklin.....	·789	·146	·044	·017	·054	·004
Wilmot.....	·805	·097	·031	·018	·028	·058	·025	·010	...
All.....	·800	·105	·027	·014	·010	·005	·001	·014	...

[NOTE.—This table gives the average values of all choices recorded, not merely of the choices which produced the Votes effective at the end of the Scrutiny.]

Table VIII. of the Report for 1909 gives similar information for the Election of that year. For the Election of 1912, the laborious examination of the papers required to ascertain the values of the second and subsequent choices was not undertaken. The values of the first choices in 1912 were—Bass, ·728 of a vote; Darwin, ·842; Denison, ·699; Franklin, ·733; Wilmot, ·772; all, ·752.

TABLE XXII.—General Election, 23rd January, 1919.—Table showing the Approximate Number of Votes of which the Distribution might have been altered if the Rule (b) (i), (see Para. 13 of the Report), of the Municipal Representation Bill, 1908, for the Transfer of Surpluses had been used in place of the Rules of "The Electoral Act, 1907."

(NOTE.—The number of Votes obtained by each Candidate on a transfer of a Surplus is the same according to both sets of Rules; the difference between the two sets can show itself only when the papers on which these transferred Votes are recorded have to be counted again.)

District.	Some of the Papers distributed in transferring Surpluses had to be counted again; the Value in Votes of the Papers which were counted again was as follows:—						General Election, 30th April, 1909. Percentage of Total of (a) and (b) to Total Votes.
	(a) Papers which were distributed in transferring Surpluses obtained at First Count, and which were counted again.		(b) Papers which were distributed in transferring Surpluses obtained by Transfer, and which were counted again.		Total of (a) and (b).		
	Value in Votes.	Percentage to Total Votes.	Value in Votes.	Percentage to Total Votes.	Value.	Percentage to Total Votes.	
Bass.....	111	0·81	0	0·00	111	0·81	2·53
Darwin ...	0	0·00	80	0·63	80	0·63	1·23
Denison ...	17	0·11	135	0·91	152	1·02	0·51
Franklin ...	109	0·71	438	2·87	547	3·59	4·14
Wilmot ...	23	0·19	180	1·47	203	1·65	3·64
All ...	260	0·38	833	1·21	1093	1·59	2·17

PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION

LIST OF PUBLICATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF TASMANIA.

1896.

"The Electoral Act, 1896."

Not obtainable separately. The volume of Statutes for 1896 can be purchased from the Government Printer, Hobart. Price, £2 16s. Postage: Australia, 3d.; New Zealand, 1s. 2d.; other Countries, 2s. 4d.

1897.

R. M. Johnston (Government Statistician, Tasmania): Observations on the Working Results of the Hare System of Election in Tasmania.

Issued as a Pamphlet (out of print). Also in Papers and Proceedings of the Royal Society of Tasmania, 1897. Obtainable from the Society, Hobart. Price, 15s. Postage: Australia, 1d.; New Zealand, 4d.; other Countries, 7d.

1899.

R. M. Johnston (Government Statistician, Tasmania): Further Observations on the Hare System.

Out of print.

1907.

"The Electoral Act, 1907."

Obtainable from the Government Printer, Hobart. Price, 5s. 10d. Postage: Australia, 3d.; New Zealand, 2d.; other Countries, 3d.

1908.

P. C. Douglas (Under Secretary and Chief Electoral Officer of Tasmania): Explanation and Illustrations of the Hare-Clark System of Election.*

R. M. Johnston (Government Statistician, Tasmania): The New Hare System of Election in Tasmania: Practical Illustration of the Working of the System.

Out of print.

1909.

Report on the General Election for the House of Assembly, 30th April, 1909.²

1912.

Report on the General Election for the House of Assembly, 30th April, 1912.*

E. L. Piesse: The Theory of the Quota in Proportional Representation, I.*

1913.

E. L. Piesse: The Theory of the Quota in Proportional Representation, II.*

E. L. Piesse: A Bibliography of Proportional Representation in Tasmania.*

Report on the General Election of 23rd January, 1913.*

* Obtainable from the State Electoral Department, Hobart.

TABLE XVI.—General Election, 23rd January, 1913—Party-Voting and Cross-Voting.

DISTRICT OF BASS.

Candidate.	Party-Voting.						Cross-Voting.				Total of all Papers.			
	Papers having—					Total of (a), (b), (c), (d), (e).		Grand Totals.		Totals.				
	2nd and 3rd Choices for same Party as 1st and no other Choices.	2nd, 3rd, and 4th Choices for Candidates of same Party as 1st and no other Choices.	2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th Choices for Candidates of same Party as 1st and no other Choices.	2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Choices for Candidates of same Party as 1st and no other Choices.	2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, & 7th Choices for Candidates of same Party as 1st and no other Choices.	Number.	Percentage to all Papers.	Number.	Percentage to all Papers.	Number.		Percentage to all Papers.		
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)		%		%		%				
Lib. (4) Anderson	58	1785	1843	93	131	7	1974
Becker	80	1784	1864	91	175	9	2039
Guy	44	969	1013	90	118	10	1181
Howroyd	46	1611	1657	93	6877	92.0	131	7	555	8.0	1788
Hayes	48	1520	1568	95	75	5	1643
McKenzie	52	1018	1070	92	87	8	1157
Sadler	54	944	998	88	132	12	1180
Solomon	83	2672	2755	95	6391	93.4	154	5	448	6.6	2909
Total	465	12,303	12,768	92.7	1003	7.3	13,771

DISTRICT OF DARWIN.

Lib. (5) Belton	135	128	1209	1472	85	264	15	1786
Hurst	62	89	1074	1225	89	147	11	1372
Jones	10	5	108	123	79	33	21	156
Ogden	63	101	1451	1615	92	136	8	1751
Watkins	44	49	1242	1335	94	5770	89.6	91	6	671	10.4	1426
Lamerton	37	46	532	615	83	127	17	742
Laughton	77	61	804	942	87	137	13	1079
Payne	85	60	1214	1359	92	125	8	1484
Pullen	58	78	1076	1212	90	129	10	1341
Whitsett	75	101	1235	1411	92	5539	89.7	117	8	635	10.3	1528
Total	646	718	9945	11,309	89.6	1306	10.4	12,615

DISTRICT OF DENISON.

Lib. (7) Barker	24	16	18	120	972	1150	89	144	11	1294
Edmonds	13	6	13	51	634	717	94	47	6	764
Giblin	31	19	35	186	1336	1607	91	153	9	1760
O'Brien	11	5	7	45	271	339	86	53	14	392
Sheridan	23	21	14	97	787	942	92	85	8	1027
Waterworth	10	9	15	45	381	460	92	42	8	502
Woods	37	31	40	126	1051	1285	92	6500	91.1	108	8	682	8.9	1393
Bottrill	13	24	...	28	249	314	85	55	15	369
Davies	56	49	52	234	1342	1733	91	169	9	1902
Fullerton	38	23	18	116	1046	1241	94	80	6	1321
Lewis	51	37	51	216	1785	2140	93	152	7	2292
Paterson	10	7	3	22	111	153	76	49	24	202
Rattle	18	15	17	67	405	522	84	98	16	620
Valentine	18	21	35	91	758	923	91	7026	91.0	88	9	691	9.0	1011
Total	353	283	318	1444	11,128	13,526	91.1	1323	8.9	14,849

DISTRICT OF FRANKLIN.

Lib. (4) Banks	70	739	809	85	141	15	950
Dicker	114	690	804	86	116	14	920
Farle	287	2654	2941	91	293	9	3234
Martin	93	1359	1452	92	6006	90.0	121	8	671	10.0	1573
Cotton	102	182	2359	2643	91	254	9	2897
Evans	86	109	1653	1848	92	159	8	2007
Ewing	90	109	1431	1630	93	117	7	1747
Hean	109	95	1071	1275	90	147	10	1422
McDermott	26	27	362	415	84	7811	91.2	78	16	756	8.8	493
Total	977	5964	6876	13,817	90.6	1427	9.4	15,243

DISTRICT OF WILMOT.*

Lib. (3) Lyons	1896†	1896	86	302	14	2198	
O'Keefe	881†	881	87	127	13	1008	
Shoobridge	1129†	1129	91	3906	87.8	116	9	545	12.2	1245	
Best	60	46	838	944	81	219	19	1163	
Hays	66	68	1168	1302	86	204	14	1506	
Lee	56	73	1191	1320	91	136	9	1456	
Mulcahy	54	85	1617	1756	90	205	10	1961	
Walduck	32	35	676	643	83	5965	86.9	132	17	896	13.1	775	
Total	4174	307	5390	9871	87.3	1441	12.7	11,312*	
Totals for Tasmania	6615	19,575	22,529	1444	11,128	61,291	90.4	6499	9.6	67,790*	
Totals for the Parties								Labour	28,559	90.3	3073	9.7	31,632
								Liberal	32,732	90.5	3426	9.5	36,158

* Excluding papers on which first choice given to the Independent candidate, Cameron. † Including papers on which second and third choices were for Labour candidates, and fourth choices for other candidates.

Para. 10.

TABLE XIX.—General Elections, 30th April, 1909, 30th April, 1912, 23rd January, 1913—The Strengths of the Parties.

District.	Election.	I.—First Choices.					II.—First, Second, and Third Choices.				III.—Papers on which there was no Cross-voting.			
		For Liberal Candidates. (a)	For Labour Candidates. (b)	Total Number of First Choices. (c)	Strength of Liberal Party. (e)	Strength of Labour Party. (d)	For Liberal Candidates. (a)	For Labour Candidates. (b)	Strength of Liberal Party. (e)	Strength of Labour Party. (d)	For Liberal Candidates. (a)	For Labour Candidates. (b)	Strength of Liberal Party. (e)	Strength of Labour Party. (f)
Bass	1909	5795	3275	9070	63·9	36·1	16,310	10,900	59·9	40·1	*	*	*	*
	1912	7626	7109	14,735	51·8	48·2	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
	1913	6839	6932	13,771	49·7	50·3	20,515	20,798	49·7	50·3	6391	6377	50·0	50·0
Darwin	1909	3912	5493	9405	41·6	58·4	11,242	16,973	39·8	60·2	*	*	*	*
	1912	6848	7259	13,743	47·2	52·8	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
	1913	6174	6441	12,615	48·9	51·1	18,510	19,335	48·9	51·1	5539	5770	49·0	51·0
Denison	1909	8119	3218	11,337	71·6	28·4	24,068	9943	70·8	29·2	*	*	*	*
	1912	8255	7901	16,156	51·1	48·9	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
	1913	7717	7132	14,849	52·0	48·0	22,566	21,981	50·7	49·3	7026	6500	51·9	48·1
Franklin	1909	6837	3448	10,285	66·5	33·5	17,122	13,733	55·5	44·5	*	*	*	*
	1912	9306	6930	16,239	57·3	42·7	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
	1913	8566	6677	15,243	56·2	43·8	23,809	21,920	52·1	47·9	7811	6006	56·5	43·5
Wilmot	1909	5230	3633	8863	59·0	41·0	14,093	12,496	53·0	47·0	*	*	*	*
	1912	8587	4426	13,013	66·0	34·0	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
	1913	6861	4451	12,289	55·8	36·2	19,004	16,504	51·6	44·8	5965	3906	60·4	39·6
All	1909	29,893	19,067	48,960	61·0	39·0	82,835	64,045	56·4	43·6	*	*	*	*
	1912	40,252	33,634	73,886	54·5	45·5	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
	1913	36,157	31,633	68,767	52·6	46·0	104,404	100,538	50·6	48·7	32,732	28,559	53·4	46·6

* Information not available.

For convenience of comparison of the strengths of the parties, the choices for all non-Labour candidates at the election of 1909 have been placed in the same columns (a) as the choices for the Liberal candidates in 1912 and 1913. The choices for the Independent candidate in Wilmot in 1913 are not included in columns (a) or (b); but the percentage strengths of the parties in I. and II., columns (c) and (d), are calculated upon all the votes recorded. Thus the entry in I., column (c), "First Choices, Wilmot, 1913, Strength of Liberal Party 55·8 per cent.," means that 55·8 per cent. of all the voters gave their first choices to Liberal candidates. The percentage strengths of the parties in III., columns (e) and (f), are calculated only upon the papers on which there was no cross-voting (see Table XVI.).

The First, Second, and Third Choices tabulated in II. are the First, Second, and Third Choices on all papers, not merely on the papers on which there was no cross-voting.

The following figures from the results of the elections for the Federal Senate and House of Representatives on 30th April, 1910, and 31st May, 1913, are added for comparison:—

Senate Elections, 1910 and 1913.—Votes Polled and Strengths of Parties.

Division.	Votes Polled, divided by 3.						Strengths of Parties.			
	1910.			1913.			1910.		1913.	
	Liberal.	Labour.	Total.*	Liberal.†	Labour.	Total.	Liberal.	Labour.	Liberal.	Labour.
Bass	4558	6772	11,330	7660	7018	14,678	40·2	59·8	52·2	47·8
Darwin	3364	6935	10,299	7353	8140	15,493	32·7	67·3	47·5	52·5
Denison	5210	6961	12,171	8276	8352	16,628	42·8	57·2	49·8	50·2
Franklin	6098	5679	11,777	9052	6805	15,857	51·8	48·2	57·1	42·9
Wilmot	5128	4331	9459	8194	4550	12,744	54·2	45·8	64·3	35·7
All	24,358	30,678	55,036	40,535	34,865	75,406	44·3	55·7	53·8	46·2

* Excluding 2041 votes for an Independent candidate.

† Including votes for an Independent Liberal.

House of Representatives Elections, 1910 and 1913.—Votes Polled and Strengths of Parties.

Division.	Votes Polled.						Strengths of Parties.			
	1910.			1913.			1910.		1913.	
	Liberal.	Labour.	Total.	Liberal.	Labour.	Total.	Liberal.	Labour.	Liberal.	Labour.
Bass	5022	6612	11,634	7212	7954	15,166	43·2	56·8	47·6	52·4
Darwin	3881	6681	10,562	7652	8312	15,964	36·7	63·3	47·9	52·1
Denison	5172	7170	12,342	7839	8943	16,782*	41·9	58·1	46·7	53·3
Franklin	6356	5554	11,910	9202	7209	16,510	53·4	46·6	55·8	44·2
Wilmot	5498	4216	9714	8251	4922	13,173	56·6	43·4	62·6	37·4
All	25,929	30,233	56,162	40,156	37,430	77,586*	46·2	53·8	51·8	48·2

* Excluding 261 votes for an Independent candidate.

GENERAL ELECTION, 1913.

RESULT-SHEET OF ELECTION FOR BASS.

Number of Members to be elected, **6**.

Number of Ballot-papers, **14,132**.

Number of Ballot-papers rejected as informal, **351**.

Number of valid Ballot-papers, **13,771**.

$$\text{Quota} = \frac{13771}{7} + 1 = 1968 \quad (\text{neglecting remainder.})$$

Table I.—Counting of the Choices.

No. of Count.	Description of Choices Counted. ["N.a.c." means "Next available choice."]	Number of Choices obtained by each Candidate at Count or Number of Papers placed in each Candidate's Compartment at Count. <small>[A number in a circle—e.g. (2)—is the number of the Count (if any) at which the Papers above it are counted again. "N.V." is an abbreviation for "no value," and indicates that the Papers above it have a value of less than one vote.]</small>								Papers exhausted at Count.	Total of Papers counted.	Transfer Value.	Votes transferred to Table II.
		ANDERSON	BECKER	GUY	HAYES	HOWROYD	MCKENZIE	SADLER	SOLOMON				
1	FIRST CHOICES ON ALL PAPERS	1974 ⁽⁴⁾	2039 ⁽³⁾	1131 ⁽⁵⁾	1643	1788	1157	1130	2909 ⁽²⁾	-	13,771	1	13,771
2	N.a.c. after Solomon on his papers at Count	-	-	9 ⁽⁶⁾	659	18	742	1481	-	-	2909	$\frac{941}{2909}$	941
3	N.a.c. after Becker on his papers at Count	-	-	1363 ⁽⁷⁾	24 ^{N.V.}	631	11 ^{N.V.}	9 ^{N.V.}	-	1 ^{N.V.}	2039	$\frac{71}{2039}$	71
4	N.a.c. after Anderson on his papers at Count	-	-	1429 ⁽⁸⁾	22 ^{N.V.}	518	2 ^{N.V.}	3 ^{N.V.}	-	-	1974	$\frac{6}{1974}$	6
5	N.a.c. after Guy on his papers at Count	-	-	-	47	1044 ⁽⁹⁾	10	16	-	14	1131	1	1131
6	N.a.c. after Guy on his papers at Count	-	-	-	1	-	1	4	-	3	9	$\frac{931}{2909}$	2
7	N.a.c. after Guy on his papers at Count	-	-	-	72	-	26 ^{N.V.}	17 ^{N.V.}	-	1248	1363	$\frac{71}{2039}$	47
8	N.a.c. after Guy on his papers at Count	-	-	-	88 ^{N.V.}	-	8 ^{N.V.}	16 ^{N.V.}	-	1317	1429	$\frac{6}{1974}$	4
9	N.a.c. after Howroyd on his papers at Count	-	-	-	16	-	8	38	-	982	1044	$\frac{891}{1044}$	891

Table II.—Distribution of the Effective Votes.

No. of Count.	Effective Votes credited to each Candidate at Count (entered above horizontal line) and Total Votes standing to the Credit of each Candidate at end of Count (entered below horizontal line).								Exhausted Votes.	Votes lost by omitting Fractional Remainders.	Total of Votes of all Candidates at end of Count.	Remarks.	No. of Count.
	ANDERSON	BECKER	GUY	HAYES	HOWROYD	MCKENZIE	SADLER	SOLOMON					
1	1974	2039	1131	1643	1788	1157	1130	2909	-	-	13771	Solomon, Becker, and Anderson elected	1
2	1974	2039	1133	1856	1793	1397	1609	1968	-	2	13771	Distribution of Solomon's surplus	2
3	1974	1968	1180	1856	1814	1397	1609	1968	-	5	13771	Distribution of Becker's surplus	3
4	1968	1968	1184	1856	1815	1397	1609	1968	-	6	13771	Distribution of Anderson's surplus	4
5	1968	1968	1131	47	1044	10	16		14	6	13771	Guy excluded, his first choices distributed, and Howroyd elected	5
6	1968	1968	51	1903	2859	1407	1626	1968	14	7	13771		6
7	1968	1968	4	1905	2859	1407	1626	1968	57	9	13771	Distribution of Guy's transferred votes	7
8	1968	1968	-	1905	2859	1407	1626	1968	61	9	13771		8
9	1968	1968	-	1918	1968	1413	1658	1968	899	11	13771	Howroyd's surplus distributed, McKenzie excluded, Hayes and Sadler elected	9

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RESULT-SHEET OF ELECTION FOR BASS.

Number of Members to be elected, 6. Number of Ballot-papers, 15,133. Number of Ballot-papers rejected as informal, 398. Number of valid Ballot-papers, 14,735.

Quota = 14,735 / 7 + 1 = 2106 (neglecting remainder).

Table I.—Counting of the Choices.

Table I: Counting of the Choices. Columns include Candidate Name, Count, and various ballot categories (Anderson, Bakke, Becker, etc.). Rows list candidates from 1 to 55.

Table II.—Distribution of the Effective Votes.

Table II: Distribution of the Effective Votes. Columns include Candidate Name, Count, and various ballot categories. Rows list candidates from 1 to 55. Includes handwritten notes on the right side.

GENERAL ELECTION, 1913.

RESULT-SHEET OF ELECTION FOR FRANKLIN.

Number of Members to be elected, **6**.

Number of Ballot-papers, **15,739**.

Number of Ballot-papers rejected as informal, **496**.

Number of valid Ballot-papers, **15,243**.

$$\text{Quota} = \frac{15243}{7} + 1 = 2178 \quad (\text{neglecting remainder}).$$

Table I.—Counting of the Choices.

No. of Count.	Description of Choice Counted. ["N.a.c." means "Next available choice."]	Number of Choices obtained by each Candidate at Count or Number of Papers placed in each Candidate's Compartment at Count. [A number in a circle (1)-(14) is the number of the Count (if any) at which the Papers above it are counted again. "N.V." is an abbreviation for "no value," and indicates that the Papers above it have a value of less than one vote.]										Papers exhausted at Count.	Total of Papers counted.	Transfer Value.	Votes transferred to Table II.
		BANKS	COTTON	DICKER	EARLE	EVANS	EWING	HEAN	MCDERMOTT	MARTIN					
1	FIRST CHOICES ON ALL PAPERS	950 (10)	2897 (3)	920	3234 (2)	2007	1747	1422	493 (5)	1573	-	15,243	-	-	
2	N.a.c. after Earle on his papers at Count	313 (11)	-	1579	-	48	22	26	20 (6)	1226	-	3234	$\frac{1056}{3234}$	1056	
3	N.a.c. after Cotton on his papers at Count	5 (12)	-	36	-	1343 (4)	644	606	254 (7)	9	-	2897	$\frac{719}{2897}$	719	
4	N.a.c. after Evans on his papers at Count	1 (N.V.)	-	4 (N.V.)	-	-	934	317	79 (8)	3 (N.V.)	5	1343	$\frac{177}{1343}$	177	
5	N.a.c. after McDermott on his papers at Count	2 (13)	-	20	-	-	172 (9)	274	-	24	1	493	$\frac{1}{493}$	493	
6	N.a.c. after McDermott on his papers at Count	1 (N.V.)	-	14	-	-	-	-	-	3 (N.V.)	2	20	$\frac{1056}{3234}$	6	
7	N.a.c. after McDermott on his papers at Count	-	-	4	-	-	-	229	-	8	13	254	$\frac{719}{2897}$	63	
8	N.a.c. after McDermott on his papers at Count	2 (N.V.)	-	1 (N.V.)	-	-	-	59	-	3 (N.V.)	14	79	$\frac{177}{1343}$	10	
9	N.a.c. after Ewing on his papers at Count	1 (N.V.)	-	3 (N.V.)	-	-	-	155	-	-	13	172	$\frac{30}{172}$	30	
10	N.a.c. after Banks on his papers at Count	-	-	589	-	-	-	12	-	336 (14)	13	950	$\frac{1}{950}$	950	
11	N.a.c. after Banks on his papers at Count	-	-	289	-	-	-	1	-	-	23	313	$\frac{1056}{3234}$	102	
12	N.a.c. after Banks on his papers at Count	-	-	4	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	5	$\frac{719}{2897}$	1	
13	N.a.c. after Banks on his papers at Count	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	$\frac{1}{2}$	2	
14	N.a.c. after Martin on his papers at Count	-	-	297	-	-	-	6	-	-	33	336	$\frac{158}{336}$	158	

Table II.—Distribution of the Effective Votes.

No. of Count.	Effective Votes credited to each Candidate at Count (entered above horizontal line) and Total Votes standing to the Credit of each Candidate at end of Count (entered below horizontal line).										Exhausted Votes.	Votes lost by omitting Fractional Remainders.	Total of Votes of all Candidates at end of Count.	Remarks.	No. of Count.	
	BANKS	COTTON	DICKER	EARLE	EVANS	EWING	HEAN	MCDERMOTT	MARTIN							
1	950	2897	920	3234	2007	1747	1422	493	1573	-	-	-	-	15,243	Earle and Cotton elected	1
2	102		515	-1056	15	7	8	6	400				3		Earle's surplus distributed	2
	1052	2897	1435	2178	2022	1754	1430	499	1973	-	3	15,243				
3	1	-719	8		333	159	150	63	2				3		Cotton's surplus distributed and Evans elected	3
	1053	2178	1443	2178	2355	1913	1580	562	1975	-	6	15,243				
4					-177	123	41	10					3		Evans' surplus distributed	4
	1053	2178	1443	2178	2178	2036	1621	572	1975	-	9	15,243				
5	2		20		172	274	-493	24					1		McDermott excluded, his first choices distributed, and Ewing elected	5
	1055	2178	1463	2178	2178	2208	1895	79	1999	1	9	15,243				
6			4					-6					2		Distribution of McDermott's transferred votes	6
	1055	2178	1467	2178	2178	2208	1895	73	1999	1	11	15,243				
7							56	-63	1	3	3				Distribution of McDermott's transferred votes	7
	1055	2178	1467	2178	2178	2208	1951	10	2000	4	14	15,243				
8							7	-10		1	2				Distribution of McDermott's transferred votes	8
	1055	2178	1467	2178	2178	2208	1958	-	2000	5	16	15,243				
9							-30	27		2	1				Ewing's surplus distributed	9
	1055	2178	1467	2178	2178	2178	1985	-	2000	7	17	15,243				
10	-950		589				12		336	13					Banks excluded, his first choices distributed, and Martin elected	10
	105	2178	2056	2178	2178	2178	1997	-	2336	20	17	15,243				
11	-102		94							7	1				Distribution of Banks' transferred votes	11
	3	2178	2150	2178	2178	2178	1997	-	2336	27	18	15,243				
12	-1										1				Distribution of Banks' transferred votes	12
	2	2178	2150	2178	2178	2178	1997	-	2336	27	19	15,243				
13	-2		2												Martin's surplus distributed, Hean excluded, and Dicker elected	13
	-	2178	2152	2178	2178	2178	1997	-	2336	27	19	15,243				
14			141				2		-158	15					Martin's surplus distributed, Hean excluded, and Dicker elected	14
	-	2178	2293	2178	2178	2178	1999	-	2178	42	19	15,243				

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GENERAL ELECTION, 1913.

RESULT-SHEET OF ELECTION FOR WILMOT.

Number of Members to be elected. **6.**

Number of Ballot-papers, **12,586.**

Number of Ballot-papers rejected as informal, **297.**

Number of valid Ballot-papers, **12,289.**

Quota = $\frac{12289}{7} + 1 = 1756$ (neglecting remainder.)

Table I.—Counting of the Choices.

No. of Count.	Description of Choices Counted. ["N.a.c." means "Next available choice."]	Number of Choices obtained by each Candidate at Count or Number of Papers placed in each Candidate's Compartment at Count. [A number in a circle (1)-(9) is the number of the Count (if any) at which the Papers above it are counted again. "N.V." is an abbreviation for "no value," and indicates that the Papers above it have a value of less than one vote.]										Papers exhausted at Count.	Total of Papers counted.	Transfer Value	Votes transferred to Table II
		BEST.	CAMERON.	HAYS.	LEE.	LYONS.	MULCAHY.	O'KEEFE.	SHOBRIDGE.	WALDUCK.					
1	FIRST CHOICES ON ALL PAPERS	1163	977 ⁽⁹⁾	1506	1456	2198 ⁽²⁾	1961 ⁽³⁾	1008	1245	775 ⁽⁴⁾	-	12,289	-	12,289	
2	N.a.c. after Lyons	8	37 ⁽¹⁰⁾	30	18	-	-	1572	525	8 ⁽⁵⁾	-	2198	$\frac{442}{2198}$	442	
3	N.a.c. after Mulcahy	200	31 ⁽¹¹⁾	894	640	-	-	43	9	144 ⁽⁶⁾	-	1961	$\frac{205}{1961}$	205	
4	N.a.c. after Walduck	151	8 ⁽¹²⁾	194 ⁽⁸⁾	374 ⁽⁷⁾	-	-	22	25	-	1	775	1	775	
5	N.a.c. after Walduck	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	4	-	1	8	$\frac{442}{2198}$	1	
6	N.a.c. after Walduck	129	4 ⁽¹³⁾	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	9	144	$\frac{205}{1961}$	15	
7	N.a.c. after Lee	339	11 ⁽¹⁴⁾	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	14	374	$\frac{143}{374}$	143	
8	N.a.c. after Hays	171	6 ⁽¹⁵⁾	-	-	-	-	4	5	-	8	194	$\frac{43}{194}$	43	
9	N.a.c. after Cameron	403 ⁽¹⁶⁾	-	-	-	-	-	219	121	-	234	977	1	977	
10	N.a.c. after Cameron	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	11	-	2	37	$\frac{442}{2198}$	7	
11	N.a.c. after Cameron	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	3	-	26	31	$\frac{205}{1961}$	3	
12	N.a.c. after Cameron	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	8	1	8	
13	N.a.c. after Cameron	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	3	4	$\frac{205}{1961}$	-	
14	N.a.c. after Cameron	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	10	11	$\frac{143}{374}$	4	
15	N.a.c. after Cameron	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	4	6	$\frac{43}{194}$	1	
16	N.a.c. after Best	-	-	-	-	-	-	27	21	-	355	403	$\frac{161}{403}$	161	

Table II.—Distribution of the Effective Votes.

No. of Count.	Effective Votes credited to each Candidate at Count (entered above horizontal line) and Total Votes standing to the Credit of each Candidate at end of Count (entered below horizontal line).										Exhausted Votes.	Votes lost by emitting fractional Remainders.	Total of Votes of all Candidates at end of Count.	Remarks.	No. of Count.
	BEST.	CAMERON.	HAYS.	LEE.	LYONS.	MULCAHY.	O'KEEFE.	SHOBRIDGE.	WALDUCK.						
1	1163	977	1506	1456	2198	1961	1008	1245	775	-	-	-	12,289	Lyons and Mulcahy elected	1
2	1	7	6	3	-442	-	316	105	1	-	3	-	12,289	Distribution of Lyons' surplus	2
3	20	3	93	66	-205	4	-	15	-	4	-	12,289	Distribution of Mulcahy's surplus	3	
4	1184	987	1605	1525	1756	1756	1328	1350	791	-	7	-	12,289	Walduck excluded, his first choices distributed, and Hays and Lee elected	4
5	151	8	194	374	-	-	22	25	-775	1	-	1	12,289		5
6	1335	995	1799	1899	1756	1756	1350	1375	16	1	7	-	12,289	Distribution of Walduck's transferred votes	6
7	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-1	1	-	1	12,289		7
8	1348	995	1799	1899	1756	1756	1350	1375	15	1	8	-	12,289		8
9	129	4	-	-143	-	-	3	-	5	2	-	2	12,289	Lee's surplus distributed	9
10	1477	999	1799	1756	1756	1756	1350	1378	-	6	12	-	12,289	Hays' surplus distributed	10
11	37	1	-43	-	-	-	1	-	1	3	-	3	12,289		11
12	1514	1000	1756	1756	1756	1756	1350	1379	-	7	15	-	12,289	Cameron excluded, his first choices distributed, and Best elected	12
13	403	-977	-	-	-	-	219	121	-	234	-	234	12,289		13
14	1917	23	1756	1756	1756	1756	1569	1500	-	241	15	-	12,289		14
15	-7	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	-	1	-	1	12,289		15
16	1917	16	1756	1756	1756	1756	1573	1502	-	241	16	-	12,289		16
17	-3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	3	12,289		17
18	1917	13	1756	1756	1756	1756	1573	1502	-	241	19	-	12,289		18
19	-8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	8	12,289	Distribution of Cameron's transferred votes	19
20	1917	5	1756	1756	1756	1756	1573	1502	-	249	19	-	12,289		20
21	1917	5	1756	1756	1756	1756	1573	1502	-	249	19	-	12,289		21
22	-4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	4	12,289		22
23	1917	1	1756	1756	1756	1756	1573	1502	-	249	23	-	12,289		23
24	-1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	12,289		24
25	1917	-	1756	1756	1756	1756	1573	1502	-	249	24	-	12,289		25
26	-161	-	-	-	-	-	10	8	-	141	2	-	12,289	Best's surplus distributed, Shoobridge excluded, and O'Keefe elected	26
27	1756	-	1756	1756	1756	1756	1583	1510	-	390	26	-	12,289		27

GENERAL ELECTION, 1913.

RESULT-SHEET OF ELECTION FOR DENISON.

Number of Members to be elected, 6. Number of Ballot-papers, 15,340. Number of Ballot-papers rejected as informal, 491. Number of valid Ballot-papers, 14,849.

Quota = $\frac{14849}{7} = 2122$ (neglecting remainder)

Table I.—Counting of the Choices.

No. of Count	Description of Choices Counted. [If a voter has marked "Next available choice" on his paper at Count.]	Number of Choices obtained by each Candidate at Count or Number of Papers placed in each Candidate's Column at Count. [A number in parentheses indicates the number of the Paper (or Papers) on which the Preference is an "informal" paper, i. e., an ballot paper for an office not indicated on it. Papers which do not have a valid choice are not counted.]													Total of Papers counted	Total of Votes credited to each Candidate at Count	Surplus Votes	Votes transferred to other Candidates	
		BARBER	BOTTRILL	DAVIES	EDMONDS	FULLERTON	GIBLIN	LEWIS	O'BRIEN	PATERSON	RATTLE	SHERIDAN	VALENTINE	WATERWORTH					WOODS
1	FIRST CHOICES OF ALL PAPERS	1294	369	1902	764	1321	1760	2292	392	202	620	1027	1011	502	1393	-	14,849	-	-
2	N. a. c. after Lewis on his papers at Count	3	60	1540	1	351	10	7	35	69	3	209	1	3	-	2292	170	170	
3	N. a. c. after Paterson on his papers at Count	1	18	46	-	46	5	-	2	34	3	40	3	4	-	202	1	202	
4	N. a. c. after Paterson on his papers at Count	2	2	8	-	7	1	-	-	6	-	11	-	-	-	35	170	2	
5	N. a. c. after Bottrill on his papers at Count	6	-	182	8	101	8	-	2	28	1	30	1	2	-	369	1	369	
6	N. a. c. after Bottrill on his papers at Count	2	-	-	-	34	-	-	-	8	-	17	-	-	-	60	170	4	
7	N. a. c. after Bottrill on his papers at Count	3	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	3	-	6	-	-	-	18	1	18	
8	N. a. c. after Davies on his papers at Count	5	1	-	6	113	1	-	2	20	-	32	-	1	6	182	122	122	
9	N. a. c. after O'Brien on his papers at Count	1	46	-	25	7	97	-	-	5	120	3	22	60	7	392	1	392	
10	N. a. c. after O'Brien on his papers at Count	5	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2	1	2	
11	N. a. c. after O'Brien on his papers at Count	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2	1	2	
12	N. a. c. after O'Brien on his papers at Count	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	122	182	1	
13	N. a. c. after Waterworth on his papers at Count	1	37	-	26	1	224	-	-	4	81	2	-	127	-	502	1	502	
14	N. a. c. after Waterworth on his papers at Count	3	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	3	1	3	
15	N. a. c. after Waterworth on his papers at Count	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	1	1	
16	N. a. c. after Waterworth on his papers at Count	9	3	-	2	-	3	-	-	-	3	-	-	11	-	22	1	22	
17	N. a. c. after Rattle on his papers at Count	1	6	-	3	349	24	-	-	-	18	205	-	8	7	620	1	620	
18	N. a. c. after Rattle on his papers at Count	2	-	-	-	30	-	-	-	-	-	35	-	2	2	69	170	5	
19	N. a. c. after Rattle on his papers at Count	3	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	-	1	23	-	1	2	34	1	34	
20	N. a. c. after Rattle on his papers at Count	5	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	28	1	28	1	
21	N. a. c. after Rattle on his papers at Count	7	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	3	1	3	1	
22	N. a. c. after Rattle on his papers at Count	8	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	12	-	3	20	122	182	13	
23	N. a. c. after Rattle on his papers at Count	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	2	1	5	1	5	1	
24	N. a. c. after Rattle on his papers at Count	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	2	1	4	1	4	
25	N. a. c. after Giblin on his papers at Count	17	1	-	3	4	-	-	-	3	4	-	6	3	24	1	24	1	
26	N. a. c. after Edmonds on his papers at Count	1	269	-	-	5	-	-	-	295	5	-	188	2	764	1	764	1	
27	N. a. c. after Edmonds on his papers at Count	5	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	4	-	1	-	8	1	8	1	
28	N. a. c. after Edmonds on his papers at Count	8	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	6	122	182	4	4	
29	N. a. c. after Edmonds on his papers at Count	9	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	6	-	25	1	25	1	
30	N. a. c. after Edmonds on his papers at Count	15	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	1	-	2	1	26	1	26	
31	N. a. c. after Edmonds on his papers at Count	16	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	2	1	2	
32	N. a. c. after Edmonds on his papers at Count	17	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	3	1	3	1	3	
33	N. a. c. after Edmonds on his papers at Count	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	1	1	1	
34	N. a. c. after Valentine on his papers at Count	8	-	-	925	-	-	-	-	11	-	15	52	1011	1	1011	1	1011	
35	N. a. c. after Valentine on his papers at Count	2	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	203	209	170	2292	15	15	
36	N. a. c. after Valentine on his papers at Count	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	38	40	1	40	1	40	
37	N. a. c. after Valentine on his papers at Count	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	30	1	30	1	30	
38	N. a. c. after Valentine on his papers at Count	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	16	17	170	2292	1	1	
39	N. a. c. after Valentine on his papers at Count	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	6	1	6	1	6	
40	N. a. c. after Valentine on his papers at Count	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	30	32	122	182	21	21	
41	N. a. c. after Valentine on his papers at Count	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	3	1	3	1	3	
42	N. a. c. after Valentine on his papers at Count	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	2	122	182	1	1	
43	N. a. c. after Valentine on his papers at Count	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	1	2	1	2	
44	N. a. c. after Valentine on his papers at Count	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	1	201	205	1	205	1	205	
45	N. a. c. after Valentine on his papers at Count	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	34	35	170	2292	2	2	
46	N. a. c. after Valentine on his papers at Count	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	21	23	1	23	1	23	
47	N. a. c. after Valentine on his papers at Count	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	14	1	14	1	14	1	
48	N. a. c. after Valentine on his papers at Count	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
49	N. a. c. after Valentine on his papers at Count	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12	12	122	182	8	8	8	
50	N. a. c. after Valentine on his papers at Count	23	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
51	N. a. c. after Valentine on his papers at Count	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
52	N. a. c. after Valentine on his papers at Count	26	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	5	1	5	1	5	
53	N. a. c. after Valentine on his papers at Count	27	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	1	4	1	4	1	
54	N. a. c. after Valentine on his papers at Count	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
55	N. a. c. after Valentine on his papers at Count	33	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
56	N. a. c. after Fullerton on his papers at Count	34	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	4	906	925	175	925	775	775	

Table II.—Distribution of the Effective Votes.

No. of Count	Effective Votes credited to each Candidate at Count (Centered above horizontal line); and Total Votes standing to the Credit of each Candidate at end of Count (Centered below horizontal line).															Excess of Votes	Votes lost by losing Candidates	Total of Votes of all Candidates at end of Count	Remarks	No. of Count
	BARBER	BOTTRILL	DAVIES	EDMONDS	FULLERTON	GIBLIN	LEWIS	O'BRIEN	PATERSON	RATTLE	SHERIDAN	VALENTINE	WATERWORTH	WOODS						
1	1294	369	1902	764	1321	1760	2292	392	202	620	1027	1011	502	1393	-	-	14,849	Lewis elected	1	
2	1294	373	2016	764	1347	1760	2122	392	204	625	1027	1026	502	1393	-	4	14,849	Lewis' surplus distributed	2	
3	1295	391	2062	764	1393	1765	2122	394	2	659	1030	1066	505	1397	-	4	14,849	Paterson excluded and his first choices distributed	3	
4	1295	391	2062	764	1393	1765	2122	394	-	659	1030	1066	505	1397	-	6	14,849	Distribution of Paterson's transferred votes	4	
5	1301	22	2244	772	1494	1773	2122	396	-	687	1031	1096	506	1399	-	6	14,849	Bottrill excluded, his first choices distributed, and Davies elected	5	
6	1301	18	2244	772	1496	1775	2122	396	-	687	1031	1097	506	1399	-	7	14,849	Distribution of Bottrill's transferred votes	6	
7	1301	-	2244	772	1505	1775	2122	396	-	690	1031	1103	506	1399	-	7	14,849	Davies' surplus distributed	7	
8	1301	-	2122	776	1580	1775	2122	397	-	703	1031	1124	506	1399	4	11	14,849	O'Brien excluded and his first choices distributed	8	
9	1347	-	2122	801	1587	1870	2122	397	-	708	1151	1127	528	1459	11	11	14,849	Distribution of O'Brien's transferred votes	9	
10	1347	-	2122	801	1587	1871	2122	397	-	708	1152	1127	528	1459	11	11	14,849	Distribution of O'Brien's transferred votes	10	
11	1347	-	2122	801	1587	1871	2122	397	-	708	1153	1127	528	1460	11	11	14,849	Distribution of O'Brien's transferred votes	11	
12	1347	-	2122	801	1587	1871	2122	397	-	708	1153	1128	528	1460	11	11	14,849	Waterworth excluded and his first choices distributed	12	
13	1384	-	2122	827	1588	2095	2122	-	-	712	1234	1130	26	1567	11	11	14,849	Distribution of Waterworth's transferred votes	13	
14	1384	-	2122	827	1588	2096	2122	-	-	712	1234	1130	23	1588	11	11	14,849	Distribution of Waterworth's transferred votes	14	
15	1384	-	2122	827	1589	2096	2122	-	-	712	1234	1130	22	1589	11	11	14,849	Distribution of Waterworth's transferred votes	15	
16	1387	-	2122	829	1589	2099	2122	-	-	712	1237	1130	-	1600						